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1 Introduction 
This thesis is a collection of three empirical papers that tests hypotheses within 
the context of two related and intersecting theoretical frameworks: rational 
expectations and efficient markets.1 The aim is to empirically explore to what 
extent households form their inflation expectations in a rational manner, and 
to explain why households’ perceptions may deviate from the measured 
official rate. This is done by studying how their expectations change with 
economic conditions and with information about their readiness to spend 
money on cars and houses. The thesis also addresses the effects of option 
introduction on the prices and risk of the underlying securities, where this 
information implicitly tests stock market efficiency. This last topic formed the 
base for my licentiate degree, and was defended at a public hearing in 
September 2000. 
1.1 Rational expectations, efficient markets and this 
thesis 
A large part of economics is concerned with expectations. Expectations refer 
to the forecasts or views that decision makers hold about future key variables 
in their decision-making process. Consumers planning to smooth consumption 
over time form expectations about future income, prices, interest rates and 
taxes (Hall 1978). Producers deciding on future investments form expectations 
of future sales, costs and returns (Simon 1979). Policy makers aiming to 
stabilise the economy or inflation use forward looking fiscal and monetary 
policies to achieve their goals (Phillips 1958; Taylor 1979). As such, 
                                                     
1  The information and views set out in this publication are those of the author and do not 
necessarily reflect the official opinion of the European Commission. The Commission does 
not guarantee the accuracy of the data included in this study. Neither the Commission nor 
any person acting on the Commission’s behalf may be held responsible for the use which 
may be made of the information contained therein. 
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expectations are a basic building block of economic theories, and economists 
try to measure them, analyse their effects on the economy, and study how they 
are formed. 
The assumption of rational expectations is still the standard methodology for 
modelling expectations (Evans and Honkapohja 2001). Although there are 
more recent expectation theories, rational expectations is still a rather recent 
step in a long line of theory development that emphasises the importance of 
expectations. 
The most simple assumption about expectations one can make is that of naïve 
or static expectations, which was used in the early literature. It implies that the 
current value of an economic variable is the best prediction of the value in the 
following period, and the notion of static expectations is credited to Alfred 
Marshall (see, e.g., Grossman 1981; Evans and Honkapohja 2001). One of the 
most well-known formal models incorporating static expectations was the 
‘cobweb theorem’ in agriculture. This model describes how cyclical demand 
and supply in a market can give rise to price fluctuations when producers have 
to decide on the amount to produce before they can observe the prices (Kaldor 
1934; Pashigian 2008). 
Adaptive expectations generalises the idea behind static expectations, 
postulating that economic agents take into account not just the current value of 
an economic variable, but a weighted average of past observations of the 
variable. It played an important role in modelling inflation expectations in 
monetary economics. Adaptive expectations was formally introduced by 
Cagan (1956), Nerlove (1958) and Friedman (1968), when studying 
hyperinflation, farmers’ planting decisions, and the role of monetary policy, 
respectively. 
Later research showed that these models were not sufficiently robust given 
their assumptions on how expectations were formed, as the results of both 
theoretical and empirical work depended on the specification of the 
expectations. In certain contexts, other forecasting rules could improve the 
forecasts, where the optimal forecast method proved to be contingent on the 
stochastic process of the variable being forecasted, i.e. there was an 
interdependence between the forecasting method and the economic model. 
John Muth (1961) recognised this problem and suggested that expectations 
might change in the course of events, and should therefore not be specified in 
a way that does not allow them to change. If the economic system changes, 
people should also change the way they form their expectations, at least 
eventually. Furthermore, Muth suggested that economic agents in models 
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should act consistent with the models used to explain their behaviour. This 
would ensure that the behaviour of the model was consistent with the economic 
agents’ beliefs about the economic system they act within (Sheffrin 1996). He 
called such expectations rational. 
Rational expectations is an equilibrium concept (Sargent 2008), where 
expectations are model consistent. Economic agents within the model are 
assumed to know the model and take the model’s predictions as valid. The 
assumption is that forecasts done within the model does not differ 
systematically from the market equilibrium of the model, i.e. economic agents 
do not make systematic errors when forecasting the future value of different 
variables, and any deviations are random. Given the information available, this 
is modelled by assuming that the expected value of an economic variable is 
equal to the expected value predicted by the model. 
Following the ‘rational expectation revolution’, a lot of research has been done 
concerning the bounds of rationality within the field of behavioural economics. 
Behavioural theories and models integrate insights from psychology, 
neuroscience, and microeconomics. The idea is that when people make 
decisions they are subject to cognitive limitations (or bounded rationality), 
self-control problems, and social preferences. For surveys of behavioural 
economics, see e.g. Dellavigna (2009), Camerer (2014), and Thaler (2015). 
The following two chapters should be placed in the intersection between these 
last two concepts, i.e. to what extent households form rational expectations or 
are rationally inattentive. Inattention follows from the constraints on rationality 
that households face, e.g. from insufficient processing capacity, lack of time, 
or other frictions that prevent households from forming expectations in line 
with rationality as prescribed by theory. The first chapter tests hypotheses 
implied by rational expectations and rational inattention, and the second 
distinguishes between different types of households to see if inattention differs 
depending on their intention to buy cars, houses or making home 
improvements. 
The final chapter is connected to the second and third chapter via the close 
relationship between rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis, 
which is a benchmark approach in financial economics. The efficient market 
hypothesis is usually attributed to Samuelson (1965) and Fama (1965). The 
two concepts of rational expectations and the efficient market hypothesis are 
often associated with each other (see, e.g., Mishkin 2016), as both are 
equilibrium concepts. The efficient market hypothesis postulates that asset 
prices reflect all available information, while rational expectations similarly 
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imply that prices reflect the best or optimal forecast of the assets’ future return. 
The two concepts are even claimed to be equivalent, but their respective 
development is better characterised as independent from each other (Delcey 
and Sergi 2019). 
The last chapter examines the effects of option introductions on the price and 
risk of the underlying assets. Black and Scholes (1973) assumed that options 
are redundant assets and could thereby derive a pricing rule for derivative 
securities. However, researchers recognise that financial markets are not 
complete, which imply that introducing derivatives could make markets more 
efficient, lead to welfare effects and make derivative markets interact with the 
underlying securities market (see, e.g., Ross 1976, Hakansson 1982, and 
Detemple and Selden 1991). By empirically testing hypotheses related to 
redundancy of derivative securities and the information content of option 
introductions, Chapter 4 is also related to the other two chapters, by providing 
implicit tests and evidence of the efficient market hypothesis. 
1.2 Survey data and rational expectations 
Instead of resorting to theoretical arguments to determine the best way to build 
an economic model based on expectations, a researcher can empirically 
examine the available data on households’, firms’ or experts’ expectations. 
Today there are several surveys that provide data on expectations. These 
surveys cover several aspects of economic development, including forecasts 
for inflation, commodity prices, interest rates, and foreign-exchange rates. 
Among the earliest and most used datasets are the Livingston data on inflation 
expectations; other examples include the Blue Chip Economic Indicator 
Survey, Commerce Department data, and Money Market Services. These 
datasets have been developed in the US. To mention two tests of rationality, 
Pessando (1975) was the first researcher to test for rationality using the 
Livingston data. He rejected the rationality hypothesis because the forecasts of 
inflation at different times in the future were not consistent with one another. 
Using the Blue Chip Economic Indicator Survey, Batchelor and Dua (1991) 
showed that individual interest-rate forecasts were rational in the sense that 
forecasts were unbiased and that the forecast error was uncorrelated with small 
information sets known at the time when the forecasts were made. However, 
the frequency of rational forecasts declined significantly when more 
information was used in the tests. 
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Today there are many survey-based datasets on expectations covering 
households and firms in several countries outside the US and on different 
continents. Some are qualitative surveys (non-numerical categorical data) and 
others are quantitative (numerical data). The focus of this thesis is on 
quantitative measures of households’ inflation expectations, and there are 
several examples of such surveys. Among the earlier datasets are the Swedish 
Household Survey (see, e.g., Jonung 1981), the University of Michigan Survey 
of Consumer Attitudes (see, e.g., Curtin 2010), and the Inflation Psychology 
Survey conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in association 
with Ohio State University (see, e.g., Bryan and Venkatu 2001). Surveys in 
other countries, such as Australia (see, e.g., Ballantyne 2016), New Zealand 
(see, e.g., Ranchhod 2003) and South Africa (Kershoff 2000), also include 
explicit questions on inflation in their respective consumer surveys. More 
recently, surveys of consumers’ quantitative inflation expectations have been 
launched in Brazil (Campelo et al. 2014), Canada (Bank of Canada 2015), and 
India (Das et al. 2018). 
This thesis makes use of a unique and relatively unexplored dataset compiled 
by the European Commission. In May 2003, the European Commission, in 
association with its partners, introduced two new questions into the 
Harmonised Consumer Survey for the European Union (see European 
Commission 2016), thereby substantially adding to the number of surveys that 
explicitly ask a selection of respondents (representing the public at large) about 
their inflation perceptions and expectations. The data from these surveys are 
particularly suitable for studying the formation of perceptions and expectations 
of inflation, as the methodology applied across the then 28 EU member states 
is consistent, while providing a variety of country specific conditions and 
differences. For a more complete description of the data see European 
Commission (2006). 
The harmonised questionnaire contains two questions asking respondents to 
put a number on the inflation rate that they perceived to be over the past 12 
months and what they expect it to be for the following 12 months. It also 
contains information on income, occupation, work regime, education, age, and 
sex. 
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of the whole dataset between 
January 2004 and May 2014, where the descriptive statistics for the monthly 
survey results are aggregated across time by calculating simple averages. The 
two last rows in the table show the total number of responses to the surveys. 
For the 125 months considered, a total of 4 340 982 individuals responded to 
the national surveys. Out of these, 73% gave a quantitative estimate of their 
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past and future opinion on inflation. On average, households perceived the 
inflation rate to be almost 11% and expected inflation to be 8.5%. The table 
also shows the wide range of possible replies that households provided as 
estimates for average annual inflation. Perceived inflation ranges from 900% 
down to -400% and expected inflation ranges from 900% to -500%. The 75th 
and 25th percentile show that more than 50% of the answers for perceived 
inflation lay between 2.0% and 15.0% and between 0.0% and 10.0% for 
expected inflation. 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics on households’ perceived and expected inflation rates 
Distribution of households’ quantitative estimates of perceived and expected inflation, Jan 2004 to May 2014. In 
all calculations, an equal weight is applied to all responses. 
STATISTIC PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
Mean (%) 10.9 8.5 
25th percentile (%) 2.0 0.0 
Median (%) 5.0 5.0 
75th percentile (%) 15.0 10.0 
Max (%) 900.0 900.0 
Min (%) -400.0 -500.0 
Mode (%) 0.0 0.0 
Relative frequency of mode (%) 18.4 27.2 
Standard deviation 15.5 13.7 
Skewness 4.3 4.9 
Kurtosis 80.8 99.1 
Total number of respondents 4 340 982 4 340 982 
No. responding to quantitative questions 3 264 361 3 183 807 
The median responses to the two quantitative price questions were both 5%. 
As the means were substantially higher (10.9% and 8.5%), this suggests that 
they are heavily influenced by outliers. It is clear from the table that households 
overstated both perceived and expected inflation, where perceptions were far 
from the official inflation rate based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer 
Prices (HICP). To some extent this reflects a de-linkage between perceived and 
the official HICP rate of inflation that occurred when the euro notes and coins 
were introduced in January 2002. Whether this de-linkage happened because 
of a loss of ‘price memory’, higher prices for frequently purchased items, or 
psychological effects, it is nevertheless likely that it takes a long time before 
perceptions and expectations align with each other and the official rate of 
inflation (see, e.g., Ehrmann 2006, Marques and Dehaene 2004, and Fischer et 
al. 2002). 
19 
Chart 1: Histogram of households’ perceived and expected inflation 
Relative frequency of replies in 27 EU member states, Jan 2004 to May 2014 
 
Chart 2: Households’ perceived and expected rate of inflation and the EU HICP inflation rate 
Weighted average of perceived and expected inflation in 27 EU member states. Perceived and expected inflation 
are calculated using equal weigths for individual responses, HICP country weights, and adjusted for differences 
in monthly sample sizes. 
 
Although the ranges of numbers reported by respondents are very wide, the 
mode of the two distributions, i.e. the inflation rates reported with the highest 
frequencies, were both 0. Besides 0, with a relative frequency of 18% for 
perceptions, the most preferred numbers were 10, 5, and 20 with frequencies 
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ranging from 14-8%. For expectations, the most preferred numbers after 0 
(with a relative frequency of 27%) were also 10, 5, and 20 with frequencies 
ranging from 12-7%. Other popular numbers were 2 and 3, and other multiples 
of the number 5. The distributions also exhibit a high degree of variation as 
depicted in Chart 1 and by the standard deviation shown in Table 1. 
Furthermore, the distributions deviate from normality by being skewed to the 
right and having fat tails. This is in line with earlier evidence from Carlson 
(1975), Batchelor (1981, 1982), and Lahiri and Teigland (1987). 
Chart 2 shows the time series for both perceived and expected inflation. The 
dotted line at the bottom of the figure is the official HICP rate of inflation. The 
other two lines are households’ perceived (continuous line) and expected 
(dashed line) inflation rates. 
In general, the chart shows that both perceived and expected inflation are much 
higher than the official rate, and that perceived inflation is much higher than 
expected future inflation. Furthermore, perceived inflation was trending 
downward since the beginning of January 2004 until 2007, when the first signs 
of the financial crisis emerged. The very high perceived inflation rate is 
probably linked to the cash changeover that occurred in January 2002, and the 
decline shows the adjustment process of perceptions. Longer time series of 
qualitative data show a similar pattern (see European Commission 2006). 
Households’ inflation expectations have followed the movements of the HICP 
inflation rate more closely. The correlation coefficients between the HICP rate 
of inflation and households’ perceived and expected inflation are 63% and 
82%, respectively. 
Respondents to the Harmonised Consumer Survey for the European Union can 
be categorised by the answers to five questions of a socioeconomic nature: 
income of the household (4 classes), age (4 groups), work regime (3 categories) 
occupation (6 categories), education (3 levels), and sex (male or female). 
Chart 3 shows how the answers are distributed depending on socioeconomic 
belonging. 
Several disparities emerge across the different socioeconomic groupings. 
Perceived and expected inflation fall as income rises. Perceptions fall by as 
much as 4.0 percentage points (p.p.) from the first quartile (25%-lowest 
income earners) to the fourth quartile (25%-highest income earners). The 
difference for expected inflation is 2.1 p.p. Similarly, reported inflation rates 
fall as respondents’ education increases. The difference between households 
with primary schooling and those with an education that goes beyond 
secondary schooling is 3.6 p.p. for perceptions and 1.7 p.p. for expectations. 
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This finding is consistent with the fact that, in general, households with higher 
education have higher incomes. Sex also matters; women perceive and expect 
higher inflation rates than men. The differences are 2.6 p.p. and 1.3 p.p. for 
perceptions and expectations, respectively. Finally, younger households 
perceive and expect slightly higher inflation rates than older households. 
However, the differences are less pronounced than for the other categories. 
Chart 3: Households’ perceived and expected inflation across socio-economic groups 
Weighted averages of perceived and expected inflation in 27 EU member states. Perceived and expected 
inflation are calculated using equal weigths for individual responses, HICP country weights, and adjusted for 
differences in monthly sample sizes. 
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1.3 Chapter overview 
The thesis is composed of three chapters, with two different focuses: inflation 
expectations and asset pricing. The differences in focus and topics reflect the 
rather long gap between my first and second period of academic studies. I 
started this thesis as a PhD student at Stockholm School of Economics in the 
Department of Finance, more than 25 years ago, and finished it at Lund 
University, where I started my academic studies as an undergraduate student. 
Chapters 2 and 3 concern households’ inflation expectations, where Chapter 2 
tests to what extent households responding to the surveys form rational 
expectations as defined by different theories of rationality, and Chapter 3 
proposes an explanation as to why surveyed inflation perceptions deviate from 
the official measure of inflation. Chapter 4, which formed the base of my 
licentiate degree, deals with pricing effects on stocks of option introductions. 
1.3.1 Do exceptional events and the inflation environment impact 
the rationality of inflation expectations? 
The second chapter explores to what extent households’ inflation expectations 
are consistent with theories of rationality, and how these expectations change 
in times of major economic events and changes in the inflation environment. 
The events studied are the financial and economic crisis of 2008, several euro-
cash changeovers, and periods of low and high inflation. 
The hypothesis is that people become more informed during major events and 
at times of high inflation. This reduces their forecasting error and produces 
expectations that are more consistent with theories of rationality. To this end, 
the chapter makes use of a unique database that covers more than 3 million 
observations of households’ inflation expectations from 27 out of the then 28 
member states of the European Union. The dataset has been developed within 
the framework of the Joint Harmonised EU Programme of Consumer Surveys, 
which is managed by the European Commission. The questionnaire contains a 
question explicitly asking households to quantify the future rate of inflation. 
The results show that households do not form rational expectations in the sense 
of Muth (1961), and that their rationality does not improve in times of crisis or 
at the time of a major economic event such as changing the domestic currency 
to the euro. The results suggest that households use a rather constant amount 
of resources and effort in forming expectations on inflation, except possibly in 
extreme situations when one-off changes to expectations are formed. In times 
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of economic crisis, the expectation bias increases; when inflation is low, the 
bias decreases. These results are consistent with households that spend a fixed 
amount of resources and effort on forming expectations, which implies that 
occasionally they perform better relative to the official inflation rate, and at 
other times worse. For example, when inflation is low, inflation variability is 
low, which makes it easier to form expectations. On the other hand, during 
times of crisis, volatility is high, as is uncertainty, which makes it more difficult 
to form expectations. A new situation may also require people to adjust their 
thinking (their model) which, if not done, leads to a larger expectation bias. 
There is only weak empirical support in favour of the theory of rational 
inattention. When a crisis turns sufficiently extreme, as during the sovereign 
debt crisis in 2012, the cost of not updating one’s information set and thinking 
seems to become too high. In this situation, people are compelled to update 
and produce less biased expectations relative to households experiencing more 
moderate crises. Nevertheless, the biases increase regardless of the severity of 
crisis. Introducing the euro may also be classified as an extreme event, but in 
this case the biases in inflation expectations decline. However, this decline is 
a one-off adjustment of the level of inflation expectations. 
1.3.2 Why do households’ perceptions and expectations of 
inflation differ from the official measure of inflation? 
The third chapter investigates whether households’ purchasing plans for big 
expenditure items matter to households when they form their views on past and 
future inflation, and whether differences in their purchasing plans can explain 
the deviations usually found between surveyed inflation and the official 
measure of the rate of inflation. The hypothesis is that the more likely 
households are to spend a large sum of money, the stronger incentive they have 
to collect and process data to forecast inflation; this leads to households 
producing better inflation projections. 
The empirical analysis makes use of the same dataset as in Chapter 2. Besides 
the two questions explicitly asking households to quantify the past and future 
rate of inflation, the surveys include three questions on households' likelihood 
to buy a car, a house, and spend a large amount of money on home 
improvements. These three questions are used as a device to group households 
in terms of the strength of incentives they may have to collect information on 
inflation. 
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The results show that stronger incentives to collect information on inflation 
induce households to produce perceived and expected inflation rates that more 
closely correspond to the officially measured rate of inflation. After correcting 
for outliers, households that say they are likely to spend a large sum of money 
on a car, a house, or home improvements both perceive and expect the inflation 
rate to be lower than those not likely to spend a large sum of money. 
Furthermore, at times of high inflation, a substantial part of the difference 
between households’ opinions about the inflation rate and the official rate can 
be explained by these spending plans, which is consistent with the theory of 
rational inattention. However, it is not sufficient to explain the whole 
difference. A significant bias remains, especially for perceived inflation, which 
leaves room for other explanations not tested in this thesis. 
1.3.3 The price and risk effects of option introductions on the 
Nordic markets 
The opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 1973 started 
a new era of derivative trading. CBOE revolutionised the option trading by 
creating standardised, listed stock options. In the same year Black and Scholes 
(1973) published their work on option pricing. They assumed that options are 
redundant assets and could thereby derive a pricing rule for derivative 
securities. This was done by applying a so called no-arbitrage argument and 
by constructing a dynamic hedge portfolio. Since then academics have 
questioned the assumption of redundancy. Researchers recognise that financial 
markets are not complete. Therefore, introducing derivative securities could 
increase the opportunity set of investors, which in turn could make markets 
more efficient, lead to positive welfare effects, and make the derivatives 
market interact with the underlying securities market. 
The final chapter empirically investigates the effects of option introduction on 
the prices and risk of the underlying securities. The data used come from the 
stock markets in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as well as from the 
option market in Sweden. The study is motivated fourfold: 
1. One reason is to check the results and implications of theories regarding
option introduction presented in the academic literature.
2. Most studies concerning the impact of option listing on the underlying
stock have been based on data from the US. To confirm the results from
these studies, evidence from other data sets are needed.
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3. Studies based on US data have found time-varying price and risk effects. 
These results, which diverge from most other findings, are compared with 
those results based on data from the Nordic markets. 
4. Policy questions arise on account of concerns that derivative trading adds 
to the instability of the underlying assets market. Such trading often gets 
blamed for increased instability. Some solutions to reduce instability have 
been proposed, such as introducing frictions into the market that would 
reduce the speed of transactions, e.g. the introductions of a turnover tax on 
short-term positions. Although no explicit conclusions can be drawn, it is 
worthwhile checking if the allegation of adding instability has any 
empirical support. 
There are several arguments suggesting that there exist effects on the 
underlying stock returns related to the listing of options. The structure, 
magnitude or even the direction of these effects are debatable, and a better 
understanding of the effects involved can only be determined empirically. 
In the Nordic countries, the introduction of options has proved to provide the 
underlying stocks with a significant price increase, and a persistent excess 
return compared to an index indicating normal return. The positive effect is 
strong and similar in magnitude to those in studies based on data from other 
countries. Contrary to the experiences from other studies, the observed 
increase in returns seems to be associated with the date of announcement of 
the option program, rather than the date of introduction. Further, there is no 
evidence of a trend in the size of the price effect, as found in recent work based 
on option introductions made in the US. The findings in this study are therefore 
in harmony with the market efficiency hypothesis and the expectations that 
prices should be promptly adjusted when additional information reaches 
market participants. 
The positive price effect could be explained by a change in the risk of the 
underlying stock. An increased systematic risk or an increased idiosyncratic 
risk can lead to a price increase, assuming that the capital asset pricing model 
holds. As the results show, no statistically significant support can be found for 
this argument. It can also be argued that options expand the opportunity set of 
investors and promote risk reallocation, which can be beneficial to market 
participants. To the degree that the investors experience a better control of the 
financial risk when options are introduced, the required yield can be reduced. 
The impact on the total risk is also favourable, and in line with findings in other 
studies. No influence on the systematic risk could be verified. Volatility in the 
underlying stocks is found to decrease continuously for ten months after the 
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introduction of the option program. Furthermore, there is no evidence of a trend 
in the size of the volatility effect, as found in recent US studies. These results 
support the notions that derivatives widen the investment choices of market 
participants, decrease risks, and provide improved hedging opportunities. 
In all, this study supports the idea that option introductions make markets more 
efficient. The results of the analysis do not provide any indication that 
derivative trading contributes to financial unrest. On the contrary, option 
programs seem to add increased stability to the market. 
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2 Do exceptional events impact the 
rationality of inflation 
expectations? 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores to what extent households’ inflation expectations are 
consistent with theories of rationality, and how this consistency changes in 
times of major economic events and with the inflation environment. The events 
studied are the financial and economic crisis of 2008 and several euro-cash 
changeovers. The hypothesis is that people become more informed during 
major events and at times of high inflation, which reduces their forecasting 
error and produces expectations that are more consistent with theories of 
rationality. To this end, the chapter makes use of a unique database on 
households’ inflation expectations. 
With the failures of models assuming full-information and rational 
expectations, there has been a renewed interest in resolving the problems by 
focusing on better understanding the frictions and limitations people face in 
the acquisition and processing of information (Coibion and Gorodnichenko 
2012). For example, the delayed and differential response of inflation to 
monetary policy and technology shocks is not easily generated without adding 
information rigidities (Mankiw and Reis 2002; Dupor et al. 2009). 
In this context, the theory of rational inattention is motivated by the idea that 
individual people are constrained in their ability and capacity for processing 
information, and therefore form their expectations based on incomplete 
information (Sims 2003). However, the theory also suggests that people shift 
more attention to the process of forming expectations when it becomes 
important to do so (Reis 2006a). These theories are part of the grander field of 
behavioural economics (see, e.g., Golman et al. 2017; Thaler 2015), and have 
implications for how, for example, macroeconomic models are augmented 
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with frictions and fitted using inflation expectations data (see, e.g., Ormeño 
and Molnár 2015). 
Testing for different forms of weak and strong rationality is a longstanding 
topic in economic research (see, e.g., Carlson and Parkin 1975; Jonung and 
Laidler 1988; Dias et al. 2010), and more recently also involves the theory of 
rational inattention.2 For example, Lanne et al. (2009) show that a significant 
proportion of the population rely on the past release of actual inflation data, 
instead of basing their expectations on rational forward-looking forecasts 
produced by professional forecasters. Easaw and Golinelli (2012) distinguish 
between purely forward-looking and ‘stubborn’ households, i.e. those that rely 
on their lagged one-year-ahead forecast. Easaw et al. (2013) employ an error-
correction model to show that: (i) households absorb professional forecasts 
when forming expectations; (ii) households’ expectations are determined by 
current inflation (or perceptions of current inflation); and (iii) current inflation 
signals are used to determine the future direction of inflation rates. Following 
the approach of Easaw et al. (2013), Campelo et al. (2014) studied the 
formation of inflation expectations in Brazil, adding the effects of households’ 
opinions on the personal and general economic situation. 
This chapter adds to this research by studying households’ rationality and to 
see how it changes with major economic events and the inflation environment. 
Using a unique dataset, covering more than 3 million observations of 
households’ inflation expectations from 27 member states of the European 
Union (EU), the chapter presents the results of conventional tests of attitudes 
under the hypothesis that respondents form rational expectations (see, e.g., 
Jonung and Laidler 1988; Ekeblom 2014). Furthermore, it adds to previous 
research testing the theory of rational inattention by exploring how the results 
of the conventional tests change in response to the financial crisis that started 
in 2007 and later developed into a debt and currency crisis in the euro area. 
This was the most severe crisis since the Great Depression in the 1930s. The 
idea tested is that the risk of incurring costs would induce households to follow 
the evolving events, update their information and expectations, and react 
                                                     
2  The rational expectations hypothesis, first introduced by Muth (1961), states that 
expectations of an economic variable are based on all available information, including 
historical values of the variable as well as current knowledge about its future values. Tests 
of rational expectations are usually classified in terms of weak-form and strong-form tests, 
imposing different assumptions on the information set that people use when forming their 
expectations. Weak-form tests basically examine if a forecast of a variable is unbiased, or if 
past values of the variable can be used to explain any error between the forecast and the 
realised variable. Strong-form tests examine whether any other information can explain the 
forecast errors. 
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accordingly to maximise their utility. During the sample period, several 
countries also abandoned their national currency when joining the euro area; 
as well, measured inflation fluctuated more than in a long time. Both euro cash 
changeovers and changes in the inflation environment have possible 
implications for households’ expectation formation. A final novelty concerns 
the information set used to test rational expectations, which distinguishes 
between traditional macroeconomic data (e.g. unemployment and interest 
rates) and more personal, or micro-oriented data, such as the economic 
situation of a given household. 
The results show that households do not form rational expectations in the sense 
of Muth (1961), and that their rationality does not improve in times of crisis or 
at the time of a major economic event such as changing the domestic currency 
to the euro. The results suggest that households use a rather constant amount 
of resources and effort in forming expectations on inflation, except possibly in 
extreme situations when one-off changes to expectations are formed. In times 
of economic crisis, the expectation bias increases; when inflation is low, the 
bias decreases. These results are consistent with households that spend a fixed 
amount of resources and effort on forming expectations, which implies that 
occasionally they perform better relative to the official inflation rate, and at 
other times worse. For example, when inflation is low, inflation variability is 
low, which makes it easier to form expectations. On the other hand, at times of 
crisis volatility is high, as is uncertainty, which makes it more difficult to form 
expectations. A new situation may also require people to adjust their thinking 
(their model) which, if not done, leads to a larger expectation bias. 
There is only weak empirical support in favour of the theory of rational 
inattention. When a crisis turns sufficiently extreme, as during the sovereign 
debt crisis in 2012, the cost of not updating one’s information set and thinking 
seems to become too high. In this situation, people are induced to update and 
produce less biased expectations relative to households experiencing more 
moderate crises. Nevertheless, the biases increase regardless of the severity of 
crisis. Introducing the euro may also be classified as an extreme event, but in 
this case the biases in inflation expectations decline. However, this decline is 
a one-off adjustment of the level of inflation expectations. 
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2.2 Theory and hypotheses 
The basic idea behind rational expectations is that people use all available 
information efficiently to form expectations about the future without making 
systematic errors in their predictions (Muth 1961). However, if people have 
limited capacity to process costly information, they may form their 
expectations based on incomplete data. This may lead to systematically biased 
forecast errors, which may vary in size depending on economic circumstances. 
As discussed by Sims (2003), if people have limited capacity for processing 
data, the amount of effort devoted to collecting information and forming 
expectations may vary with the benefit of having more complete datasets and 
better forecasts. By using information theory, Sims developed a model where 
the information flow about macroeconomic variables is very low, and where 
people only devote a fraction of their information-processing capacity and 
attention to macroeconomic variables. A complementary approach is offered 
by Reis (2006a, 2006b), who assumes that it is costly for people to acquire, 
absorb, and process information in forming expectations and making 
decisions.3 In this setting, people rationally choose to update their information 
and their plans infrequently. Information becomes ’sticky’ and gradually 
dissipates to the population over time. The model describes a rational 
behaviour by agents where they update information infrequently, as the 
optimal response to explicitly modelled costs of planning. These two strands 
of theories of rational expectations have several testable implications. A 
financial crisis provides the right setting for testing such implications, as both 
the cost of being complacent and the information flow on economic 
performance increase during a crisis. 
Rational expectations put constraints on how individuals’ expectations relate 
to the variable being predicted and on how individuals use information to form 
their expectations. There is a longstanding literature on testable implications, 
where four are commonly tested (see, e.g., Sheffrin 1996). These tests can be 
categorised as tests of unbiasedness, efficiency, forecast-error unpredictability, 
and consistency. For unbiasedness to hold, agents’ expectations should not 
systematically deviate from the outcome. This is a test of the weak-form 
version of rational expectations, which is independent of the agents’ 
information set. For efficient expectations to hold, past information on 
                                                     
3  The two approaches complement each other, as Sims (2013) focuses on the information 
problem facing agents, while simplifying their actions. Reis (2006a), on the other hand, 
focuses on the decisions of agents and their interaction with inattentiveness, while 
simplifying the information acquisition problem. 
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inflation should not improve the agents’ forecasts. For forecast-error 
unpredictability to hold, no other information should help to improve the 
agents’ forecasts. This test places restrictions on the information set of agents, 
which is a test of the strong-form version of rational expectations. Finally, for 
consistency to hold, forecasts made for different times in the future should be 
consistent with each other. To a large extent these tests are similar in the sense 
that they all test different properties of conditional expectations. 
2.2.1 Weak and strong rationality hypotheses 
This chapter investigates whether households form weak- and strong-forms of 
rational expectations, as introduced by Muth (1961), and combines the tests for 
unbiasedness and forecast-error unpredictability (see, e.g., Sheffrin 1996). The 
first two hypothesises investigated — Hypothesis 1 (H1) and Hypothesis 2 
(H2) — are the following: 
H1: Households form unbiased predictions of inflation 12 months ahead — 
weak rationality. 
H2: Households’ expectations are uncorrelated with any information available 
at the time the forecast is made — strong rationality. 
A rejection of the first hypothesis would imply that agents make systematic 
errors when forming their expectations of future inflation. However, there are 
no implications for the directions of the bias. For example, if agents use 
adaptive expectations and inflation is on an upward trend, the bias will be 
negative, as expected inflation is consistently lower than the true inflation rate. 
If inflation is trending downward, the opposite is true: expectations will be 
higher than the true inflation rate. 
A rejection of the second hypothesis would imply that households exclude 
taking certain information into account when forming their expectations, and 
that their forecast can be improved by doing so. Including both macroeconomic 
variables (e.g. unemployment and interest rates) and private information (e.g. 
the household’s own financial situation) in the tested information set allows 
for distinguishing between information that is available but inaccessible, as 
opposed to information that is privately known and accessible to the 
household. This puts different restrictions on the information set used to form 
expectations and makes it possible to distinguish between degrees in the 
strength of rationality. In both cases, however, there are no implications for the 
direction of the correlation of the information. Correlation could be negative 
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or positive; either way, it would be a rejection of the strong-form of rational 
expectations. 
2.2.2 Rational inattention hypotheses 
There are several indications that inflation expectations formed by surveyed 
households in the EU violate the conditions for rational expectations (see, e.g., 
Lindén 2010; Arioli et al. 2016). Instead the theory of rational inattention 
provides another set of testable predictions, which allows for frictions in the 
expectation-formation process. The following list of predictions is not 
exhaustive, but they are the most relevant for the purpose of this chapter. First, 
households respond more quickly to news that refers to some extraordinary 
event that captures everyone’s attention. Second, the higher the risk faced by 
a household and the higher aversion to this risk, the higher are the costs of 
being inattentive. Thus, the household will be inattentive for a shorter period 
of time when the risk increases. Third, the lower the inflation rate, the higher 
the inattentiveness. In recent years, the European Union has experienced 
several events and fluctuating inflation that affect households in line with these 
predictions, which provide a suitable environment for testing both rational 
inattention and rationality in the sense of Muth (1961). 
The hypothesis concerning rational inattentive households can be grouped into 
three categories defined by the evolution of the financial crisis that broke out 
in 2007 and by the euro-area developments: (i) the financial and the economic 
crisis, exploiting different time periods (with or without crisis); (ii) 
extraordinary events, differentiating member states based on how severe the 
crisis was for each individual country and whether a member state introduced 
the euro; and (iii) the inflation environment, i.e. periods of low or high 
inflation. Thus, the following additional four hypotheses can be grouped 
accordingly: (i) Hypothesis 3 (H3); (ii) Hypothesis 4 (H4) and Hypothesis 5 
(H5); and (iii) Hypothesis 6 (H6): 
The effect of economic crises on rationality 
Hypothesis 3 tests the implication that households update their expectations 
when they face a situation that significantly changes economic conditions: 
H3: Households become more rational during a crisis period. 
By ‘more rational’ is meant that households form expectations that are more in 
line with Hypotheses 1 and 2, i.e. any systematic bias is reduced and any 
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correlated information becomes less correlated. However, it does not imply 
that households are fully rational. 
The financial crisis and the following currency and debt crises changed the 
economic conditions, with lower growth, higher unemployment, and 
significantly increasing prices, inducing increasing risks and direct costs for 
many households. The crises put more attention on economic news which, 
together with the costs and risks, should induce households to update their 
information sets more often, all in accordance with the theory of rational 
inattention. The incentives to update their information should allow them to 
improve their expectations of inflation and make expectations more rational. 
It is possible, however, that the crises put households in a situation so extreme 
and unfamiliar that they made even greater mistakes than before in forming 
their expectations concerning inflation. Many households had not faced an 
economic crisis of the same magnitude before, which required them to have a 
rather advanced analytical capacity and deep understanding of the new 
economic situation. This is an economic situation that many economists had 
difficulties analysing, and that put into question traditional models and 
analytical frameworks (Blanchard et al. 2010). 
The effect of extraordinary and transforming events on rationality 
Along the same lines, the following two hypotheses test the implications of 
extraordinary events that also significantly change economic conditions: 
H4: Households in member states that experience more severe crises form 
more rational expectations than households in member states that 
experience less severe crises. 
H5: Households in member states that switch currency to the euro are more 
rational after the switch. 
The global financial crisis that started in 2007 was not one crisis, but a 
combination of several different kinds of crises, often intertwined with one 
another (see, e.g., Claessens and Kose 2013; Reinhart and Rogoff 2015). 
Almost all countries faced volatile financial markets; others experienced a 
banking crisis, sovereign debt crisis, or a currency crisis — often in 
combination. For some countries, the crises were more severe than for others, 
to the point where the crises became systemic and threatened the functioning 
of the financial system at large. For a few countries, the economic crises 
became so severe that they experienced or were threatened by financing 
difficulties that required them to request assistance from other member states 
and the International Monetary Fund. The assistance offered was accompanied 
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by conditions for economic reforms, a so-called economic programme. Other 
member states introduced the euro, which changed the unit of account in the 
respective member states. Both events generated media coverage, new risks, 
and incentives for households to inform themselves and potentially form 
updated and more accurate expectations. 
Nevertheless, the situation households faced in the hardest hit countries — 
mainly programme countries — were more severe than in other member states, 
and therefore more difficult to assess. To the extent that the financial and the 
economic crises made it more difficult for households to form expectations, 
this would be even more the case in the hardest hit programme countries. 
Furthermore, most member states with a programme are less advanced in terms 
of economic development, as evidenced by lower GDP per capita, but also are 
less advanced in terms of financial literacy (Standard & Poor’s Ratings Service 
2015). Thus, even though the incentives for households to update their 
information and expectations concerning inflation were present, their ability to 
do so might have been impeded relative to other member states less affected 
by the crises. 
Concerning the hypothesis related to the cash changeover to the euro, the test 
may also be ambiguous. Although euro introduction is a significant event, with 
campaigns informing households about the change and incentives for 
households to at least temporarily inform themselves, there is significant 
evidence that the euro introduction put people off in terms of forecasting 
inflation (see, e.g., Ehrmann 2006; European Commission 2002; Traut-
Mattausch et al. 2004). 
The effect of the inflation environment on rationality 
The last hypothesis concerns the level of inflation in the economy, which 
changes the cost related to inflation that households face: 
H6: Households become less rational in periods of low inflation. 
In a low-inflation environment, the cost of inflation and price volatility 
declines, making it less important for households to pay attention to price 
developments. To the extent households update their information set less, and 
pay less attention to price movements in general, their expectations on future 
inflation should be less in line with rational expectations. However, households 
may resort to low-cost strategies — a rule of thumb approach which, in effect, 
may lead households to produce better forecasts of inflation at times of low 
inflation, i.e. more in line with rational expectations, than at times of high 
inflation. For example, a household assigning a low constant as its expectation 
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of future inflation when inflation is low and a high constant when inflation is 
high, will on average produce better forecasts of inflation when inflation is 
low, as inflation volatility is lower at low inflation rates (Judson and 
Orphanides 1999). 
All tests of the hypotheses concerning rational inattention rely on events that 
bring about significant change in the economic environment. While the 
hypothesis is that these events induce people to inform themselves, the 
complexity of the economic environment also increases. Muth (1960) pointed 
out that when there is a significant regime change recent past information is 
more important for households than being forward looking in forming their 
expectations, as they learn about the dynamics of the new regime. These two 
opposing forces makes the hypotheses open ended; the results can go in either 
direction. Ultimately, it is an empirical question as to what extent households 
behave rationally in accordance with the theories of rational expectations, 
rational inattention, or neither. 
2.3 Model and tests 
This section presents the model used for testing the different hypothesis versus 
the null hypothesis that households form expectations in a rational or rationally 
inattentive manner. The tests explore both the weak-form and strong-form of 
rational expectations, and how these change as a result of economic events. 
The various tests impose different assumptions on the households’ information 
set and make use of specific events during the sample period that may induce 
households to update them, i.e. to form inattentive rational expectations. 
Hypothesis 1 — Weak rationality 
With weak-form rational expectations, Hypothesis 1, people make optimal use 
of all public information available to them that, in their view, matter for 
assessing the future development of a relevant economic variable. The weak 
form of rational expectations is closely related to that of unbiasedness, and the 
two concepts have been intermingled in previous research (see, e.g., Jonung 
and Laidler 1988). In the context of households’ inflation expectations, rational 
households should form expectations about inflation that make optimal use of 
their information; there is no restriction placed on the information. Weak-form 
rational expectations imply that expected inflation should match the true 
inflation rate.  
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Hypothesis 1 is tested using the standard regression of the following form: 
𝜋௧ାଵଶ = 𝛼 + 𝛽గ೐𝜋௜,௧௘ + 𝜀௜,௧    (1) 
Under the null hypothesis, 𝛼 and 𝛽 are equal to 0 and 1 at the same time 
(𝐻଴: 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽గ೐ = 1), where 𝜋௧ାଵଶ is the officially measured HICP inflation 
rate of inflation 12 months ahead, 𝜋௜,௧௘  is the expected inflation rate formed by 
individual 𝑖 in month 𝑡, and 𝜀௜,௧ is the error term. Thus, for example, an 
expectation formed in January 2010 is compared with the 12-month rate of 
change in the HICP reported for January 2011.4 This regression does not test 
whether all relevant information was used or whether households possess all 
relevant information. Therefore, the weak-form test is complemented by a 
strong-form test of rational expectations. 
Hypothesis 2 — Strong rationality 
With strong-form rational expectations, Hypothesis 2, people have access to 
all relevant information, including the structure of their environment, and make 
optimal use of this information to predict the future development of a relevant 
economic variable. In the context of households’ inflation expectations, 
rational households should form expectations that are correct up to the point of 
unavoidable, or unsystematic, errors. Strong-form rational expectations imply 
that expected inflation forecasts should match that of the true inflation rate, 
and no other information should correlate with the expectation errors in a 
systematic way, which places a strong restriction on the information set. 
Hypothesis 2 is tested by complementing regression (1) with a set of 
information variables that were known to households at the time when 
expectations were formed: 
𝜋௧ାଵଶ = 𝛼 + 𝛽గ೐𝜋௜,௧௘ + 𝒁௜,௧𝚪 + 𝜀௜,௧   (2) 
In regression (2), 𝒁௜,௧ is a set of five information variables that were known to 
households at the time when expectations were formed, and 𝚪 is a vector of 
regression coefficients. For households to use their information efficiently, the 
information in 𝒁 should not correlate with expectation errors, i.e. the null 
                                                     
4  The timing of the data collection of the survey data and the prices underlying the calculation 
of the HICP is not perfect. The data collection for the consumer surveys, in general, are 
conducted during the first two weeks of the month, and the price collection takes place across 
at least one working week period at, or near, the middle of the calendar month to which the 
index pertains. Therefore, there is some discrepancy between a household’s forecast horizon 
and the date of the value used to compare it with. 
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hypothesis is that the coefficients in vector Γ are all zero at the same time as 𝛼 
and 𝛽 are equal to 0 and 1 (𝐻଴: 𝛼 = 0, 𝛽గ೐ = 1, 𝚪 = 0). 
Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 — Rational inattention 
To test Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6, regression (2) is further augmented with an 
additional set of dummy and interaction variables 𝑫௜,௧, testing for different 
aspects of rational inattention: 
𝜋௧ାଵଶ = 𝛼 + 𝛽గ೐𝜋௜,௧௘ + 𝒁௜,௧𝚪 + 𝑫௜,௧𝚲 + 𝜀௜,௧   (3) 
Matrix 𝑫௜,௧ contains three dummy variables identifying if households are 
located in countries that have experienced two, three, or four types of crises 
(H3 and H4), a dummy variable identifying households in countries that 
changed their currency to the euro (H5), and a dummy variable identifying low 
inflation periods (H6). In addition to these five dummy variables, there is a set 
of six interaction variables for each dummy variable. These are formed by 
multiplying each dummy variable with expected inflation (𝜋௜,௧௘ ) and the five 
information variables (𝒁௜,௧). For both weak- and strong-form rational 
expectations to hold, all 𝜆-coefficients should jointly be zero (𝐻଴: 𝚲 = 0). 
However, if the two null hypotheses H1 and H2 are rejected, households may 
update their expectations at certain times, and then the 𝜆-coefficients may be 
significant, shifting expectations further away or closer towards a more rational 
representation of regression (3). 
Full regression specification 
To complete the specification, the regression is augmented with a set of 54 
additional country-specific terms (27 constants and 27 slope coefficients) and 
a common time pattern (or time effects) represented by a sequence of time 
dummies, one for each month in the sample. The country dummies control for 
the large heterogeneity in replies among national surveys, both in terms of the 
level of the bias (the constant) and the slope coefficient of expected inflation. 
They also allow for illustrating country-specific results of the tests. The time 
dummies control for the relatively large swings in inflation that took place 
during the crisis in Europe. 
The full specification of the estimated regression is: 
𝜋௡,௧ାଵଶ = ∑ 𝛼௡௡∈ே + ∑ 𝛽గ೐,௡𝜋௜,௡,௧௘௡∈ே + 𝛾ை𝑍௜,௧ை + 𝛾ோ𝑍௜,௧ோ + 𝛾௎𝑍௜,௧௎ +
               +𝛾ொଵ𝑍௜,௧ொଵ + 𝛾ொଶ𝑍௜,௧ொଶ + ∑ ൫𝜆௖ఈ𝐷௜,௧௖ + 𝜆௖గ𝜋௜,௧௘ 𝐷௜,௧௖ + 𝜆௖ை𝑍௜,௧ை 𝐷௜,௧௖ +௖∈஼
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               +𝜆௖ோ𝑍௜,௧ோ 𝐷௜,௧௖ + 𝜆௖௎𝑍௜,௧௎ 𝐷௜,௧௖ + 𝜆௖ொଵ𝑍௜,௧ொଵ𝐷௜,௧௖ + 𝜆௖ொଶ𝑍௜,௧ொଶ𝐷௜,௧௖ ൯ +
               + ∑ Τ௠௠∈ெ + 𝜀௜,௧ ,    (4) 
where 𝑁 = ሼ𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝐻𝑈ሽ, 𝐶 = ሼ𝐹2, 𝐹3, 𝐹4, 𝐸, 𝐼ሽ and 
𝑀 = ሼ𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎ𝑠 𝐽𝑎𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑟𝑦 2004 𝑡𝑜 𝑀𝑎𝑦 2014ሽ. 
In total, regression (4) contains 218 terms. The first 54 are the country-specific 
constants and the households’ expected inflation rates over the coming 12 
months. The following five terms — the information matrix 𝒁௜,௧ — represents 
the households’ national price of motor fuels (O), the three-month interest rate 
(R), the unemployment rate (U), the households’ individual view of the change 
in their respective financial situation over the last 12 months (Q1), and their 
view of how their financial position will change over the next 12 months (Q2). 
The fuel prices, the interest rates, and the private information on the 
household’s financial situation are contemporaneous information, while the 
unemployment rate is lagging households’ expectations by two months, in 
accordance with the release schedule of Eurostat. 
Next are five sets of seven variables — the dummy matrix 𝑫௜,௧ — representing 
different economic conditions and events: the financial crisis depending if 
countries experienced two, three or four types of crises (F1, F2 and F3), the 
period after a country changed their national currency to the euro and joined 
the euro area (E), and low-inflation periods (I). All this information should in 
principle already be reflected in households’ expectations and have no 
additional explanatory power. The regression is estimated with least squares, 
and clustered errors by month are used for the significance tests. 
One potential issue regarding testing the hypotheses on rational inattention in 
this setting relates to the uncertainty involving the dating of events and by 
when new information reaches households, which may lower the estimated 
coefficients and bring them closer to zero, and bias the results towards 
insignificance. The dates for euro introduction in some EU member states are 
clearly known, planed and announced well in advance, and should not suffer 
from this problem. The crisis dates and the periods of low inflation are 
determined after they occurred, based on historical events and data, and can be 
affected by subjective methodological and judgemental choices. However, the 
crisis dates are determined and published by the System of European Central 
Banks and the European Systemic Risk Board, using state of the art 
methodological tools and expert judgement. The low-inflation periods are 
defined below, specifically for this chapter, and it is unclear how quickly new 
information on inflation can be absorbed by households, which therefore merit 
a minimum of sensitivity tests of the results. 
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2.4 Data 
The reference data used as the dependent variable for testing consumers’ 
rationality when forming their inflation expectations is the household’s 
respective national year-on-year rate of change in the harmonised index of 
consumer prices (HICP), as published by the European Central Bank (ECB).5 
The main independent variable is consumers’ inflation expectations, and the 
data used come from the Harmonised Consumer Survey for the European 
Union (European Commission 1997, 2006, 2016). National institutes in each 
of the 28 participating countries conduct the surveys. The harmonised 
questionnaire contains questions on the economic situation of the household 
and the country where the respondent resides. It also contains information on 
the socioeconomic characteristics of the household. Parallel with two 
qualitative questions on price developments, two additional price questions 
were introduced in 2003 on an experimental basis. These two questions ask 
respondents to quantify past and future inflation and give their responses in 
percentages. The survey questions on future inflation — questions 6 and 61 in 
the standardised questionnaire — are the following: 
Q6 By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer 
prices will develop in the next 12 months? They will: (1) increase more 
rapidly; (2) increase at the same rate; (3) increase at a slower rate; (4) stay 
about the same; (5) fall; (N) don’t know. 
Q61 If question 6 was answered by 1, 2, 3, or 5: by how many percent do you 
expect consumer prices to go up/down in the next 12 months? (Please 
give a single figure estimate): Consumer prices will increase by……,…% 
/ decrease by……,…%. 
It is the quantitative measure of inflation expectations that is particularly useful 
for testing how rational households are when forming expectations. Without 
this measure, researchers must resort to different quantification methods to 
transform qualitative data into quantitative content, giving rise to less reliable 
data. Also, the qualitative question is more complex, as it requires respondents 
to be able to differentiate between different concepts of price developments: 
                                                     
5  It is standard practice in this type of research to use the officially measured inflation rate as 
the benchmark for comparing households’ inflation expectations, as there is no better 
alternative available. However, to what extent it corresponds to what households perceive as 
inflation is an open question. There is also an ongoing academic discussion on what to 
include in the indexes of inflation (see Goodhart 2001; Bryan et al. 2002). Both issues may 
have bearing on the results of this chapter. 
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the price level, the rate of change in the price, and the change in the rate of 
change in the price. The quantitative question, on the other hand, is more 
straight forward, as it pertains to price increases in general. However, the 
question does not refer to the HICP rate of inflation explicitly. Nevertheless, 
with representative surveys, there should be strong correspondence between 
the two. For a more comprehensive description of the harmonised-EU-survey 
programme, see European Commission (1997, 2006, 2016). 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics of households’ inflation expectations, January 2004 to May 2014 
Distribution of households’ quantitative estimates of expected inflation, Jan 2004 to May 2014. In all calculations, 
an equal weight is applied to all responses. 
 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
STATISTICS FULL SAMPLE TRIMMED SAMPLE 
Min (%) -500.0 -33.0 
25th percentile (%) 0.0 0.0 
Mean (%) 8.5 6.6 
Median (%) 5.0 4.0 
75th percentile (%) 10.0 10.0 
Max (%) 900.0 100.0 
Mode (%) 0.0 0.0 
Relative frequency of mode (%) 27.2 29.3 
   
Total number of respondents 3 183 807 2 953 512 
 
The dataset is comprehensive and contains more than 3 000 000 observations 
on households’ inflation expectations. It comprises more than 10 years of 
monthly data, from January 2004 to May 2014, and includes individual 
observations from 28 member states of the EU at the time. However, Hungary 
is excluded from the analysis, because there is only one month of data 
available. Hence, the analysis covers 27 member states. There are also other 
issues with the dataset. First, as shown in Table 1, there are several outliers. 
Second, expectations differ significantly across countries. Third, for some 
member states data are missing in some periods, either due to experiments in 
the early days of the dataset, or because the quantitative questions were not 
asked. For these reasons, data are not available for Croatia between January 
2004 and December 2005, for Germany between August and October 2007, 
for France every August until 2007, for the Netherlands between May 2005 
and May 2011, and for Spain September 2005. For other issues with the data, 
see European Commission (2006) and Arioli et al. (2016). 
As the data contain numerous extreme values, they are trimmed. The amount 
and magnitude of the outliers differ across countries, which warrants using an 
approach that takes the distribution of replies into account. The method applied 
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selects all responses that fall within the range of the 2nd to 3rd quartile, plus 
or minus 1.5 times the interquartile range of the 2nd to 3rd quartile. Thus, 
observations are considered outliers if they are larger than q3 + 1.5(q3 – q2) or 
smaller than q2 – 1.5(q3 – q2), where q1 and q3 are the 25th and 75th 
percentiles, respectively. The value of 1.5 corresponds to approximately +/–
2.7 standard deviations and a 99.3% coverage if the data are normally 
distributed. This truncation affects about 10% of all expected inflation rates. 
Several other trimming methods have also been applied. They do not influence 
the results in any material way, except the level of the average expected 
inflation rates.6 
Note, although there are around 3 million observations on inflation 
expectations, the dependent variable in the estimated regression is the national 
HICP rate of inflation, which is the same for all households in any specific 
country and month. This significantly reduces the effective number of 
observations to the number of countries times the number of months that the 
dataset spans. In total there are 3 270 individual pairs of country and monthly 
observations. However, all expectation observations are used in estimating 
regression 4, which may lead to the inference suffering from what is called the 
p-value problem (see Lin et al. 2013). With very large samples, as in this case, 
p-values quickly go towards zero, which can lead to conclusions that are of no 
practical relevance, and increase the likelihood of false positives. To deal with 
this issue, the results are discussed not only in terms of statistical significance, 
but also in terms of ‘economic significance’. 
Hypothesis 1 and 2 — Weak and strong rationality 
Testing the different forms of rational expectations also involves identifying a 
set of information variables that were known to households at the time when 
expectations were formed. There are five information variables, which can be 
classified into two groups. The first group contains three publicly available 
market and macroeconomic data series: (i) the households’ national price of 
motor fuels; (ii) the three-month interest rate; and (iii) the unemployment rate. 
The second group contains information which is private to the household; this 
is more micro-oriented data: (iv) the households’ individual view of the change 
in their respective financial situations over the last 12 months; and (v) their 
view of how their financial position will change over the next 12 months. The 
first set of information requires some degree of gathering by the household, 
                                                     
6  See Lindén (2010) and European Commission (2006) for a brief description of some of the 
methods applied. 
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and it is publicly available to all households. The second set, the household’s 
economic situation, is directly available and is private to each individual 
household. Both sets of data, however, may require costly processing to 
constitute valuable information for forming expectations about inflation. 
Specifically, the data used and the sources are the following: Fuel prices are 
the weighted average consumer price of petrol and diesel collected from the 
weekly oil bulletin of the European Commission, which reflects price and tax 
differences across member states. The interest rates are the three-month 
interbank rate for each country or currency area, collected from Datastream, 
and the unemployment rate is the harmonised version published by Eurostat, 
the statistical office of the European Union. The two variables on a household’s 
financial position are the household’s respective answer to questions one and 
two in the harmonised questionnaire of the EU Harmonised Consumer Survey 
(see European Commission 2016). 
In addition, the analysis requires the identification of a set of dates and time 
periods to be used for generating dummy variables applied in the regression 
analysis. These dates concern the onset and end of any systemic financial and 
economic crisis that a county faced during the sample period, the date for a 
euro-cash changeover, and months of low inflation. 
Hypothesis 3 — The effect of economic crises on rationality 
The ECB and the European Systemic Risk Board (ESRB) have developed a 
new database for financial crises in European countries, which is applied to 
generate a set of dummy variables used in the rationality tests. The database 
contains a chronology of crisis periods from 1970, designed to support the 
calibration of models in macro-prudential analysis. However, the design is 
suitable for other applications as well that require a proper dating and 
identification of crises. To identify crisis periods, the ECB and the ESRB have 
combined a quantitative approach based on a financial stress index with expert 
judgement from national and European authorities. For details about the 
construction of the database, see Lo Duca et al. (2017). 
For the purpose of this chapter, the database contains information on the 
starting date of a crisis period and the end of crisis management date, which 
can be seen as the acute phase of the crisis. Besides the two dates used to define 
the beginning and the end of a crisis period, the database contains a system 
’back to normal’ date, which is not used. The main reason is that the definition 
of a system being back to normal requires monetary policy to have been 
normalised. There is a problem with applying those dates in the tests for both 
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euro area and non-euro area countries. For the countries in the euro area this is 
a problem, as there are several countries that are clearly no longer in a crisis 
(e.g. Germany), while others clearly are (e.g. Greece), and monetary policy is 
set for the euro area as a whole, with ongoing quantitative easing and very low 
policy interest rates. As a result, no euro-area member state has a system that 
can be classified as back to normal. The same is true for Denmark and Sweden, 
where national authorities seem to have judged their respective monetary 
policy stance differently, i.e. Denmark’s system is back to normal as of 
December 2013, while in Sweden the crisis is still ongoing. Neither country 
has any significant sign of an ongoing financial crisis. 
The database also classifies each crisis in one or more non-mutually exclusive 
categories: (i) currency/balance of payment (BoP)/capital flow crisis, (ii) 
sovereign crisis, (iii) banking crisis, and (iv) crisis with significant price 
correction. The categories are simplifications, but provide an indication of the 
type of risks that materialised. They also give an indication of how complex or  
 
Table 2: Overview of the applied systemic crises in the database 
   TYPE OF CRISIS  
Country 
Start 
date 
End of crisis 
management 
Currency / 
BoP / 
Capital flow Sovereign Bank 
Significant 
asset price 
correction 
№ of 
crises 
AT 2007-12 2016-04 0 0 1 1 2 
BE 2007-11 2012-12 0 0 1 1 2 
DE 2007-08 2013-06 0 0 1 1 2 
DK 2008-01 2013-12 0 0 1 1 2 
FR 2008-04 2009-11 0 0 1 1 2 
LT 2008-12 2009-11 0 0 1 1 2 
LU 2008-01 2010-10 0 0 1 1 2 
NL 2008-01 2013-02 0 0 1 1 2 
RO 2007-11 2010-08 1 0 0 1 2 
SE 2008-09 2010-10 0 0 1 1 2 
UK 2007-08 2010-01 0 0 1 1 2 
LV 2008-11 2010-08 1 0 1 1 3 
SI 2009-12 2014-12 0 1 1 1 3 
CY 2011-06 2016-03 1 1 1 1 4 
ES 2009-03 2013-12 1 1 1 1 4 
GR 2010-05 Ongoing 1 1 1 1 4 
HR 2007-09 2012-06 1 1 1 1 4 
IE 2008-09 2013-12 1 1 1 1 4 
IT 2011-08 2013-12 1 1 1 1 4 
PT 2008-10 2015-12 1 1 1 1 4 
Source: European Central Bank and European Systemic Risk Board, 2017 
Note: Balance of payment (BoP); Start and end of crisis dates are denoted by year and month 
(YYYY-MM). For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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severe a crisis period was. All crisis episodes entail the materialisation of at 
least two different risks. Table 2 presents the dates of the crisis events and the 
different types of crises that occurred during that period. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 — The effect of extraordinary and transforming events 
on rationality 
Essential for the analysis is also defining the two extraordinary events: 
differentiating member states on the severity of crisis experienced and whether 
a member state introduced the euro or not. 
The number of interacting crises indicate the complexity, but also the severity, 
of a crisis event that any individual country has experienced. Based on the 
number of types of crises in Table 2, a set of three dummy variables are 
constructed, where each household is represented with a 1 if they lived in a 
country that experienced respectively two, three, or four different types of 
crises at the time of the survey, and 0 otherwise. One indication that these 
dummy variables distinguish countries in terms of severity of crisis is that 
countries that experienced two types of crises performed relatively better in 
terms of growth in gross domestic product than those that experienced four 
types of crises. Furthermore, among those countries that experienced four 
types of crises, five — Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain — were 
not able to finance themselves on the bond market and became subject to IMF-
EU rescue programmes. 
Between 2004 and 2014, six countries introduced the euro: Slovenia (January 
2007), Cyprus (January 2008), Malta (January 2008), Slovakia (January 2009), 
Estonia (January 2011), and Latvia (January 2014). Based on these dates, a 
euro-cash changeover dummy is constructed, where each household residing 
in one of the six member states after the introduction date of the euro is 
represented with a 1, and 0 otherwise. 
Hypothesis 6 — The effect of low or high inflation periods on rationality 
The low inflation periods are defined as the months below the 25th percentile 
of the distribution of the year-on-year rate of change in the harmonised index 
of consumer prices. The low inflation dummy is constructed by assigning a 1 
to all households responding to the survey in a month defined as a low inflation 
month, and 0 otherwise. 
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2.5 Results 
This section presents the results of the different tests of expectation properties 
under the null hypothesis that households form expectations in a rational or 
rationally inattentive manner. The results are presented for three samples of 
the data: the full sample and two subsamples. The full sample is split into two 
subsamples, which distinguish households based on their level of education: 
one for households with basic education and the other for households with a 
higher level of education. The subsamples serve three purposes. First, they 
allow for checking the stability of the results. Second, they allow for testing 
whether there is a difference in rationality between those with basic and higher 
education. Third, they allow for comparing some of the results with other 
studies using education as an identifying variable. This seventh hypothesis is 
nothing that comes out of the theories of rational expectations or rational 
inattention. However, with education could come more knowledge and better 
capacity to process data, which could give rise to differences in the tests of 
rationality. As such, the question concerning education is equally relevant 
under each of the six hypotheses, and the results of any differences between 
the subsamples are presented under each separate heading of tested hypothesis. 
2.5.1 Results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 — weak and strong 
rationality 
Table 3a presents the first part of the results from estimating regression (4), 
testing hypotheses H1 and H2. The first column shows the results for the full 
sample. The following two columns show the results for two sub-samples, 
distinguishing households based on their level of education, i.e. basic 
education (primary and secondary schooling) and further education. The first 
row shows the values for the average of the 27 national constants (𝛼௡), the 
national expectation biases, which for the full sample is 4.2 percentage points 
above the officially measured inflation rate. The second row shows the average 
of the 27 slope coefficients (𝛽గ೐,௡), which is 0.02. In this setting, there is no 
material economic difference in the bias between households with basic 
education and households with higher education. This finding is at odds with 
other findings using this type of survey data (see, e.g., Bryan and Venkatu 
2001), where households with higher education usually produce expectations 
with lower biases. These coefficients, together with the coefficients in the 
following five rows, provide the information for testing the hypotheses of 
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Table 3a: Estimated coefficients of regression 4, testing the hypothesis of households forming weak 
and strong rational expectations of inflation one year ahead — Hypotheses 1 and 2 
  SAMPLE 
ROW COEFFICIENT TOTAL BASIC EDUCATION FURTHER EDUCATION 
(1) Average constant (𝛼௡) 4.22*** 4.28*** 4.38*** 
(2) Average exp. inflation (𝛽గ೐) 0.02 0.02 0.02 
     
 Information variables    
(3) Fuel price (𝛾ை) 0.00 0.00 0.00 
(4) Interest rate (𝛾ோ) 0.12*** 0.16*** -0.02 
(5) Unemployment (𝛾௎) -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.22*** 
(6) Q1 (𝛾ொଵ) -0.06*** -0.07*** -0.04*** 
(7) Q2 (𝛾ொଶ) -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.02*** 
     
 Tests    
(8) H1: Wald stat. weak RE >10 000*** >10 000*** >10 000*** 
(9) H2: Wald stat. strong RE >10 000*** >10 000*** >10 000*** 
     
(10) 𝑅ଶ 0.683 0.691 0.678 
(11) № of observations 3 270 3 270 3 270 
(12) № of households 2 855 265 2 014 850 834 593 
Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
 
strong and weak rational expectations, with test statistics from the Wald tests 
in rows 8 and 9. 
All three tests of Hypothesis 1 reject the null hypothesis of households forming 
weakly rational expectations of inflation (row 8), where the joint test — 
∀ 𝑛: 𝛼௡, 𝛽గ೐,௡ = (0,1) — is performed with a Wald test and clustered standard 
errors. Figure 1 presents all the national constants and slope coefficients for 
expected inflation. The constants 𝛼௡ lie between 2.8 and 6.7 percentage points 
and are all significant at the 1% level (left map, the colour shading represents 
the strength of the bias), while the slope coefficients 𝛽గ೐,௡ are all very close to 
zero (right map, the colour shading represents p-values below 2.5%, 5%, 7.5% 
and 10% and above). Still, the slope coefficients in 14 cases are significantly 
positive at the 5% level, and two are negative. There is no significant difference 
between the two education samples. 
The Wald test of Hypothesis 2 on row 9 rejects the null hypothesis that 
households use information efficiently when forming inflation expectations, 
i.e. satisfying the conditions for strong-form rational expectations — 
∀ 𝑛: 𝛼௡ = 0, 𝛽గ೐,௡ = 1, 𝚪 = 0. For the full sample, the officially measured 
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Figure 1: Country-specific constants (left map) and slope coefficients (right map) 
The values are the total expectation errors (the constants 𝛼௡) in percent (colour shading represents the strength 
of the bias) and the slope coefficients 𝛽௡ from regression 4 (the coulour shading represents p-vlues below 2.5%, 
5%, 7.5% and 10%, from ligther to darker coulour). 
 
inflation rate correlates significantly with the short-term interest rates (0.12), 
the unemployment rate (-0.19), and how households perceive their past (-0.06) 
and future (-0.04) financial situation. Interestingly, however, the results 
indicate that households do make efficient use of the price of petrol and diesel, 
as the coefficient is not significantly different from zero. Besides fuel prices, 
the private information, households’ views about their own economic situation 
generates the smallest expectation errors of the significant information 
variables. Note, however, that the coefficients are close to zero and imply that 
any change in the independent information variables would only have a 
marginal effect for improving expectations. 
The results imply that households do not adjust their expectations in 
accordance with interest rates and unemployment and underestimate any 
changes present in these two variables, where increasing interest rates indicate 
rising inflation and higher unemployment indicates lower inflation. However, 
as expected, the impact is relatively weak, as the short-term interest rates and 
unemployment rates are slow-moving variables. Nevertheless, over time they 
may have a significant impact, which households seem to neglect when 
forming their inflation expectations, i.e. expectations are rather constant over 
time and do not vary with changing external economic conditions. 
With one exception, the results are essentially the same for the two education 
sub-samples, for which both weak- and strong-form rational expectations are 
rejected. The official inflation rate correlates with the unemployment rate 
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(-0.19 and -0.22) and how households perceive their own past (0.07 and 0.04) 
and future (0.04 and -0.02) financial situation. Households with higher 
education take their financial situation slightly more into account than those 
with lower education when forming their expectations concerning inflation. 
The results, however, show that households with higher education take the 
short-term interest rate into account when forming their expectations, as the 
coefficient (-0.02) is not statistically different from zero. 
Overall, the results show that households are not rational in the sense of Muth 
(1961). The strong and persistent expectation biases in conjunction with the 
very low, and economically irrelevant, slope coefficients indicate that 
households do not update their expectations often and are rather insensitive in 
taking available information into account. These results are consistent with 
households that put a constant amount of resources and effort into forming 
expectations. Possibly, it also indicates that households do not fully understand 
the concept of inflation and other macroeconomic variables. 
2.5.2 Results of testing Hypotheses 3, 4, 5 and 6 — rational 
inattention 
Given the results in Section 2.5.1, where the hypotheses that households form 
rational expectations are rejected, the tests of whether households are 
inattentively rational in times of crisis, or when exceptional events take place, 
shift from testing 𝐻଴: Λ = 0 to whether the coefficients move in a direction 
that would improve households’ rationality. For example, if the bias declines 
and the slope coefficient for expected inflation increases, this would constitute 
a move by households towards more rationally-formed expectations. Such a 
move would be in line with the hypothesis that households behave in a rational 
inattentive manner. 
Hypothesis 3 — The effect of economic crises on rationality 
Almost all tests of Hypothesis 3 reject the null hypothesis of households 
becoming more rational in the weak sense during the financial crises, where 
the tests are 𝜆ிଶఈ , 𝜆ிଷఈ , 𝜆ிସఈ < 0 and 𝜆ிଶగ , 𝜆ிଷగ , 𝜆ிସగ > 0. Table 3b presents the 
results on the first two rows of each panel, i.e. member states that experienced 
two, three, or four types of crisis. With the financial crisis, households become 
less rational, as the estimated coefficients change in a direction that is not 
consistent with improved rationality. The bias in households’ inflation 
expectations — 𝜆ிଶఈ , 𝜆ிଷఈ  and 𝜆ிସఈ  — increase by 1.75, 0.74, and 0.77 of a  
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Table 3b: Estimated coefficients of regression 4 continued, testing the hypothesis that economic crises 
affect households’ rationality and that households form more rational expectations in a more 
severe crisis — Hypotheses 3 and 4 
  SAMPLE 
ROW COEFFICIENT TOTAL BASIC EDUCATION FURTHER EDUCATION 
 Financial crisis (2)    
(1) Constant (𝜆ிଶఈ ) 1.75*** 1.81*** 1.76*** 
(2) Expectation (𝜆ிଶగ ) -0.02** -0.02 -0.04*** 
(3) Fuel price (𝜆ிଶை ) -0.01*** 0.00 -0.02*** 
(4) Interest rate (𝜆ிଶோ ) 0.02 0.00 0.06* 
(5) Unemployment (𝜆ிଶ௎ ) -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.19*** 
(6) Q1 (𝜆ிଶொଵ) 0.06*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 
(7) Q2 (𝜆ிଶொଶ) -0.01 0.00 -0.02** 
     
 Financial crisis (3)    
(8) Constant (𝜆ிଷఈ ) 0.74 0.82 0.35 
(9) Expectation (𝜆ிଷగ ) -0.03** -0.03** -0.03** 
(10) Fuel price (𝜆ிଷை ) 0.11*** 0.11*** 0.10*** 
(11) Interest rate (𝜆ிଷோ ) -1.52*** -1.58*** -1.29*** 
(12) Unemployment (𝜆ிଷ௎ ) -0.03 -0.04 0.02 
(13) Q1 (𝜆ிଷொଵ) -0.04** -0.04* -0.06** 
(14) Q2 (𝜆ிଷொଶ) -0.02 -0.01 -0.07** 
     
 Financial crisis (4)    
(15) Constant (𝜆ிସఈ ) 0.77*** 0.91*** 0.15 
(16) Expectation (𝜆ிସగ ) 0.00 -0.01 0.00 
(17) Fuel price (𝜆ிସை ) 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01* 
(18) Interest rate (𝜆ிସோ ) -0.13*** -0.16*** -0.02 
(19) Unemployment (𝜆ிସ௎ ) 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.09*** 
(20) Q1 (𝜆ிସொଵ) -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.13*** 
(21) Q2 (𝜆ிସொଶ) -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** 
     
 Coefficient tests    
(22) H0: 𝜆ிଶఈ − 𝜆ிସఈ = 0 0.98*** 0.90*** 1.60*** 
(23) H0: 𝜆ிଶగ − 𝜆ிସగ = 0 -0.02* -0.01 -0.05*** 
Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
 
percentage point during the crisis, although the increasing bias in countries 
with three types of crises is not significantly different from zero. At the same 
time, their inflation expectations — 𝜆ிଶగ , 𝜆ிଷగ  and 𝜆ிସగ  — are less relevant for 
explaining HICP inflation, i.e. the coefficients are significantly negative, or 
insignificantly different from zero. The increase in the bias is economically 
relevant, while the change in the slope coefficients are not, as the coefficients 
are close to zero. The increasing biases and households’ expectations 
explaining less of what is happening in the HICP rate of inflation, imply that 
they are not adjusting their expectations sufficiently to take the new situation 
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into account. These two results add to the previous ones, showing households 
becoming even less rational in the weak sense, i.e. the constant and the slope 
coefficient are creeping further away from zero and one, respectively. 
In general, households made less efficient use of the tested information 
variables during the episode of the financial crisis. For the total sample, the 
interaction variables change significantly in a direction consistent with 
increased rationality in 4 out of 15 cases, i.e. for households’ past financial 
situation in countries with two types of crises (𝜆ிଶொଵ, row 6 in Table 3b), the 
short-term interest rate in countries with three or four types of crises (𝜆ிଷோ  and 
𝜆ிସோ , rows 11 and 18), and the unemployment rate in countries with four types 
of crises (𝜆ிସ௎ , row 19). In seven cases the households made a significantly less 
efficient use of the information tested. 
There is also no material difference between the two subsamples in the sense 
that most coefficients move in the same direction for the two subsamples, 
although with some difference in significance. The biggest difference concerns 
the bias in inflation expectations for households with further education in 
countries with four types of crises, which is not significantly different from 
zero. 
Overall, there is only little or no evidence that households behave in an 
inattentively rational manner because of the financial crisis. Rather, the results 
are consistent with households that behave in a general inattentive manner, as 
they don’t change their expectations with regard for the new economic 
situation. Instead the expectation errors increase and changes in readily 
available information continue to not be taken into account. 
Hypotheses 4 and 5 — The effect of extraordinary and transforming events 
on rationality 
Tests of Hypothesis 4 partially accept the hypothesis that households in 
member states that experienced a more severe crisis form more rational 
expectations than households in countries that experienced a less severe crisis. 
Table 3b presents the results from testing whether the bias in countries with 
two types of crises is equal to the bias in countries with four types of crises 
𝜆ிଶఈ − 𝜆ிସఈ = 0, row 22). For all samples, households in countries with four 
types of crises make significantly smaller mistakes in forming their 
expectations, which may be taken as a signal that a severe crisis induces some 
households to partially update their information set. This difference is also of 
a magnitude that is economically relevant, in the order of a percentage point or 
more. This notion is reinforced by households with further education showing 
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no additional bias in countries with four types of crises (𝜆ிସఈ , row 15). 
Furthermore, households in countries with four types of crises do not make any 
additional mistakes regarding the slope coefficients (𝜆ிସగ , row 16). However, 
relative to households experiencing two types of crises, the differences are not 
significant, except for households with further education. 
Households experiencing a more or a less severe financial crisis also make 
different use of information, where households in countries that experienced 
four types of crises make better use of information on interest rates and 
unemployment (𝜆ிସோ  and 𝜆ிସ௎ , rows 17 and 18). Interest rates are even used 
efficiently in times of crisis, while the use of unemployment is improved 
significantly. However, the private information on the household’s past and 
future economic situation is used less efficiently (𝜆ிସொଵ and 𝜆ிସொଶ, rows 20 and 
21), as the coefficients add to the bias significantly. Households experiencing 
two types of crises, on the other hand, improve their use of their private 
information on the household’s past economic situation to the point that it is 
used efficiently during a crisis (𝜆ிଶ௎ , row 6). Furthermore, those households 
with further education also make efficient use of the information on interest 
rates. 
Although Hypothesis 4 is partially accepted in the sense that in general the 
biases are smaller when the crisis is more severe, and parts of the information 
set are used more efficiently, the results are not consistent with the theory of 
rational inattention. The biases remain large and other parts of the information 
set are used less efficiently and are of little economic importance. Furthermore, 
some of the differences between the coefficients in the two panels of severity 
of crisis are not significant. The results are rather consistent with households 
that form expectations based on a rule of thumb, but that in an extreme event 
have made a one-off partial adjustment of their inflation expectations. 
Note that, in testing Hypothesis 4, countries with three types of crises are 
disregarded — for two reasons. First, there are only two countries with 
relatively few observations. Second, by focusing on the difference between 
countries with two and four types of crises, the difference in severity of crises 
becomes more distinct. 
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Table 3c: Estimated coefficients of regression 4 continued, testing the hypothesis of households in 
member states that switched their national currencies to the euro became more rational after 
the switch — Hypothesis 5 
  SAMPLE 
ROW COEFFICIENT TOTAL BASIC EDUCATION FURTHER EDUCATION 
 Euro introduction    
(1) Constant (𝜆ாఈ) -0.97*** -0.82*** -1.62*** 
(2) Expectation (𝜆ாగ) 0.01* 0.01 0.01** 
(3) Fuel price (𝜆ாை) 0.01*** 0.02*** 0.00 
(4) Interest rate (𝜆ாோ) 0.14** 0.12** 0.20*** 
(5) Unemployment (𝜆ா௎) 0.02 0.02 0.06*** 
(6) Q1 (𝜆ாொଵ) 0.08*** 0.09*** 0.09*** 
(7) Q2 (𝜆ாொଶ) 0.06*** 0.06*** 0.09*** 
Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
 
Tests of Hypothesis 5 partially accept the hypothesis that households in 
member states that switched their national currencies to the euro became more 
rational after the switch. The results in Table 3c show that in general 
households in countries that introduced the euro form less biased inflation 
expectations, and partially make better use of the tested information. After the 
euro-cash changeover, the expectation bias (𝜆ாఈ, row 1) declines significantly 
by almost one percentage point in the total sample, and by 1.6 percentage 
points in the sample of households with further education. The average bias 
before the euro introduction is 4.8 percentage points above the officially 
measured inflation rate. The slope coefficients, however, do not increase in any 
material way, i.e. inflation expectations (𝜆ாగ, row 2) did not become more 
relevant for explaining inflation. 
Households in member states that introduced the euro made more efficient use 
of private information on the economic situation of the household, but less 
efficient use of the short-term interest rates. The coefficients for both the past 
and the future economic situation of the household increased significantly (𝜆ாொଵ 
and 𝜆ாொଶ, rows 6 and 7), to the extent that the information is used in line with 
the strong-form of rationality. However, the interest rates, which should have 
been an important variable in the run-up to the euro-cash changeover, are used 
less efficiently, as the coefficients (𝜆ாோ, row 4) are significantly positive and 
add to the bias. The coefficients for fuel prices and unemployment are mainly 
insignificant, although it is worth noting the households with further education 
make more efficient use of the unemployment rate after euro introduction. 
These coefficients are yet again close to zero and of little economic 
importance. 
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These results are consistent with those of Hypothesis 4, in the sense that 
Hypothesis 5 is partially accepted, as the biases are smaller and parts of the 
information set are used more efficiently. However, the results are yet again 
not consistent with the theory of rational inattention, as the biases remain large 
and other parts of the information set are used less efficiently. The results are 
yet again rather consistent with households that form expectations based on a 
rule of thumb and, in an extreme event, have made a one-off partial adjustment 
of their inflation expectations. 
The results from testing Hypothesis 5 also show interesting differences from 
those of other studies that show that the euro introduction made it more 
difficult for households to form expectations regarding inflation. In the first 
round of euro-cash changeovers in 2002, households in many member states 
felt they experienced a significant increase in inflation, even though the official 
rate only changed marginally (see, e.g., Ehrmann 2006). This difficulty should 
have induced households to update their information sets, yet the results show 
they did not. However, the results in Table 3c show that, in member states 
taking part in later rounds of euro introduction, the biases in households’ 
inflation expectations decline. 
Hypothesis 6 — The effect of low or high inflation periods on rationality 
Tests of Hypothesis 6 reject the hypothesis that households become less 
rational in periods of low inflation.7 Table 3d shows that periods of lower 
inflation induce households to shift their inflation expectations down, while 
the expectations lose some of their explanatory power. The expectation bias 
(𝜆ூఈ, row 1) declines significantly by 0.8 of a percentage point, which is not 
consistent with the theory of rational inattention. However, households’ 
inflation expectations become less relevant for explaining inflation 
(𝜆ூగ declines, row 2), which is in accordance with the theory of rational 
inattention. 
                                                     
7  As there is some uncertainty to when households are able to absorb and process new 
information on inflation developments, regression 4 has also been estimated using lagged 
dates for low-inflation periods, to check the sensitivity of the results. Assuming that it takes 
more time for lower inflation to enter into households’ expectations about inflation, later 
inflation expectations may perform better. Regression 4 is therefore estimated using a 3, 6 
and 12 month lag to the low-inflation periods. There are no material differences to the 
estimated parameters. Hypothesis 6 is rejected in the same way as in the original specification 
of regression 4, and the value of the coefficients are similar, with few differences in 
significance. The main difference is that the expectation bias (𝜆ூఈ) declines slightly less, the larger the lag. 
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Table 3d: Estimated coefficients of regression 5, testing the hypothesis of households becoming less 
rational in periods of low inflation — Hypothesis 6 
  SAMPLE 
ROW COEFFICIENT TOTAL BASIC EDUCATION FURTHER EDUCATION 
 Low inflation    
(1) Constant (𝜆ூఈ) -0.80*** -0.89*** -0.62*** 
(2) Expectation (𝜆ூగ) -0.03*** -0.03*** -0.03*** 
(3) Fuel price (𝜆ூை) -0.01** -0.01* -0.01** 
(4) Interest rate (𝜆ூோ) -0.03 0.00 -0.08 
(5) Unemployment (𝜆ூ௎) 0.01 0.01 0.01 
(6) Q1 (𝜆ூொଵ) 0.10*** 0.11*** 0.07*** 
(7) Q2 (𝜆ூொଶ) 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.06*** 
Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
The empirical results also show that, during periods of low inflation, 
households make more efficient use of the tested information, but this may 
simply be because such information is less important when inflation is low. 
The coefficients for the interaction variables for households’ views of their 
own past (𝜆ூொଵ, row 6) and future (𝜆ூொଶ, row 7) financial situation increase 
significantly during periods of low inflation and reduce the inefficient use of 
these information variables. The coefficient for short-term interest rates (𝜆ூோ, 
row 4) and unemployment (𝜆ூ௎, row 5) are insignificantly different from zero, 
but have signs that are consistent with a more efficient use of these information 
variables. The results point to a more efficient, or at least not a worse, use of 
information during periods of low inflation. This is not consistent with the 
hypothesis that households become less rational in the strong sense during 
periods of low inflation. Moreover, the coefficients are close to zero. 
The results show that households do not become less rational in periods of low 
inflation; the expectation bias declines and the tested information is used more 
efficiently. Households rather seem to resort to low-cost strategies, a rule of 
thumb approach, which in effect may lead them to produce better forecasts of 
inflation at times of low inflation, i.e. more in line with rational expectations. 
For example, a household assigning a low constant as its expectation of future 
inflation when inflation is low, and a high constant when inflation is high, will 
on average produce better forecasts of inflation when inflation is low, as 
inflation volatility is lower at low inflation rates (Judson and Orphanides 
1999). The low slope coefficient and the fact that it does not change in any 
economically relevant way (𝛽గ೐  and 𝜆ூగ are both close to zero) supports the 
notion that households resort to changing their expectations in occasional one-
off steps. 
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2.6 Concluding remarks 
To summarise, the purpose of this chapter is to explore to what extent 
households’ inflation expectations are consistent with theories of rationality. 
Six hypotheses are tested by regressing households’ inflation expectations, a 
set of information variables, and a set of dummy variables specifying events 
that may induce households to improve on their expectations on the official 
measure of inflation, the HICP rate of inflation. Table 4 summarise the results 
and shows that four hypotheses are rejected and two are partially accepted. 
The results show that households do not form rational expectations in the sense 
of Muth (1961), and their rationality does not improve in times of crisis or at 
the time of a major economic event such as changing the domestic currency to 
the euro. The data suggest that households use a rather constant amount of 
resources and effort in forming expectations on inflation, except possibly in 
extreme situations when one-off changes to expectations are made. In times of 
economic crisis, the expectation bias increases; when inflation is low, the bias 
decreases. These results are rather consistent with households that use a rule 
of thumb approach in forming expectations, which implies that occasionally 
they perform better relative to the official inflation rate, and at other times 
worse. 
Table 4: Results of testing the six hypotheses 
HYPOTHESIS TESTED RESULT 
H1 Households form unbiased predictions of inflation 12 months ahead Rejected 
H2 Households’ expectations are uncorrelated with any information available at 
the time the forecast is made 
Rejected 
H3 Households become more rational during a crisis period Rejected 
H4 Households in member states that experience more severe crises form more 
rational expectations than households in member states that experience less 
severe crises 
Partially accepted 
H5 Households in member states that switch currency to the euro are more 
rational after the switch 
Partially accepted 
H6 Households become less rational in periods of low inflation Rejected 
There is only weak empirical support in favour of the theory of rational 
inattention. When a crisis turns sufficiently extreme, as during the sovereign 
debt crisis in 2012, the cost of not updating ones’ information set and thinking 
seems to become too costly. In this situation, households are induced to update 
and produce less biased expectations, relative to households experiencing less 
severe crises. Nevertheless, the biases increase regardless of the severity of 
crisis. Also, introducing the euro may be classified as an extreme event, but in 
this case the biases in inflation expectations decline. However, this decline is 
a one-off adjustment of the level of inflation expectations. 
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It should be noted: the sample used in this chapter contains three million 
observations on households’ inflation expectations, and the question is how 
rational they actually are. Not very, it would seem. However, the answer may 
not be so simple: the results raise many questions. First, is the benchmark, the 
official inflation rate based on the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices, 
measured correctly. Discussions exist on what should be included in the 
indexes of inflation, that is, should house and financial asset prices be included 
(see Goodhart 2001; Bryan et al. 2002)? Second, if it is measured correctly, 
does it correspond to what households perceive as inflation? For example, 
again, house- and stock market developments may influence households’ 
views. Third, how well do people understand inflation and rates of change? 
Macroeconomic concepts are difficult to understand and are something that 
most people do not deal with on a regular basis in their daily lives. Fourth, do 
respondents to the surveys understand or interpret the questions correctly? The 
two qualitative price questions in the Harmonised Consumer Survey are 
complex and involve understanding and switching between three concepts of 
price developments: the price level, the rate of change (first derivative) in the 
price, and the change in the rate of change (second derivative) in the price. The 
quantitative questions are somewhat easier to understand, as they just ask about 
a number for the inflation rate. Nevertheless, this involves thinking in terms of 
percentages, which people have been found to struggle with, as shown by the 
survey questions used to calculate the Financial Literacy Index (Standard & 
Poor’s 2015). 
People may know more about their daily lives and their personal economy than 
about macroeconomic variables. The results in this chapter show that 
households make somewhat more rational use of their private information, i.e. 
the information on the household’s past and future financial situation, 
especially the past information. The coefficients in general are lower than for 
the other information variables, and the efficient use of this information 
improves in certain cases. To add to this notion, Jonsson and Lindén (2009), 
in a paper trying to find the best survey indicator for consumption growth, 
show that questions related to personal economy perform better in tracking 
overall consumption than a combination of answers to questions that mainly 
relate to general economic developments. This suggests that digging deeper 
into the survey, looking at aspects of households that distinguish between those 
that are more and less informed could be relevant. This is particularly true if 
those aspects are directly relevant to the economic situation of the household 
and, at the same time, relate to inflation, or at least to the macroeconomy in 
general. 
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2.8 Appendix 
Table A1: Names and abbreviations of countries in the European Union 
COUNTRY ABBREVIATION COUNTRY ABBREVIATION COUNTRY ABBREVIATION 
Austria AT Germany DE Poland PL 
Belgium BE Greece GR Portugal PT 
Bulgaria BG Hungary HU Romania RO 
Croatia HR Ireland IE Slovakia SK 
Cyprus CY Italy IT Slovenia SI 
Czechia CZ Latvia LV Spain ES 
Denmark DK Lithuania LT Sweden SE 
Estonia EE Luxembourg LU United Kingdom GB 
Finland FI Malta MT Euro area EA 
France FR Netherlands NL European Union EU 
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3 Why do households’ perceptions 
and expectations of inflation 
differ from the official measure 
of inflation? 
3.1 Introduction 
Households’ perceived present rate of inflation and expected future rate of 
inflation differ substantially from the officially measured inflation rate. The 
average Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP), which is the official 
measure of consumer price inflation for the euro area, has increased on average 
2% per year between 2003 and 2014. Households, however, perceived price 
increases to be consistently higher than the measured rate at an average of 
10.7% per year, and they expected prices to continue to increase in the coming 
12 months by 5.7%. There are large differences among households, but also 
across member states. In Finland, households perceived and expected inflation 
to be 3.8% and 3.1%, while the official rate was 1.9%. In some cases, these 
differences are substantially larger. For example, Italian households’ perceived 
and expected inflation to be 16.0% and 5.3% respectively, while the official 
rate was 2.2% (see Chart 1 and Chart 2). 
Several studies have tried to explain such differences between households’ 
opinions about inflation and the official rate, which are commonly found in 
consumer surveys.8 Jonung (1981) proposed that past experienced inflation 
matters for forming expectations for the future, e.g. households that 
experienced low rates in the past would tend to expect lower rates in the future. 
 
                                                     
8  In this chapter ‘opinions about inflation’ and ‘inflation opinions’ are used to refer to both 
‘perceptions and expectations about inflation’ and ‘perceived and expected inflation’. 
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Chart 1: HICP inflation and households’ perceived and expected inflation in selected member states in 
the European Union, 2003-2014 (%) 
 
Chart 2: HICP inflation and households’ perceived and expected inflation in selected member states in 
the European Union, 2003-2014 (%) 
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He also suggested that differences in purchasing patterns may explain 
significant differences between women and men. In a similar vein, Bryan and 
Venkatu (2001a) suggested that differences in consumption patterns may 
explain the differences between surveyed inflation expectations and the 
consumer price index in the US. In Europe, the euro-cash changeover also 
presents as a specific event that explains disparities between perceived and 
expected inflation and the HICP (see Ehrmann 2006). 
This chapter provides an alternative explanation for why households’ opinions 
about inflation deviate from the official inflation rate, which suggests that 
households’ purchasing plans for big expenditure items matter when they form 
their opinions. The explanation rests on the theory of rational inattention, i.e. 
that it is costly to both gather and analyse data to form opinions on inflation 
developments, and that people pay attention to information according to their 
needs (Sims 2003; Reis 2006a). The hypothesis is that the more likely 
households are to spend a large sum of money, the stronger incentive they have 
to collect and process data to forecast inflation; this leads to their, producing 
better financial projections. The Harmonised Consumer Survey for the 
European Union is a unique database particularly useful for studying this 
hypothesis, with information on the households’ views of past and future 
inflation. In addition, the survey contains information on households’ 
likelihood to buy a new car, a house, and to make major home improvements. 
These economic activities may potentially induce strong incentives for people 
to form more precise expectations of inflation, or at least cause them to show 
an interest in general macroeconomic developments, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of becoming better informed. 
The results show that stronger incentives to collect information on inflation 
induce households to produce perceived and expected inflation rates that more 
closely correspond to the officially measured rate of inflation (HICP), which 
may contain measurement errors, and that these incentives are stronger when 
inflation is higher. After correcting for outliers, households that say they are 
likely to spend a large sum of money on a car, a house, or home improvements 
perceive inflation to be about 0.8 of a percentage points lower than those not 
likely to spend a large sum of money. Similarly, such households expect 
inflation to be about 0.6 of a percentage point lower than those households that 
are not likely to make a large expenditure. In those months when the official 
inflation rate is above the sample median inflation, the respective differences 
increase to 1.9 and 1.6 percentage points. Thus, at times of high inflation, a 
substantial part of the difference between households’ opinions about the 
inflation rate and the official rate can be explained, which is consistent with 
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the theory of rational inattention. At the same time, however, there is a 
significant bias that remains unexplained, leaving room for other explanations 
which are not tested in this thesis. 
3.2 Background 
Inflation expectations are more than of academic interest; the subject is an 
integral part of central bank policy (Blanchflower 2008; Côté 2015) and is 
consistently discussed by the governing boards of central banks (see, e.g., 
European Central Bank [ECB] 2016). According to the present approach to 
monetary policymaking, founded on inflation targeting, central banks should 
be forward-looking, framing their policies today on basis of forecasts of the 
future rate of inflation one to two years ahead. This approach requires access 
to reliable and frequently reported data on inflation expectations of the public. 
The ECB monitors inflation expectations in the euro area through several 
sources, including indicators derived from financial assets, consumer surveys, 
and surveys of professional forecasters (ECB 2003). Furthermore, expectations 
about the future course of the price level are important to decision-makers in 
all markets: for goods, labour, money, financial assets, and currencies. 
Decisions taken on these markets have an impact on the actual rate of inflation, 
nominal wage rates, interest rates, and exchange rates, as well as variables such 
as the rate of unemployment. 
In standard models of unemployment, business cycle and inflation dynamics, 
the role of households’ expectations is well established. However, how 
households form their expectations about the macroeconomy is still less 
understood (see Cavallo et al. 2014; Coibion and Gorodnichenko 2015). In 
practice it is difficult to generalise, as individuals are likely to form their 
expectations heterogeneously, using different information sets, relying on 
different models, and having different capacities for processing information 
(see Jonung 1984). 
Measuring inflation expectations is far from an exact science. Such numbers 
are difficult to compile for the simple reason that inflation expectations are not 
directly measurable in a way that objective variables are (e.g. interest rates, 
monetary aggregates, rates of unemployment, consumer and producer prices, 
etc.). Expectations regarding the future behaviour of prices are held by 
individuals in their minds. To measure them in a representative way is 
therefore a major challenge for economists and for policymakers. 
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A straightforward way to measure the inflation expectations of the public is to 
ask people about them. In fact, a few surveys do exactly that. Examples of such 
surveys are the Swedish Household Survey, the University of Michigan Survey 
of Consumer Attitudes, and the Inflation Psychology Survey conducted by the 
Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland in association with Ohio State University. 
Other countries such as Australia, New Zealand, India, and South Africa have 
also included explicit questions on inflation in their respective consumer 
surveys. More recently, the National Banks of Canada (Bank of Canada 2015) 
and Brazil (Campelo et al. 2014) have launched surveys of consumers’ 
inflation expectations. 
A potential problem with these surveys is that the questions asked concern 
variables that are difficult to assess or even understand. Inflation, for example, 
is a macro variable measuring the aggregate price level, but as households’ 
consumption baskets do not necessarily correspond to the one used for 
calculating consumer price indices, the answers obtained on the surveys can 
differ substantially from the official inflation rates (see, e.g., Jonung 1981; 
Bryan and Venkatu 2001a, 2001b; Palmqvist and Strömberg 2004). This is 
often the case; typically surveys do show perceptions and expectations that are 
very different from the official rates. 
Economists have put forth a few possible explanations as to why survey data 
are commonly higher than the official inflation estimates, but generally they 
fail to explain the differences (Bryan and Venkatu 2001b). These explanations 
refer to differences in respondents’ shopping habits or in their shopping 
experience. For example, in terms of habits, one group of people may do more 
shopping than another, and therefore be in a better position to assess and 
forecast price developments. The shopping experience may also differ between 
groups of people because they buy different bundles of goods. One group may 
buy more durable goods (e.g. domestic appliances) and another may buy 
nondurable goods (e.g. food). In recent research, Das et al. 2019 show that the 
persistent upward bias in households’ inflation opinions are also explained by 
price changes of different categories of consumption goods. They find that 
energy and food price inflation have a disproportionately large effect on 
households’ opinions about inflation. Others suggest that people are simply 
irrational. None of these explanations are able to fully account for the observed 
difference between opinions about inflation and the official inflation rate; thus 
the question remains as to why this is the case. 
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3.3 Theory, empirical evidence, and hypothesis 
Rational inattention offers a theoretical explanation for the difference between 
perceived and expected inflation and the official rate. The difference might be 
explained by the relatively weak incentives people face in their daily lives to 
gather information on inflation, i.e. most of the answers to the surveys would 
contain noisy signals. This is particularly true when member states of the 
European Union are experiencing low inflation, such as is occurring now and 
during a large part of the sample: it is not very important for people to have 
correct conjectures about future inflation on a daily basis. It is also especially 
true when information is costly, either in terms of money or processing 
capacity, and the cost must be weighed against an alternative use of available 
resources (Stigler 1961). On the other hand, there are instances when decisions 
must be made where inflation and interest rates could become important 
variables in people’s lives, e.g. when a major investment is going to be 
undertaken, such as the purchase of a house. 
These notions are embedded in the theory of rational inattention, which is 
motivated by the idea that individual households have limited capacity for 
processing information (Sims 2003). Sims uses information theory to develop 
a model where the information flow about macroeconomic variables is very 
low, and where people only devote a fraction of their information-processing 
capacity and attention to macroeconomic variables. A complementary 
approach is offered by Reis (2006a, 2006b), who assumes that it is costly for 
people to acquire, absorb, and process information in forming expectations and 
making decisions. In his framework, people rationally choose to update their 
information and their plans infrequently. Information becomes ‘sticky’, only 
gradually dissipating to the population. The model posits a rational behaviour 
by agents where they update information infrequently, as the optimal response 
to explicitly modelled costs of planning. 
Carroll (2003, 2006) puts forward an alternative model, in which people do not 
have full understanding of the underlying macroeconomic construct. Instead, 
people are assumed to obtain their information from professional forecasters 
via news media or other secondary sources. However, each person is not 
observing all news at all times. Instead, people are assumed to absorb economic 
information from media sporadically, so that it may take considerable time 
before information spreads throughout the economy. This model provides a 
micro-foundation of how households form their expectations of 
macroeconomic variables — a framework Carroll refers to as ‘epidemiological 
expectations’. Using the Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes, he shows 
69 
that the typical household updates its expectations about inflation roughly once 
a year and that they are forward looking when they do so. 
Several recent papers have used Carroll’s framework for studying the 
formation of inflation expectations. Lanne et al. (2009) propose and show that 
a significant proportion of the population rely on the past release of actual 
inflation, instead of basing their expectations on rational forward-looking 
forecasts produced by professional forecasters. Easaw and Golinelli (2012) 
extend Carroll’s model to distinguish between purely forward-looking and 
‘stubborn’ households, i.e. those that rely on their lagged one-year-ahead 
forecast. Easaw et al. (2013) employ an error-correction version of Carroll’s 
model, relaxing the constraint that short- and long-term dynamics have the 
same absorption rate for the news. The results show that: (i) households absorb 
professional forecasts when forming expectations; (ii) households’ 
expectations are determined by current inflation (or perceptions of current 
inflation); and (iii) current inflation signals are used to determine the future 
direction of inflation rates. Following the approach of Easaw et al., Campelo 
et al. (2014) studied the formation of inflation expectations in Brazil, adding 
the effects of households’ opinions on the personal and general economic 
situation of that population. 
The analysis in this study also follows those of Carroll (2003) and Easaw et al. 
(2013) that consider households’ inattentive behaviour when forming their 
inflation expectations. The version of the model employed here considers the 
possibility that contemplating purchase of a car or a house, or making major 
home improvements, could determine how households perceive past inflation 
and shape expectations of future inflation. Households may also take into 
account various macroeconomic data. The estimated model therefore also 
considers the possibility that households consider the interest rate, the 
unemployment rate, and a measure of the output gap when forming their 
expectations. Households do not necessarily take these variables into account 
literally, but they may serve as proxies for information that individuals pick up 
through media and other channels. The output gap, for example, is not 
observable and rarely reported in regular media, but it may serve as a gauge 
for information on the current state of the business cycle. 
The two main hypotheses (H1 and H2) tested in this chapter follow directly 
from the rational expectation literature: 
H1: Households more likely to purchase a house or a car, or make significant 
home improvements, form less biased perceptions and expectations about 
inflation. 
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H2: The difference in perceived and expected inflation between households 
more and less likely to purchase a house or a car, or make significant home 
improvements, is less in times of low inflation. 
Hypothesis 1 tests the implication that in certain circumstances in people’s 
lives, some households are more likely to pay attention to economic news and 
events than others (e.g. when making decisions that may affect their wealth or 
income), and seeks to determine whether those with incentives to update their 
information are more attentive and likely to report less biased perceived and 
expected inflation rates. 
Detailed questions in the Harmonised Consumer Survey for the EU on 
household purchasing plans of cars, houses, and home improvement make it 
possible to study these issues. It is conjectured that these durable consumption 
expenditures have a high probability of inducing the households to take on new 
loans or causing them to rebalance their portfolio, which increases the 
incentive to collect and process information on interest rates, risk premiums, 
and inflation rates, or just being more observant on macroeconomic news in 
general. Thus, the more likely the households are to spend large amounts of 
money, the closer their answers on inflation should be to the official rate, or 
more correct ’ex post’. 
It is possible, however, that the purchase of durable goods such as a car and 
investments in real estate make people excessively attentive to price 
developments in these markets and cause them to form opinions about inflation 
based on these developments, instead of on general price developments. For 
example, if house prices are increasing faster than other asset prices or those 
of consumer goods, households more likely to purchase a house may consider 
inflation as higher than inattentive households. 
Hypothesis 2 concerns the level of inflation in the economy, which changes 
the costs related to inflation that households face. When inflation is low, the 
costs of inflation and price volatility decline, making it less important for 
households to pay attention to price developments. To the extent households 
update their dataset less and pay less attention to price movements in general, 
the difference in perceived and expected inflation between attentive and 
inattentive households should be smaller. Furthermore, households may resort 
to low-cost strategies such as a rule of thumb approach, which in effect may 
lead households to produce better forecasts of inflation at times of low 
inflation, again reducing the difference between attentive and inattentive 
households. For example, a household assigning a low constant as its 
expectation of future inflation when inflation is low, and a high constant when 
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inflation is high, will on average produce better forecasts of inflation when 
inflation is low, as inflation volatility is lower at low inflation rates (Judson 
and Orphanides 1999). However, as for Hypothesis 1, if those households 
more likely to purchase a car or house, or make home improvements, are more 
influenced by price developments in these markets and they diverge from 
general price movements, the difference may increase. 
One potential issue regarding this hypothesis is that of reverse causality. For 
example, if households think they are in a period of relatively low inflation, 
they may think that this is a good time to buy a car, a house, or make significant 
home improvements, i.e. inflation induce households to shift their spending in 
accordance with the level of inflation. If this is the case, the data should show 
a higher frequency of household being more likely to buy a house, a car or 
make significant home improvements. This is, however, not the case, and this 
type of reveres causality is not an issue for the results in this chapter. The 
frequency in terms of likelihood of spending a large sum of money is rather 
constant over time, the correlation with the inflation rate ranges from -0.18 to  
0.05 and are not significantly different from zero. Households’ investments in 
houses and purchases of cars rather seem to be driven by necessity, and less by 
intertemporal choices related to inflation. 
3.4 Model 
The analysis is based on a regression model with dummy variables, which 
allows for testing the hypothesis that households’ purchasing plans for big 
expenditures such as a car, a house, or home improvements induce people to 
update their views on perceived and expected inflation and consider how these 
changes depend on the inflation environment. 
Hypotheses 1 and 2 are tested using the regressions: 
𝜋௛,௧௉௘௥ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଵ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଶ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଷ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ସ஼௔௥ + 𝜀௛,௧  (1) 
𝜋௛,௧ா௫௣ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଵ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଶ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ଷ஼௔௥ + 𝛽ଵ𝐿௛,௧,ସ஼௔௥ + 𝜀௛,௧  (2) 
where 
𝐿 = ሼ1 (𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦), 2 (𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑙𝑦 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦), 3 (𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦), 4 (𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑦)ሽ 
Households’ perceived (𝜋௛,௧௉௘௥) and expected (𝜋௛,௧ா௫௣) inflation are regressed on 
an intercept (𝛼) and a first set of dummy variables where households’ answers 
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are categorised according to three questions in the Harmonised Consumer 
Survey for the EU on the likelihood to spend money. 𝐿௛,௧,௟஼௔௥  is household ℎ 
likelihood in month t for buying a car. There are four answers to the question, 
where 𝑙 can take the value 1, 2, 3, or 4, representing the answer categories ‘very 
likely’, ‘fairly likely’, ‘not likely’, and ‘not at all likely’ to make the purchase. 
These variables take the value 1 if a respondent selected the respective answer 
category and zero otherwise. The intercept represents the average inflation 
opinion among households, and the 𝛽-coefficient represents any deviation 
from the average depending on households’ likelihood to purchase a car. 
Similarly, there are two pairs of regressions that include the other likelihood 
variables for buying a house or making major home improvements. The 
variables are labelled with superscripts House (𝐿௛,௧,௟ு௢௨௦௘) and Renovation 
(𝐿௛,௧,௟ோ௘௡௢௩௔௧௜௢௡), respectively. 
Note, the regressions are not specified as deviations from measured inflation, 
because the focus is on the difference of opinions between different types of 
households, i.e. the comparison is not relative to a forecast error of zero. There 
are three reasons that motivate this specification. First, as Chapter 2 showed, 
perceived and expected inflation is excessively high in all countries. Thus, it is 
enough to show that some types of households have lower inflation opinions 
for the errors to be reduced. Second, this specification allows for using the full 
sample. By including the officially measured inflation rate on the left hand side 
of the regressions, which is the same for all households in any specific country 
and month, the sample is reduced to monthly average errors, loosing precision 
in the estimations. Third, the interpretation of the results is easier. 
Hypothesis 1, whether households’ purchasing plans matter when they form 
their opinions about perceived and expected inflation, is tested by comparing 
the differences between the coefficients for these ‘likelihood’ variables — the 
likelihood of spending money on a car, a house, or home improvements — and 
whether they are significantly different from zero (𝐻଴: Δ𝛽ଵ,ଶ = 𝛽ଵ − 𝛽ଶ = 0, 
Δ𝛽ଶ,ଷ = 𝛽ଶ − 𝛽ଷ = 0, Δ𝛽ଷ,ସ = 𝛽ଷ − 𝛽ସ = 0, in addition, Δ𝛽ଶ,ସ = 𝛽ଶ − 𝛽ସ = 0 
is tested). For the hypothesis to hold, coefficients of a higher likelihood of 
spending money should be lower than coefficients of a lower likelihood of 
spending money. If, for example, the mean for ‘very likely’ house buyers is 
lower than that of ‘fairly likely’ house buyers, this would be interpreted as a 
result in support of the hypothesis that spending patterns matter. Households 
that are more likely to be informed perceive and expect inflation to be closer 
to the official rate than households that are less likely to be informed. 
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Hypothesis 2, whether lower inflation matters when households with different 
purchasing plans form their opinions of inflation, is tested in the same way as 
for Hypothesis 1, with the addition of splitting the sample into two subsamples. 
The first subsample are months with higher inflation, and the second are 
months with lower inflation. The in-sample coefficients yet again test the first 
hypothesis, but comparing the coefficients from the two subsamples tests the 
second hypothesis (𝐻଴: Δ𝛽ଵ,ସ௅௢௪ ௜௡௙௟௔௧௜௢௡ − Δ𝛽ଵ,ସு௜௚௛ ௜௡௙௟௔௧௜௢௡ = 0). 
To complete the specification, each regression is augmented with an additional 
three sets of variables controlling for socioeconomic differences among 
surveyed households, macroeconomic conditions, and remaining country 
differences. The full specification of the estimated equations is: 
𝜋௛,௧௉௘௥ = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽௟𝐿௛,௧,௟஼௔௥௟∈௅ + ∑ 𝛾௜𝐼௛,௧,௜௜∈ூ + ∑ 𝛾௪𝑊௛,௧,௪௜∈ூ + ∑ 𝛾௘𝐸௛,௧,௘௘∈ா +
          + ∑ 𝛾௔𝐴௛,௧,௔௔∈஺ + 𝛾௦𝑆௛,௧,௦ + ∑ 𝛾௠𝑀௛,௧,௠௡௠∈ெ + ∑ 𝛾௖𝐶௛,௖௖∈஼ + 𝜀௛,௧ (3) 
𝜋௛,௧ா௫௣ = 𝛼 + ∑ 𝛽௟𝐿௛,௧,௟஼௔௥௟∈௅ + ∑ 𝛾௜𝐼௛,௧,௜௜∈ூ + ∑ 𝛾௪𝑊௛,௧,௪௜∈ூ + ∑ 𝛾௘𝐸௛,௧,௘௘∈ா +
          + ∑ 𝛾௔𝐴௛,௧,௔௔∈஺ + 𝛾௦𝑆௛,௧,௦ + ∑ 𝛾௠𝑀௛,௧,௠௡௠∈ெ + ∑ 𝛾௖𝐶௛,௖௖∈஼ + 𝜀௛,௧ (4) 
Where 𝐿 = ሼ1,2,3,4ሽ, 𝐼 = ሼ2,3,4ሽ, 𝑊 = ሼ0,1,2ሽ, 𝐸 = ሼ2,3ሽ, 𝐴 = ሼ2,3,4ሽ, 
𝑀 = ሼ1 (𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒), 2 (𝑢𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒), 3 (𝑜𝑢𝑡𝑝𝑢𝑡 𝑔𝑎𝑝)ሽ, 
𝐶 = ሼ𝐴𝑙𝑙 𝐸𝑈 𝑚𝑒𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑒𝑥𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡 𝐴𝑇 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐻𝑈ሽ 
In total, regressions (3) and (4) contain 46 terms each. Following the intercept 
and the first set of four likelihood variables, the right-hand side of the equation 
also includes a second set of five variables controlling for socioeconomic 
differences among surveyed households. These variables control for 
previously identified differences in households’ inflation opinions, e.g. that 
people with higher income perceive and expect inflation to be lower than 
people with lower income, and that opinions of women are different from those 
of men. Household characteristics include: income (𝐼௛,௧,௜), where i = 2, 3 or 4 
represent the second, third and fourth income quartile); work regime (𝑊௛,௧.௪), 
where w = 0, 1 or 2 represent unemployed, part-time and full-time work); 
education (𝐸௛,௧.௘), where e = 2 or 3 represent secondary and further education); 
age (𝐴௛,௧,௔), where a = 2, 3, or 4 represent people of the ages  
30–49, 50–64 and 65+, respectively); and sex (𝑆௛,௧,௦) for women). These 
control variables are also defined as dummy variables, where a specific 
household characteristic is given the value 1 or else 0. 
The third and final set of independent variables corresponds to macroeconomic 
information and country dummies. The macroeconomic variables 
(𝑀௛,௧,௠௡ , where m = 1, 2 and 3) are the interest rate, the unemployment rate, 
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and the output gap in the respective country (𝑛) of the surveyed household. 
These information variables serve two purposes. First, this is information that 
households may take into account. However, they do not necessarily consider 
it literally, but it may serve as a proxy for data that individuals responding to 
the surveys pick up through media and other channels. Second, they account 
for time and country differences by gauging, for example, the business cycle. 
The regression also includes a set of country-specific dummy variables, 
identifying the member state of each household (𝐶௛,௖), where c is all EU 
member states except Austria and Hungary), controlling for any residual 
country specific effects. Austria is excluded so that the regression does not 
become overidentified, and Hungary is excluded because of the lack of data. 
The regression does not include all the socioeconomic characteristics of a 
household nor does it include the answer category ‘don’t know’ for the 
likelihood variables, in order that the equation does not become overidentified. 
The intercept thus measures the mean of a reference group of households that 
are not covered by the other characteristics, and can be interpreted as the 
average expected inflation rate for a reference person who is a male from 
Austria, between 16 and 29 years old, has an education comparable to primary 
school or less, does not take part in the labour market, has an income in the 
first quartile, and has not revealed his likelihood to spend a large sum of 
money. All other socioeconomic coefficients represent the deviations from the 
mean expected inflation of the reference group of households. 
3.5 Data 
The main part of the data used come from the Harmonised Consumer Survey 
for the European Union. National institutes in each of the 28 participating 
countries conduct their portion of the survey. The harmonised questionnaire 
contains questions on the economic situation of the household and the country 
where the household is located. It also contains information on the 
socioeconomic characteristics of the household: income, work regime, 
education, age, and sex.9 Parallel with two qualitative questions on price 
                                                     
9  The socioeconomic variables have the following characteristics: income (1st, 2nd, 3rd and 
4th quartile), work regime (unemployed, part-time and full-time), education (primary, 
secondary, and further), age (16–29, 30–49, 50–64, and 65 and over), and sex (male and 
female). Note that income concerns the household and not the respondent, and that quartile 
ranges refer to each country-specific income distribution. 
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developments, two additional price questions were introduced in 2003 on an 
experimental basis. These questions ask respondents to quantify past and future 
inflation and give their responses in percentages. Furthermore, the 
questionnaire contains items that aim at establishing a household’s likelihood 
to buy a new car, a house, and to make home improvements. For a more 
comprehensive description of the harmonised-EU-survey programme, see 
European Commission (1997, 2006, 2016). 
The dependent variables for testing households’ inattentive behaviour when 
forming expectations are the surveyed quantitative perceived and expected 
inflation. The quantitative price questions (labelled Q51 and Q61 in the 
harmonised questionnaire) are based on the individual responses to the 
qualitative price questions (labelled Q5 and Q6 in the harmonised 
questionnaire). The exact phrasing of these questions and their respective 
possible responses are as follows: 
Q5 How do you think that consumer prices have developed over the last 12 
months? They have: (1) risen a lot; (2) risen moderately; (3) risen slightly; 
(4) stayed about the same; (5) fallen; (N) don’t know. 
Q51 If question 5 was answered by 1, 2, 3, or 5: by how many percent do you 
think that consumer prices have gone up/down over the past 12 months? 
(Please give a single figure estimate): Consumer prices have increased 
by……,…% / decreased by……,…%. 
Q6 By comparison with the past 12 months, how do you expect that consumer 
prices will develop in the next 12 months? They will: (1) increase more 
rapidly; (2) increase at the same rate; (3) increase at a slower rate; (4) stay 
about the same; (5) fall; (N) don’t know. 
Q61 If question 6 was answered by 1, 2, 3, or 5: by how many percent do you 
expect consumer prices to go up/down in the next 12 months? (Please 
give a single figure estimate): Consumer prices will increase by……,…% 
/ decrease by……,…%. 
As the data contain numerous extreme values, they are trimmed. The amount 
and magnitude of the outliers differ across countries, which warrants using an 
approach that takes the distribution of replies into account.10 The method 
applied in this chapter selects all responses that fall within the range of the 2nd 
to 3rd quartile, plus or minus 1.5 times the interquartile range of the 2nd to 3rd 
quartile. Thus, observations are considered outliers if they are larger than 
                                                     
10  See Chapter 1 and Lindén (2006) and European Commission (2006) for a brief description. 
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q3 + 1.5(q3 – q2) or smaller than q2 - 1.5(q3 – q2), where q1 and q3 are the 
25th and 75th percentiles, respectively. The value of 1.5 corresponds to 
approximately +/–2.7 standard deviations and a 99.3% coverage if the data are 
normally distributed. This truncation affects about 7% of all replies concerning 
inflation rates that are relevant for this chapter. Several trimming methods have 
been applied, and they do not influence the results in any material way, except 
the level of the average perceived or expected inflation rates.11 
The main independent variables are three quarterly questions that are used to 
categorise households in terms of their likelihood to undertake a major 
investment in the coming months. The hypothesis is that these investment 
plans are reasons to form better inflation projections, in order to make better 
informed investment decisions. The higher the likelihood to invest or spend, 
the closer the answers to the price questions should be to the official rate of 
inflation. The formulation of these questions — labelled as questions 13, 14 
and 15 in the harmonised questionnaire — and their respective possible 
responses are as follows: 
Q13 How likely are you to buy a car over the next 12 months? (1) very likely; 
(2) fairly likely; (3) not likely; (4) not at all likely; (9) don’t know. 
Q14 Are you planning to buy or build a home over the next 12 months (to live 
in yourself, for a member of your family, as a holiday home, to let, etc.)? 
(1) very likely; (2) fairly likely; (3) not likely; (4) not at all likely; (9) 
don’t know. 
Q15 How likely are you to spend any large sum of money on home 
improvements or renovations over the next 12 months? (1) very likely; 
(2) fairly likely; (3) not likely; (4) not at all likely; (9) don’t know. 
These three questions on households' plans to spend money are only included 
in the survey programme on a quarterly basis, that is, in the months of January, 
April, July, and October. Thus, the corresponding inflation rates only amounts 
to one fourth of the total number of observations available. Furthermore, the 
answers to the questions are not equally distributed on to the different answer 
categories (1, 2, 3, 4, and 9). There are relatively few answers to the ‘very 
likely’ (6%), ‘fairly likely’ (7%), and ‘not likely’ (14%) alternatives, while the 
                                                     
11  Several different trimming methods have been applied, e.g. truncating responses to an 
inflation rate to +/-100 percent and +/-50 percent. I have also tried the same trimming 
procedure as implemented in the University of Michigan Survey of Consumer Attitudes 
(see Curtin 1996). Responses above +95 percent or below -95 percent are truncated to +/-95 
percent. 
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‘not at all likely’ (71%) alternative dominates completely. There are also big 
differences among countries (see Tables A3 to A8 in the Appendix). 
Table 1 shows the complete breakdown of the share of households that 
answered both the questions on perceived and expected inflation and the 
questions on the likelihood of buying a car, a house, and making home 
improvements. The data cover the 11 years from July 2003 to April 2014 and 
include around 1 million individual observations from all 28 member states of 
the EU, except Hungary, for which data are not available. For the fully 
specified regressions 3 and 4, the sample is reduced and cover the period 
January 2004 to April 2014, because some member states had not yet 
introduced the quantitative questions into their survey. In general, households 
are more likely to do major home improvements (21%) than buying a car 
(12%), and they are least likely to buy a house (6%). 
Table 1: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the questions on perceived 
and expected inflation and the questions on the likelihood of buying a car, a house, and 
making home improvements as distributed according to answer categories 
 LIKELIHOOD VARIABLE 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
ANSWER CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
Very likely 4.7 2.2 9.1 4.8 2.3 9.3 
Fairly likely 6.7 3.4 11.7 6.8 3.5 12.0 
Not likely 15.9 8.0 17.5 15.9 7.9 17.6 
Not at all likely 69.7 83.9 58.3 69.6 83.8 57.9 
Don't know & n/a 3.0 2.5 3.4 2.9 2.5 3.2 
No. of observations 1 020 193 1 020 193 1 020 193 995 918 995 918 995 918 
 
As independent variables, the analysis also involves three macroeconomic 
variables, a short-term interest rate, the unemployment rate, and the output gap, 
that respondents may draw on to update their dataset and form their opinions 
on inflation or control for economic conditions. The interest rate used is the 
three-month interbank rate for each country or currency area (Datastream). The 
unemployment rate is the harmonised version published by Eurostat, the 
statistical office of the European Union. The output gaps come from AMECO, 
the annual macroeconomic database of the European Commission's 
Directorate General for Economic and Financial Affairs. The original main 
data source for the output gaps is Eurostat. 
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3.6 Empirical analysis and tests 
This section presents the results of the two tests under the null hypothesis that 
households form perceptions and expectations in a rational inattentive manner. 
3.6.1 Results of testing Hypothesis 1 — How households’ 
spending patterns influence their perceptions and 
expectations about inflation 
Table 2 presents the main results of the estimated parameters in the regression 
for the whole sample; it presents the results for a total of six regressions. There 
are two sets of equations: one for perceptions and one for expectations. Each 
set of regressions contains the three different likelihood variables (car, house, 
and renovation), respectively. In the table, each column represents the results 
from one regression. Since almost all coefficients are significant at 
conventional significance levels, only those coefficients that do not turn out to 
be significantly different from zero are marked with daggers (†). 
The results and the inference in this chapter may suffer from what is called the 
p-value problem (see Lin et al. 2013). With very large samples, as in this case, 
p-values quickly go towards zero, which can lead to conclusions that are of no 
practical relevance, and increase the likelihood of false positives. To deal with 
this issue, the results are discussed not only in terms of statistical significance, 
but also in terms of ‘economic significance’. In this chapter, economic 
significance means that the magnitude of the estimated coefficient or the 
difference between two coefficients is of economic relevance. For example, it 
implies that if the value of a coefficient — the average expected inflation rate 
— is so small that it does not really explain much of the dependent variable, it 
is not economically significant. It also means that the difference between two 
coefficients — the difference between two average expected inflation rates — 
is of a magnitude that does not make much difference in comparison with the 
level of expected inflation, it is not economically significant. 
Note: the table does not present results as deviations from the officially 
measured inflation rate. On average, households perceive and expect inflation 
much higher than the official HICP rate (see Chapter 1 and Lindén, 2010). 
Thus, any kind of lowering of the average perceived or expected inflation rate 
can be interpreted as a move closer to the officially measured inflation rate. 
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Table 2: Estimated coefficients of the regressions where perceived and expected inflation rates are 
functions of one of the three likelihood variables (car, house, and renovation), income, work 
regime, education, and age (for the country coefficients see Table A2 in the Appendix) 
  LIKELIHOOD VARIABLE 
  PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
VARIABLE ANSWER CAT. CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
Constant  5.56 5.19 5.71 3.82 3.70 3.94 
        
Likelihood (1) Very likely 1.12 1.13 1.00 0.33 0.26 0.32 
 (2) Fairly likely 1.00 1.10 0.88 0.29 0.27 0.18 
 (3) Not likely 0.75 0.30 0.75 0.24 -0.12 0.25 
 (4) Not at all likely 1.82 1.89 1.80 0.96 0.85 0.89 
        
Income 2nd quartile 0.20 0.19 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.21 
 3rd quartile -0.06 -0.09 -0.04† 0.10 0.08 0.11 
 4th quartile -0.64 -0.68 -0.63 -0.31 -0.35 -0.31 
        
Work regime Unemployed 0.67 0.69 0.66 0.58 0.60 0.57 
 Part time -0.05† -0.05† -0.05† -0.11 -0.11 -0.10 
 Full time 0.01† 0.02† 0.01† 0.01† 0.02† 0.01† 
        
Education Secondary -0.38 -0.39 -0.37 -0.05 -0.06 -0.04 
 Further -1.09 -1.09 -1.06 -0.45 -0.45 -0.44 
        
Age 30–49 0.56 0.56 0.59 0.53 0.53 0.56 
 50–64 0.39 0.40 0.44 0.62 0.63 0.66 
 65+ -0.06† -0.03† -0.01† 0.26 0.29 0.31 
        
Sex Female 0.90 0.91 0.91 0.43 0.44 0.44 
        
Interest rate  0.62 0.62 0.63 0.37 0.37 0.37 
Unempl. rate  -0.45 -0.45 -0.44 -0.32 -0.31 -0.31 
Output gap  -0.13 -0.12 -0.12 0.05 0.05 0.05 
        
R2  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.29 0.29 0.29 
RMSE  8.91 8.91 8.91 7.50 7.50 7.50 
Note: † represents insignificant coefficients. All other constants and coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
 
At first glance, incentives to collect information seem to matter partially when 
people form their views of inflation. All coefficients for the likelihood of 
buying a car or a house, or making home improvements, are significant. In 
general, the coefficients for the ‘very likely’ and the ‘fairly likely’ spenders are 
similar, although the ‘fairly likely’ spenders are somewhat lower than the ‘very 
likely’ spenders. The difference is at most 0.1 of a percentage point, which is 
economically insignificant. Households that are ‘not at all likely’ to spend a 
large sum of money have significantly higher perceived and expected inflation 
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rates, However, those that are ‘not likely’ to spend a large sum of money 
actually perceive and expect the lowest inflation rates. 
Some clear patterns and differences emerge within the socioeconomic 
groupings, which are consistent with previous findings. For example, as 
reported in Lindén (2010), perceived and expected inflation fall as income 
rises. Perceptions fall by as much as 0.6 of a percentage point from the first 
quartile (25% – lowest income earners) to the fourth quartile (25% – highest 
income earners).12 The difference for expectations is 0.3 of a percentage point. 
The same pattern can be observed for education: inflation rates fall as 
education increases. The difference between people with primary schooling 
and those with an education beyond secondary schooling is 1.1 percentage 
points for perceptions and 0.4 of a percentage point for expectations. 
Unemployed persons perceive and expect higher inflation than those with jobs 
(about 0.6 of a percentage point). The differences between the two other work 
regimes are less pronounced. Sex also matters: women have higher perceptions 
and expectations than men. The differences are 0.9 of a percentage point and 
0.4 of a percentage point, respectively. For age, the pattern seems to be that 
perceived and expected inflation decrease with age, i.e. older persons perceive 
and expect slightly lower inflation rates than younger individuals. However, 
the youngest respondents, aged between 16 and 29, have the same perceptions 
as the oldest respondents and hold the lowest inflation expectations. For the 
country-specific coefficients, see Table A2 in the Appendix. 
Calculating the differences between combinations of the likelihood 
coefficients generates a set of four restrictions that test the first hypothesis 
more formally. The first three restrictions test whether each adjacent pair of 
coefficients is equal. Following the numbering of the coefficients in Table 2, 
the restrictions are: (1) – (2) = 0, (2) – (3) = 0, and (3) – (4) = 0. If all restrictions 
are significantly negative, perceived and expected inflation increase as 
incentives to collect information and the motivation to form correct views of 
inflation decreases. As the ‘not likely’ coefficients are smaller than the ‘not 
likely’ coefficients, the fourth restriction tests whether the coefficients for the 
                                                     
12  Note: in this regression setting some differences appear as compared to the unconditional 
averages for each socioeconomic grouping. For example, the coefficients in the regression 
indicates that respondents in the first income quartile perceive and predict lower inflation 
than those in the second and third, respectively. However, the simple averages for each 
income category show a clear falling trend from 8.8–7.2% for perceived inflation and 4.8–
4.3% for expectations. 
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‘not at all likely’ households are equal to those of the ‘fairly likely’ households, 
i.e. whether (2) – (4) = 0. Table 3 summarises the results. 
Table 3: Coefficient tests of likelihood variables car, house, and renovation 
 LIKELIHOOD VARIABLES 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
TEST: H0 CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
(1) - (2) = 0 0.12** 0.03 0.12*** 0.04 0.00 0.14*** 
(2) - (3) = 0 0.24*** 0.80*** 0.13*** 0.04 0.39*** -0.07** 
(3) - (4) = 0 -1.07*** -1.59*** -1.05*** -0.72*** -0.97*** -0.63*** 
(2) - (4) = 0 -0.83*** -0.79*** -0.92*** -0.67*** -0.58*** -0.70*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
Thirteen of 24 tests of Hypothesis 1 reject the null hypothesis that households’ 
purchasing plans do not matter, where the tests — Δ𝛽ଵ,ଶ = 0, Δ𝛽ଶ,ଷ = 0, 
Δ𝛽ଷ,ସ = 0 and Δ𝛽ଶ,ସ = 0 — are performed with t-tests and clustered standard 
errors. Thus, Table 3 shows partial statistical support for the first hypothesis 
that incentives to collect information matter when people form their views of 
inflation. The differences between the ‘very likely’ spenders and the ‘fairly 
likely’ spenders are small, slightly positive, and statistically significant in three 
of six cases (first row). Economically, however, there is no difference between 
the perceived and expected inflation among those households that are ‘fairly 
likely’ or ‘very likely’ to spend money. Most differences between the ‘fairly 
likely’ and the ‘not likely’ households are also positive and significant (row 2). 
Only one difference is negative: the combination of expected inflation and 
renovation. Although the differences are yet again economically small for the 
car and renovation categories, there is a significant difference for the house 
category, where not so likely house buyers actually perceive and expect lower 
inflation by 0.8 and 0.4 of a percentage point, respectively. This is clearly in 
conflict with the first hypothesis. The differences between the ‘not likely’ and 
the ‘not at all likely’ spenders are all negative and statistically and 
economically significant (row 3). The differences range from -0.6 of a 
percentage point to -1.6 percentage points. These negative differences are 
maintained between the ‘fairly likely’ spenders and the ‘not at all likely 
spenders’ (row 4). 
To summarise, given the near equality between ‘very likely’ and ‘fairly likely’ 
car buyers and renovators, there is weak evidence that these households have 
more knowledge about past inflation, and are better at forming expectations of 
future inflation, than most households. However, households that say they are 
‘not likely’ to buy a house are those that perceive and expect the lowest 
inflation rates, i.e. those closest to the officially measured inflation rate. 
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3.6.2 Results of testing Hypothesis 2 — How periods of high and 
low inflation influence households’ perceived and expected 
inflation 
The second hypothesis is tested by splitting the sample into two subsamples, 
one with all the monthly surveys when inflation is below the median inflation 
rate over the period January 2004 to April 2014, and a second with those 
months when inflation is above the median. In periods with low inflation the 
cost of inflation is low, and the incentives to consider the cost should be 
correspondingly low. The median inflation rate during the whole considered 
period is 2.1%, and there are 21 months of survey data in each subsample. The 
average inflation rate is 1.6% for the months in the low-inflation sample and it 
is 2.8% for the months in the high-inflation sample. 
Table 4: Coefficient tests of likelihood variables car, house, and renovation in months of low and high 
inflation, respectively 
 LIKELIHOOD VARIABLES 
LOW INFLATION PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
TEST: H0 CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
(1) - (2) = 0 -0.29*** -0.20* -0.91*** -0.34*** -0.30*** -0.89*** 
(2) - (3) = 0 -0.04 0.19** -0.03 -0.23*** -0.25*** -0.19*** 
(3) - (4) = 0 -1.12*** -1.27*** -1.24*** -0.42*** -0.54*** -0.26*** 
(2) - (4) = 0 -1.45*** -1.28*** -2.18*** -0.98*** -1.10*** -1.34*** 
       
HIGH INFLATION PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
TEST: H0 CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
(1) - (2) = 0 -0.68*** -0.47*** -1.12*** -0.70*** -0.48*** -1.14*** 
(2) - (3) = 0 -0.40*** -0.67*** -0.24*** -0.54*** -0.54*** -0.34*** 
(3) - (4) = 0 -0.68*** -0.45*** -0.91*** -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.22*** 
(2) - (4) = 0 -1.76*** -1.59*** -2.27*** -1.59*** -1.39*** -1.71*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
 
Tests of Hypothesis 2 reject the null hypothesis that the difference in inflation 
opinions between households more or less likely to spend money are equal, 
where the tests are Δ𝛽ଵ,ସ௅௢௪ ௜௡௙௟௔௧௜௢௡ − Δ𝛽ଵ,ସு௜௚௛ ௜௡௙௟௔௧௜௢௡ = 0 for the respective 
spending item (car, house, and renovation) and inflation environment (low or 
high). Table 4 shows strong support for both the hypothesis that households’ 
purchasing plans matter when people form their views of inflation and that the 
difference in inflation opinions between households more and less likely to 
spend money are less when inflation is low. Perceived and expected inflation 
declines as the more likely the households are to spend a large sum of money. 
The only exception is for perceived inflation in the low-inflation sample, where 
households that say that they are ‘not likely’ to buy a house perceive inflation 
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to be lower than those households that say they are ‘fairly likely’ to buy a 
house. Furthermore, the decline in perceived and expected inflation is higher 
in months of higher inflation, i.e. when the cost of inflation is higher (the last 
row in each panel of Table 4). For perceived inflation, the differences between 
the low-inflation sample and the high inflation sample ranges between 0.1–0.3 
of a percentage point, and for expectations they range between 0.3–0.6 of a 
percentage point. These differences are statistically significant except for one, 
the 0.1 percentage point difference for perceived inflation and households that 
are likely to do a major renovation. 
3.6.3 Controlling for income effect 
A number of studies have analysed the relationship between income and 
education and, on average, one would expect higher levels of education to be 
associated with higher incomes (see, e.g., Becker 1962; Burgess 2016). 
Although the correlation between income and education is quite low in this 
case, regressing income on education and a constant results in a positive slope 
coefficient that is statistically significant. The coefficient is very low, and the 
economic significance is almost negligible. Basically, a move from the 
category labelled ‘primary education’ to the category labelled ‘further 
education’ just implies a rise in income of a small fraction of an income 
quartile, which is the measure of income. Nevertheless, it could be important 
to control for any possible existence of co-linearity between education and 
income. 
For this purpose, the sample is divided into four new subsets according to the 
four income categories. Furthermore, the answers to the likelihood variables 
for spending large sums of money are regrouped into two new aggregated 
groups. The ‘very likely’ and the ‘fairly likely’ categories are placed together 
in a new group called ‘likely’, and the ‘not at all likely’ are merged with the 
‘not likely’. This is done in order to maintain reasonable sample sizes and, as 
the previous results show, the loss of information by doing so is small. Thus, 
in this case, two sets of regression equations (perceptions and expectations) are 
estimated for each combination of income class and likelihood variable, 
resulting in a total of 12 new regressions. 
Education is more or less linearly and negatively related to perceived and 
expected inflation. Education is therefore included as an independent variable 
in its own right, without first making dummy variables. Also, the sex dummy 
is kept in the estimation. In the estimation, the coefficients for education and 
sex are expected to be significantly negative and positive, respectively. The 
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variables work regime and age are left out because these two variables turn out 
to be not significant in several of the estimated equations, which is probably 
related to the division of the sample into four subsets. 
The estimates in Table 5, where perceived inflation is the dependent variable, 
show that the coefficients are in all cases significantly different from zero. 
More importantly, the coefficients for the groups of people likely to buy a car 
or house, or spend a large sum of money on home improvements, are smaller 
than for those that are not likely to spend a large sum of money. Furthermore, 
both education and sex are strongly significant variables, showing that people 
with higher education perceive inflation to be lower than those who are less 
educated, and women perceive inflation to be higher than men. 
Table 5: Estimated regression coefficients by income for perceived inflation rates as a function of one 
of the three likelihood variables (car, house, and renovation), education, and sex 
  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
   ANSWER CATEGORY   
LIKELIHOOD 
VARIABLE 
INCOME 
CLASS CONSTANTA (1) LIKELY (2) NOT LIKELY EDUCATIONA SEXA 
Car I 5.77 1.08*** 2.08*** -0.22 0.68 
 II 5.78 0.91*** 1.65*** -0.40 0.95 
 III 6.62 0.73*** 1.19*** -0.48 0.98 
 IV 5.70 1.24*** 1.71*** -0.57 0.98 
       
House I 5.44 1.35*** 2.37*** -0.22 0.69 
 II 5.47 1.24*** 1.90*** -0.40 0.96 
 III 6.44 0.76*** 1.32*** -0.48 0.98 
 IV 5.64 1.13*** 1.72*** -0.57 0.99 
       
Renovation I 6.02 1.14*** 1.94*** -0.22 0.69 
 II 6.05 0.79*** 1.49*** -0.39 0.95 
 III 6.84 0.55*** 1.05*** -0.48 0.98 
 IV 5.82 1.17*** 1.70*** -0.57 0.99 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
A) All constants and the coefficients for education and sex are significant at the 1% level. 
 
The results for expectations are very similar to those of perceptions. Table 6 
shows that most of the estimated coefficients for the likelihood variables are  
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Table 6: Estimated regression coefficients by income for expected inflation rates as a function of one 
of the three likelihood variables (car, house, and renovation), education, and sex 
  INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
   ANSWER CATEGORY   
LIKELIHOOD 
VARIABLE 
INCOME 
CLASS CONSTANTA (1) LIKELY (2) NOT LIKELY EDUCATIONA SEXA 
Car I 4.00 0.42*** 1.11*** -0.11 0.35 
 II 4.42 0.17 0.82*** -0.24 0.46 
 III 4.54 0.15 0.58*** -0.24 0.47 
 IV 4.20 0.29*** 0.83*** -0.29 0.56 
       
House I 3.79 0.40** 1.29*** -0.11 0.36 
 II 4.31 0.20 0.87*** -0.24 0.47 
 III 4.60 -0.02 0.49*** -0.24 0.48 
 IV 4.28 0.23** 0.67*** -0.28 0.57 
       
Renovation I 4.07 0.41*** 1.15*** -0.10 0.35 
 II 4.74 -0.03 0.60*** -0.23 0.47 
 III 4.72 0.07 0.47*** -0.24 0.48 
 IV 4.36 0.32*** 0.71*** -0.28 0.57 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
A) All constants and the coefficients for education and sex are significant at the 1% level. 
 
significantly different from zero, and that likely buyers of cars and houses, as 
well as home improvers, have lower expectations of inflation than those not 
likely to spend large sums of money. Furthermore, comparing the coefficients 
for the two variables ‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ yet again tests the main 
hypothesis, where Table 7 presents the tests of whether the differences between 
the two likelihood coefficients are equal or not. The asterisks mark the 
statistically significant differences, and the table shows that all differences are 
highly significant. 
Table 7: Coefficient tests by income of likelihood variables car, house, and renovation 
 LIKELIHOOD VARIABLES 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
TEST: (1) - (2) = 0 CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
I -1.00*** -1.02*** -0.80*** -0.68*** -0.89*** -0.74*** 
II -0.74*** -0.66*** -0.70*** -0.65*** -0.68*** -0.63*** 
III -0.46*** -0.57*** -0.50*** -0.43*** -0.51*** -0.40*** 
IV -0.47*** -0.59*** -0.53*** -0.54*** -0.44*** -0.39*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5%, and * = 10%. 
All tests of Hypothesis 1 reject the null hypothesis that households’ purchasing 
plans do not matter, but the results in Table 7 point to an outcome contingent 
on the level of income. It seems that the differences between the coefficients 
are larger for the lower income groups, especially for perceptions. For income 
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class I the differences are the greatest, ranging from 1–0.7 of a percentage 
point. They are slightly smaller in income class II, and range between 0.7–0.6 
of a percentage point. In the two highest income categories, the differences are 
very similar and smaller, i.e. middle- to high-income earners hold more similar 
perceptions and expectations. Nevertheless, there is a significant difference 
between those that are more or less likely to spend a large sum of money. 
The overall conclusion is that activities such as buying a car or a house, or 
spending a large sum of money on home improvement, do in fact provide 
people with incentives to collect and process information on inflation. 
Furthermore, these activities induce people to form perceptions and 
expectations that are closer to the official measure of inflation than otherwise 
is the case. 
3.7 Country differences 
At the country level, most tests of Hypothesis 1 reject the null hypothesis that 
households’ purchasing plans do not matter, but the results differ significantly 
across countries. To summarise the results, Figure 1 and Figure 2 show the 
average differences in perceived and expected inflation between those 
households that are ‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ to spend a large sum of money on 
either a car, a house, or home improvement, i.e. the results are aggregated 
across the three different purchasing plans covered by the survey.13 In total, 81 
country-specific tests are performed, three for each member state. Seventy test 
statistics are negative for both perceived and expected inflation and, at the 5% 
significance level, 58 and 51 of them are significantly different from zero, 
respectively. Only five (perceived) and six (expected) of the test statistics are 
significantly positive. For the complete set of regression coefficients and tests, 
see Table A9 to Table A15 in the Appendix. 
There are no significant differences comparing the results for perceived and 
expected inflation, and the differences in inflation opinions between the 
‘likely’ and the ‘not likely’ spenders range between -2.3 and 0.2 percentage  
 
  
                                                     
13  As in the previous section, the four answer categories (‘very likely’, ‘fairly likely’, ‘not at 
all likely’, and ‘not likely’) are aggregated into two (‘likely’ and ‘not likely’). 
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Figure 1: Average of test coefficients for perceived inflation and likelihood variables car, house, and 
renovation by country 
 
points. Central and eastern EU countries show larger differences between the 
‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ spenders, while in Northern EU countries there is 
basically no difference. For perceived inflation, about 19 countries show 
significant differences between those who say they are ‘likely’ and those who 
say they are ‘not likely’ spenders at conventional significance levels, which 
increases to 21 countries at the 10% level. For expected inflation, slightly fewer 
countries show significant differences, i.e. 18 at the 5% level and 20 at the 10% 
level. 
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Figure 2: Average of test coefficients for expected inflation and likelihood variables car, house, and 
renovation by country 
 
In line with the second hypothesis, the level of inflation explains a significant 
part of the cross-country differences. In accordance with the hypothesis, in 
countries that have experienced higher inflation rates, the differences in 
households’ inflation opinions between the ‘likely’ and the ‘not likely’ 
spenders are higher. In a regression with the differences in inflation opinions 
between the two groups as the dependent variable and the countries’ mean 
inflation rate during the considered sample period as the independent variable, 
the level of inflation explains about 30% of the country variation. Similarly, 
the differences in inflation volatility also explains the cross-country differences 
in inflation opinions, although less so. 
89 
3.8 Concluding discussion 
Several studies have tried to explain the differences between households’ 
opinions about inflation and the official rate, commonly found in consumer 
surveys. The purpose of this chapter is to provide an alternative explanation to 
those of previous studies, resting on the theory of rational inattention. The idea 
is that households’ purchasing plans for big expenditure items matter for 
providing incentives for households to gather and analyse information that 
comes at a cost. The hypothesis is that the more likely households are to spend 
a large sum of money, the stronger incentives they have to collect information 
about inflation, as part of getting a view of where the economy is going. 
Therefore, they would be able to produce better projections in the sense that 
they move closer to the official inflation rate. In addition, and following 
directly from the theory of rational inattention, the incentive to collect and 
process such information on inflation is lower when inflation in the economy 
is lower. 
The Harmonised Consumer Survey for the European Union is a unique 
database, with information on the households’ views of past and future 
inflation that allows for studying these questions. It also contains information 
on households’ likelihood to buy a new car, a house, and making major home 
improvements. These economic activities may potentially induce strong 
incentives for households to form more precise expectations of inflation, or at 
least show an interest in general macroeconomic developments, which 
increases the likelihood of becoming better informed. The information on 
households’ purchasing plans is used as a device to group households in terms 
of how strong incentives they may have to collect and analyse costly 
information about inflation. 
The main results show that stronger incentives to collect information on 
inflation induce households to produce perceived and expected inflation rates 
that more closely correspond to the official rate of inflation. After correcting 
for outliers, households who say they are likely to spend a large sum of money 
on a car, a house, or home improvements perceive inflation to be 0.8–0.9 of a 
percentage point lower than those that are not likely to spend a large sum of 
money. Similarly, households expect inflation to be 0.6–0.7 of a percentage 
point lower than those that are not likely to spend a large sum of money. 
Overall perceived and expected inflation in the sample are respectively 7.8% 
and 4.5%, while the official inflation rate was 2.2%. So, even if perceived and 
expected inflation moves closer to the official rate, they are both still much 
higher than the official rate. 
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A second result is that the incentives to collect and analyse information is 
stronger when inflation is higher. In those months when inflation is higher than 
the median official inflation rate in the considered sample, households who say 
they are likely to spend a large sum of money on a car, a house, or home 
improvements perceive inflation to be 1.9 percentage points lower than those 
not likely to spend a large sum of money. Similarly, households expect 
inflation to be 1.6 percentage points lower than those not likely to spend a large 
sum of money. In this case, the theory of rational inattentive consumers can 
explain a substantial part of the difference between households’ inflation 
opinions and the official HICP rate. 
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3.10 Appendix 
Table A1: Names and abbreviations of countries in the European Union 
COUNTRY ABBREVIATION COUNTRY ABBREVIATION COUNTRY ABBREVIATION 
Austria AT Germany DE Poland PL 
Belgium BE Greece GR Portugal PT 
Bulgaria BG Hungary HU Romania RO 
Croatia HR Ireland IE Slovakia SK 
Cyprus CY Italy IT Slovenia SI 
Czechia CZ Latvia LV Spain ES 
Denmark DK Lithuania LT Sweden SE 
Estonia EE Luxembourg LU United Kingdom GB 
Finland FI Malta MT Euro area EA 
France FR Netherlands NL European Union EU 
Table A2: Estimated coefficients of the regressions where perceived and expected inflation rates are 
functions of one of the three likelihood variables (car, house and renovation), income, work 
regime, education, and age (Table 2 continued). 
 LIKELIHOOD VARIABLES 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
COUNTRY CAR HOUSE RENOVATION CAR HOUSE RENOVATION 
BE 1.75 1.98 1.71 1.99 1.99 1.97 
BG 13.41 13.60 13.32 13.57 13.55 13.50 
HR 12.51 12.86 12.38 12.58 12.59 12.50 
CY 6.94 7.19 6.77 7.16 7.16 7.04 
CZ -0.27 -0.15 -0.24 -0.17 -0.17 -0.16 
DK -2.79 -2.58 -2.96 -2.62 -2.64 -2.72 
EE 3.98 4.25 4.06 4.24 4.27 4.28 
FI -2.20 -2.03 -2.38 -1.97 -2.00 -2.07 
FR 0.66 0.89 0.54 0.89 0.89 0.82 
DE -0.89 -0.83 -0.89 -0.85 -0.86 -0.90 
GR 10.34 10.63 10.16 10.49 10.51 10.36 
IE 1.85 1.93 1.64 1.94 1.91 1.79 
IT 7.59 7.82 7.39 7.80 7.80 7.69 
LV 11.17 11.34 11.09 11.21 11.15 11.16 
LT 11.71 11.87 11.59 11.85 11.85 11.76 
LU -1.37 -1.15 -1.40 -1.14 -1.13 -1.15 
MT 0.85 1.11 0.81 1.11 1.11 1.08 
NL -0.73 -0.65 -1.00 -0.62 -0.68 -0.72 
PL 7.55 7.69 7.53 7.59 7.58 7.55 
PT 0.27 0.63 0.11† 0.35 0.37 0.24 
RO 8.25 8.55 8.20 8.35 8.37 8.28 
SK 5.74 6.02 5.71 5.87 5.89 5.81 
SI 3.19 3.36 3.13 3.36 3.37 3.33 
ES 9.63 9.98 9.41 9.66 9.67 9.52 
SE -3.37 -3.09 -3.42 -3.22 -3.21 -3.27 
GB 1.27 1.39 1.14 1.33 1.34 1.24 
Note: † represents insignificant coefficients. All other constants and coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
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Table A3a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a car as distributed according to answer 
categories. 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A CAR 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 8.0 5.7 28.6 
BE 5.5 5.6 6.5 
BG 1.2 5.4 12.1 
HR 1.2 4.0 21.5 
CY 9.9 6.9 6.8 
CZ 5.3 5.3 19.3 
DK 7.7 10.3 11.9 
EE 2.8 7.9 8.0 
FI 10.5 9.7 7.2 
FR 6.5 7.7 7.8 
DE 2.0 7.0 24.1 
GR 3.8 4.1 15.1 
HU - - - 
IE 10.3 11.5 17.0 
IT 2.2 5.1 8.0 
LV 3.3 12.1 23.1 
LT 1.0 4.5 15.5 
LU 9.9 8.1 5.9 
MT 2.0 1.9 4.2 
NL 13.2 9.2 15.8 
PL 1.7 6.6 23.2 
PT 0.8 2.6 23.1 
RO 2.9 8.0 10.9 
SK 1.1 6.0 16.9 
SI 4.6 6.8 13.0 
ES 1.5 5.5 24.9 
SE 10.8 11.3 12.4 
GB 6.5 8.1 20.6 
EA 4.9 6.2 15.7 
EU 4.7 6.7 15.9 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A3b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a car as distributed according to answer 
categories. 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A CAR  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 57.5 0.2 57 094 
BE 82.0 0.4 44 718 
BG 72.8 8.5 31 932 
HR 71.3 2.0 29 393 
CY 71.7 4.7 25 822 
CZ 69.4 0.7 30 444 
DK 69.9 0.2 34 606 
EE 80.8 0.4 3 535 
FI 71.9 0.7 52 641 
FR 77.9 0.1 37 589 
DE 62.5 4.4 67 602 
GR 75.2 1.9 53 066 
HU - - - 
IE 52.8 8.4 30 804 
IT 84.3 0.3 59 167 
LV 56.6 4.9 36 102 
LT 77.8 1.2 50 468 
LU 75.7 0.4 18 023 
MT 89.9 2.0 35 742 
NL 60.3 1.5 11 941 
PL 65.4 3.0 33 741 
PT 73.0 0.6 33 810 
RO 72.4 5.7 35 158 
SK 75.2 0.7 43 800 
SI 75.6 0.1 25 837 
ES 67.0 1.1 64 425 
SE 59.8 5.8 51 944 
GB 58.0 6.8 63 740 
EA 71.6 1.6 600 288 
EU 69.7 3.0 1 020 193 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A4a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a car as distributed according to answer 
categories. 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A CAR 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 7.9 5.7 28.6 
BE 5.3 5.6 6.5 
BG 1.2 5.6 12.4 
HR 1.2 4.1 21.8 
CY 9.9 7.1 6.6 
CZ 5.5 5.4 19.8 
DK 7.6 10.3 12.0 
EE 3.8 7.5 8.9 
FI 10.5 9.7 7.1 
FR 6.1 7.6 7.6 
DE 2.1 7.0 24.2 
GR 4.1 4.3 16.0 
HU - - - 
IE 9.9 11.2 17.5 
IT 2.1 5.0 7.6 
LV 3.5 12.4 23.4 
LT 1.0 4.5 15.6 
LU 10.0 8.1 5.9 
MT 1.9 1.9 4.3 
NL 12.9 9.6 15.9 
PL 1.9 6.6 23.3 
PT 0.8 2.5 22.7 
RO 3.0 8.2 11.0 
SK 1.2 6.1 16.9 
SI 4.5 6.8 13.0 
ES 1.6 5.7 25.3 
SE 10.7 11.2 12.4 
GB 6.5 8.2 20.6 
EA 5.0 6.3 15.8 
EU 4.8 6.8 15.9 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A4b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a car as distributed according to answer 
categories. 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A CAR  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 57.6 0.2 56 601 
BE 82.2 0.4 44 676 
BG 72.5 8.3 28 920 
HR 71.0 2.0 27 612 
CY 72.3 4.1 22 802 
CZ 68.6 0.7 29 481 
DK 69.9 0.2 34 129 
EE 76.3 3.5 18 904 
FI 72.1 0.6 52 850 
FR 78.5 0.1 39 136 
DE 62.4 4.4 66 714 
GR 73.7 1.9 48 843 
HU - - - 
IE 53.5 7.9 29 182 
IT 85.0 0.3 53 531 
LV 56.1 4.6 34 003 
LT 77.7 1.2 49 623 
LU 75.7 0.4 17 677 
MT 90.8 1.1 28 443 
NL 60.2 1.4 12 509 
PL 65.3 2.9 31 151 
PT 73.4 0.6 32 916 
RO 72.2 5.5 32 587 
SK 75.2 0.7 42 948 
SI 75.6 0.1 25 684 
ES 66.4 1.0 57 621 
SE 60.1 5.6 52 411 
GB 58.0 6.7 64 640 
EA 71.4 1.5 574 914 
EU 69.6 2.9 995 918 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A5a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a house as distributed according to 
answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A HOUSE 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 2.8 4.0 3.5 
BE 2.9 3.0 2.5 
BG 0.4 1.4 6.6 
HR 0.7 2.8 20.0 
CY 4.7 4.2 5.9 
CZ 2.5 2.6 4.8 
DK 4.0 4.4 6.5 
EE 2.7 3.9 4.9 
FI 4.1 4.6 1.8 
FR 4.3 3.7 3.4 
DE 0.7 3.3 5.7 
GR 1.5 2.7 11.4 
HU - - - 
IE 3.2 3.6 4.8 
IT 0.8 1.7 4.4 
LV 1.3 5.2 15.3 
LT 0.9 1.6 5.0 
LU 6.4 4.8 2.4 
MT 1.2 1.3 3.1 
NL 3.3 4.7 5.1 
PL 1.1 3.1 9.0 
PT 1.1 1.8 19.6 
RO 1.7 4.3 9.1 
SK 1.1 3.1 12.3 
SI 3.8 3.4 2.7 
ES 1.0 2.8 22.4 
SE 3.9 7.0 10.6 
GB 3.2 4.3 5.0 
EA 2.2 3.2 7.7 
EU 2.2 3.4 8.0 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A5b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a house as distributed according to 
answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING A HOUSE  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 89.6 0.0 57 094 
BE 91.3 0.3 44 718 
BG 85.1 6.5 31 932 
HR 75.1 1.4 29 393 
CY 80.7 4.6 25 822 
CZ 89.6 0.4 30 444 
DK 85.0 0.1 34 606 
EE 87.6 0.9 3 535 
FI 89.2 0.2 52 641 
FR 88.6 0.1 37 589 
DE 87.6 2.7 67 602 
GR 82.0 2.4 53 066 
HU - - - 
IE 80.1 8.2 30 804 
IT 92.9 0.2 59 167 
LV 76.2 2.0 36 102 
LT 92.3 0.2 50 468 
LU 86.1 0.3 18 023 
MT 93.4 1.0 35 742 
NL 86.0 0.7 11 941 
PL 85.3 1.5 33 741 
PT 77.2 0.4 33 810 
RO 79.3 5.7 35 158 
SK 82.9 0.6 43 800 
SI 90.0 0.0 25 837 
ES 73.0 0.8 64 425 
SE 71.4 7.1 51 944 
GB 80.9 6.6 63 740 
EA 85.7 1.2 600 288 
EU 83.9 2.5 1 020 193 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A6a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a house as distributed according to 
answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING HOUSE 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 2.8 4.0 3.5 
BE 2.8 3.0 2.4 
BG 0.4 1.5 6.8 
HR 0.8 2.8 20.2 
CY 4.8 4.3 5.4 
CZ 2.6 2.8 4.9 
DK 4.0 4.3 6.5 
EE 2.4 4.0 5.2 
FI 4.1 4.7 1.9 
FR 4.0 3.6 3.4 
DE 0.7 3.4 5.7 
GR 1.6 2.8 12.2 
HU - - - 
IE 3.1 3.4 4.9 
IT 0.8 1.6 4.4 
LV 1.4 5.5 15.5 
LT 0.9 1.6 5.0 
LU 6.4 4.9 2.4 
MT 1.3 1.4 3.3 
NL 3.4 4.8 5.0 
PL 1.1 3.2 9.1 
PT 1.1 1.7 19.6 
RO 1.8 4.4 9.2 
SK 1.2 3.1 12.2 
SI 3.9 3.4 2.7 
ES 1.0 2.9 23.0 
SE 3.9 7.0 10.5 
GB 3.2 4.3 4.9 
EA 2.3 3.2 7.7 
EU 2.3 3.5 7.9 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A6b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of buying a house as distributed according to 
answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF BUYING HOUSE  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 89.6 0.1 56 601 
BE 91.6 0.2 44 676 
BG 84.8 6.5 28 920 
HR 74.9 1.4 27 612 
CY 81.6 3.9 22 802 
CZ 89.3 0.4 29 481 
DK 85.1 0.1 34 129 
EE 84.6 3.8 18 904 
FI 89.2 0.2 52 850 
FR 88.9 0.1 39 136 
DE 87.4 2.8 66 714 
GR 80.9 2.5 48 843 
HU - - - 
IE 80.8 7.7 29 182 
IT 93.0 0.2 53 531 
LV 75.9 1.8 34 003 
LT 92.3 0.2 49 623 
LU 86.0 0.3 17 677 
MT 93.5 0.6 28 443 
NL 86.0 0.8 12 509 
PL 85.1 1.5 31 151 
PT 77.2 0.4 32 916 
RO 79.1 5.5 32 587 
SK 83.0 0.5 42 948 
SI 89.9 0.0 25 684 
ES 72.3 0.8 57 621 
SE 71.7 6.8 52 411 
GB 81.1 6.6 64 640 
EA 85.7 1.2 574 912 
EU 83.8 2.5 995 918 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A7a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of spending a large amount of money on home 
improvement or renovation as distributed according to answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF DOING RENOVATION 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 18.1 16.2 30.4 
BE 19.1 10.9 7.3 
BG 2.9 9.4 14.6 
HR 2.7 9.9 22.3 
CY 6.1 7.5 8.3 
CZ 16.6 16.2 23.2 
DK 13.6 9.3 10.6 
EE 17.2 22.9 12.2 
FI 16.7 7.5 4.6 
FR 16.0 8.9 7.3 
DE 4.1 16.4 32.3 
GR 2.8 5.7 16.3 
HU - - - 
IE 7.1 10.3 18.2 
IT 3.2 6.3 6.8 
LV 6.2 21.8 23.0 
LT 2.6 10.9 17.9 
LU 22.4 13.4 6.1 
MT 5.7 5.3 8.6 
NL 23.8 4.8 6.2 
PL 6.2 17.8 26.9 
PT 2.1 5.4 23.4 
RO 5.7 17.5 16.3 
SK 4.2 15.2 24.1 
SI 13.3 14.9 12.7 
ES 1.7 5.8 24.1 
SE 21.8 19.7 14.1 
GB 9.4 13.1 22.2 
EA 9.2 9.7 17.0 
EU 9.1 11.7 17.5 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
 
  
103 
Table A7b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on perceived 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of spending a large amount of money on home 
improvement or renovation as distributed according to answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF DOING RENOVATION  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 35.1 0.2 57 094 
BE 62.3 0.5 44 718 
BG 62.4 10.7 31 932 
HR 61.8 3.3 29 393 
CY 71.4 6.7 25 822 
CZ 43.0 1.0 30 444 
DK 66.4 0.2 34 606 
EE 47.2 0.4 3 535 
FI 70.4 0.8 52 641 
FR 67.4 0.3 37 589 
DE 42.4 4.8 67 602 
GR 72.6 2.6 53 066 
HU - - - 
IE 55.7 8.7 30 804 
IT 83.3 0.4 59 167 
LV 43.6 5.4 36 102 
LT 67.2 1.5 50 468 
LU 57.6 0.5 18 023 
MT 74.7 5.7 35 742 
NL 64.6 0.6 11 941 
PL 45.0 4.1 33 741 
PT 68.2 0.9 33 810 
RO 55.0 5.6 35 158 
SK 55.3 1.2 43 800 
SI 59.0 0.1 25 837 
ES 67.1 1.4 64 425 
SE 40.3 4.1 51 944 
GB 48.4 6.9 63 740 
EA 62.2 2.0 600 288 
EU 58.3 3.4 1 020 193 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A8a: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of spending a large amount of money on home 
improvement or renovation as distributed according to answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF DOING RENOVATION 
COUNTRY VERY LIKELY (%) FAIRLY LIKELY (%) NOT LIKELY (%) 
AT 18.1 16.2 30.3 
BE 18.6 10.8 7.1 
BG 2.9 9.7 15.0 
HR 2.8 10.1 22.6 
CY 6.2 7.8 8.2 
CZ 16.8 16.4 23.4 
DK 13.8 9.3 10.6 
EE 13.6 19.0 10.8 
FI 16.6 7.5 4.6 
FR 15.5 8.9 7.4 
DE 4.2 16.5 32.4 
GR 2.9 5.9 17.5 
HU - - - 
IE 7.1 10.3 18.6 
IT 3.1 6.2 6.9 
LV 6.4 22.6 23.1 
LT 2.6 11.0 18.0 
LU 22.7 13.5 6.0 
MT 6.1 5.5 9.3 
NL 23.7 4.8 6.2 
PL 6.3 18.0 27.1 
PT 2.2 5.4 23.0 
RO 5.8 17.8 16.5 
SK 4.2 15.2 24.1 
SI 13.4 15.0 12.8 
ES 1.7 5.9 24.7 
SE 21.8 19.6 14.1 
GB 9.5 13.1 22.1 
EA 9.4 9.8 17.2 
EU 9.3 12.0 17.6 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A8b: Share (in percent) and number of households that answered both the question on expected 
inflation and the question on the likelihood of spending a large amount of money on home 
improvement or renovation as distributed according to answer categories 
 ANSWER CATEGORIES ON LIKELIHOOD OF DOING RENOVATION  
COUNTRY NOT AT ALL LIKELY (%) DON'T KNOW (%) NO OF RESP. 
AT 35.1 0.2 56 601 
BE 63.0 0.5 44 676 
BG 62.1 10.3 28 920 
HR 61.3 3.2 27 612 
CY 71.7 6.1 22 802 
CZ 42.4 1.0 29 481 
DK 66.1 0.2 34 129 
EE 52.9 3.7 18 904 
FI 70.5 0.7 52 850 
FR 68.0 0.2 39 136 
DE 42.2 4.7 66 714 
GR 71.0 2.7 48 843 
HU - - - 
IE 55.8 8.3 29 182 
IT 83.5 0.4 53 531 
LV 42.9 5.0 34 003 
LT 67.0 1.4 49 623 
LU 57.4 0.4 17 677 
MT 75.6 3.5 28 443 
NL 64.6 0.7 12 509 
PL 44.8 3.7 31 151 
PT 68.6 0.8 32 916 
RO 54.7 5.3 32 587 
SK 55.3 1.2 42 948 
SI 58.6 0.1 25 684 
ES 66.3 1.3 57 621 
SE 40.5 3.9 52 411 
GB 48.5 6.8 64 640 
EA 61.8 1.8 574 915 
EU 57.9 3.2 995 918 
Note: For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A9: Estimated coefficients for the likelihood variable ‘CAR’ and test of difference by country. 
Perceived and expected inflation rates are functions of one of the three likelihood variables 
(car, house and renovation), income, work regime, education, and age. The coefficients for 
the socioeconomic variables are presented in Table A12 to Table A15 in the Appendix. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 CAR CAR 
COUNTRY LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF 
AT 0.06 0.19 -0.13* -0.28 -0.19 -0.09* 
BE -0.83 -0.61 -0.23** -0.71* -0.56 -0.15** 
BG 3.70* 5.65* -1.95*** 3.58* 6.24* -2.66*** 
HR -0.05 1.79* -1.84*** 0.24 1.75* -1.52*** 
CY -0.89* 0.24 -1.13*** -2.98* -2.88* -0.10 
CZ 0.13 0.59 -0.46*** 0.46 1.20* -0.74*** 
DK 1.27* 1.25* 0.02 0.85* 0.79* 0.06 
EE 0.47 1.14 -0.67** -1.13* -0.75* -0.37** 
FI 0.40* 0.42* -0.02 0.43* 0.43* 0.01 
FR -1.00 -0.73 -0.27*** 0.09 0.22 -0.12*** 
DE 0.37* 0.36* 0.01 0.48* 0.32* 0.16*** 
GR 1.92* 4.07* -2.16*** -0.54 2.24* -2.79*** 
HU - - - - - - 
IE 6.02* 6.67* -0.65*** 2.63* 3.00* -0.37*** 
IT 0.83 1.55 -0.72*** 0.93* 1.13* -0.20** 
LV 0.73* 0.80* -0.07 0.36 1.10* -0.74*** 
LT -0.47 0.53 -0.99*** -0.15 1.02* -1.17*** 
LU -0.92 -0.84 -0.09 -1.29* -1.17* -0.12* 
MT -2.05* -1.05* -1.00*** -2.45* -0.98* -1.47*** 
NL -0.61 -0.34 -0.27* -0.04 -0.01 -0.03 
PL 0.22 1.70* -1.47*** 0.31 1.50* -1.19*** 
PT -1.13* -0.66 -0.47*** -0.87* -0.61 -0.25* 
RO -0.51 1.81* -2.32*** -0.49 1.24* -1.73*** 
SK -0.84* 0.04 -0.88*** -0.20 0.57 -0.77*** 
SI 0.45 1.01 -0.55*** -1.04 -0.79 -0.25* 
ES -0.36 0.72 -1.08*** -0.34 0.52 -0.87*** 
SE -1.08* -1.10* 0.03 -0.66* -0.73* 0.07*** 
GB 0.30* 0.90* -0.60*** -0.11 0.18* -0.29*** 
EA 1.26* 1.72* -0.46*** 0.15* 0.58* -0.43*** 
EU 1.04* 1.60* -0.56*** 0.30* 0.81* -0.51*** 
Note: For the answer categories ‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ an asterisk represents significance at the 5% level. For 
the differences between the two, asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 
10%. 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A10: Estimated coefficients for the likelihood variable ‘HOUSE’ and test of difference by country. 
Perceived and expected inflation rates are functions of one of the three likelihood variables 
(car, house and renovation), income, work regime, education, and age. The coefficients for 
the socioeconomic variables are presented in Table A12 to Table A15 in the Appendix. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 HOUSE HOUSE 
COUNTRY LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF 
AT -0.01 0.32 -0.34*** -0.83 -0.58 -0.25*** 
BE -0.55 -0.19 -0.36*** -0.07 0.11 -0.18** 
BG 4.67* 6.06* -1.39*** 5.45* 6.71* -1.26** 
HR 0.32 1.90* -1.59*** -0.05 1.70* -1.76*** 
CY -0.58 0.37 -0.95*** -3.93* -3.71* -0.22 
CZ 0.61 0.92 -0.31 1.84* 2.41* -0.56*** 
DK 1.03* 1.27* -0.24*** 0.75* 0.86* -0.11* 
EE -0.61 0.48 -1.09*** -1.07* -0.77* -0.30 
FI 0.57* 0.63* -0.06 0.27 0.31 -0.04 
FR -0.53 -0.04 -0.49*** -0.97 -0.85 -0.13** 
DE 0.59* 0.43* 0.16 0.58* 0.35* 0.24*** 
GR 3.08* 4.89* -1.81*** 0.75 2.24* -1.49*** 
HU - - - - - - 
IE 6.24* 6.90* -0.67*** 2.67* 3.07* -0.40*** 
IT 1.52 1.50 0.02 0.57 0.68 -0.11 
LV 1.02* 1.40* -0.38* 1.10* 1.71* -0.61** 
LT 0.06 2.05* -1.99*** -0.54 1.72 -2.26*** 
LU 0.86 0.62 0.24** 0.01 0.13 -0.13 
MT -1.86* -0.67* -1.18*** -2.54* -1.26* -1.29*** 
NL -0.31 0.11 -0.42* 0.02 0.19 -0.18* 
PL 0.76 1.76* -1.00*** 0.37 1.21* -0.85*** 
PT -0.93* -0.66 -0.27 0.19 0.49 -0.30** 
RO -0.43 1.51* -1.94*** -0.37 1.28* -1.65*** 
SK 0.62 0.91* -0.30* 1.34* 1.79* -0.46** 
SI 5.17 5.89 -0.72*** 0.69 1.28 -0.58*** 
ES -0.14 0.44 -0.58** 0.92* 1.16* -0.24 
SE -1.07* -1.17* 0.09*** -0.70* -0.78* 0.08** 
GB 0.14 0.85* -0.71*** -0.33* 0.18* -0.51*** 
EA 2.00* 2.50* -0.50*** 0.42* 0.79* -0.37*** 
EU 1.12* 1.75* -0.63*** 0.27* 0.76* -0.49*** 
Note: For the answer categories ‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ an asterisk represents significance at the 5% level. For 
the differences between the two, asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 
10%. 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A11: Estimated coefficients for the likelihood variable ‘RENOVATION’ and test of difference by 
country. Perceived and expected inflation rates are functions of one of the three likelihood 
variables (car, house and renovation), income, work regime, education, and age. The 
coefficients for the socioeconomic variables are presented in Table A12 to Table A15 in the 
Appendix. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 RENOVATION RENOVATION 
COUNTRY LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF LIKELY NOT LIKELY DIFF 
AT 0.37 0.55 -0.18*** 0.40 0.43 -0.04 
BE -0.26 -0.13 -0.13*** -0.47 -0.46 0.00 
BG 3.18* 4.57* -1.39*** 3.05* 5.39* -2.34*** 
HR -0.84* 0.96* -1.80*** 0.20 2.11* -1.91*** 
CY -0.71* 0.30 -1.01*** -4.94* -4.05* -0.89*** 
CZ 0.07 0.43 -0.36*** 0.77 1.25* -0.48*** 
DK 1.17* 1.28* -0.10*** 0.80* 0.83* -0.03 
EE 0.05 0.52 -0.47*** -0.98* -0.64* -0.34*** 
FI 0.39* 0.39* 0.00 0.05 0.03 0.02 
FR 0.41 0.70 -0.29*** 0.22 0.37 -0.15*** 
DE 0.62* 0.30* 0.33*** 0.55* 0.24* 0.31*** 
GR 2.64* 4.71* -2.07*** -0.07 2.54* -2.61*** 
HU       
IE 6.07* 6.35* -0.28*** 2.43* 2.68* -0.26*** 
IT 0.84 2.20* -1.37*** 0.66 0.58 0.09 
LV 0.89* 0.93* -0.04 0.55 1.26* -0.71*** 
LT 0.61 1.69* -1.08*** 0.18 1.59* -1.41*** 
LU 1.03* 0.89 0.14*** -0.19 -0.22 0.04 
MT -2.44* -1.66* -0.78*** -3.66* -2.71* -0.96*** 
NL 1.66* 2.00* -0.33*** -0.44 -0.38 -0.05 
PL 0.69* 1.01* -0.32*** 0.84* 0.99* -0.15 
PT -1.06* -0.57 -0.49*** -1.08* -0.54 -0.53*** 
RO -0.20 1.54* -1.74*** -0.68* 1.21* -1.89*** 
SK 0.29 0.64* -0.35*** -0.08 0.22 -0.30*** 
SI 0.08 1.01 -0.93*** 0.60 1.24 -0.64*** 
ES 0.17 0.92* -0.74*** -0.25 0.33 -0.58*** 
SE -0.87* -0.97* 0.10*** -0.54* -0.62* 0.08*** 
GB 0.27* 0.99* -0.71*** -0.21* 0.26* -0.46*** 
EA 1.01* 1.43* -0.42*** -0.10 0.19* -0.29*** 
EU 0.92* 1.53* -0.60*** 0.24* 0.72* -0.48*** 
Note: For the answer categories ‘likely’ and ‘not likely’ an asterisk represents significance at the 5% level. For 
the differences between the two, asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 
10%. 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A12: Estimated regression coefficients for the socioeconomic variable ‘INCOME’. Extends the 
results from the regressions presented in Table A9, Table A10 and Table A11. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
  INCOME QUARTILE  INCOME QUARTILE 
COUNTRY C II III IV C II III IV 
AT 14.36*** -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.68*** 10.31*** 0.06 0.06 -0.13*** 
BE 17.96*** 0.30*** -0.63*** -1.49*** 18.33*** 0.35*** 0.11 -0.51*** 
BG 24.16*** 0.92*** 0.61*** -0.21 17.84*** 1.62*** 0.74*** -0.53*** 
HR 4.20*** 0.40*** 0.43*** 0.28 7.39*** 0.50*** 0.59*** 0.84*** 
CY 21.36*** -0.15 -0.68*** -2.15*** 20.19*** 0.30*** 0.34*** -0.64*** 
CZ 20.04*** 0.48*** 0.00 -0.24*** 6.03*** 0.55*** -0.08 -0.61*** 
DK -7.42*** 0.24*** 0.04 -0.66*** -5.41*** 0.32*** 0.26*** -0.25*** 
EE 1.78 -0.11 0.45 0.15 2.97*** -0.11 -0.16 -0.21 
FI 8.90*** 0.17*** 0.12*** -0.13*** 9.63*** 0.13*** 0.11*** -0.04 
FR 15.26*** -0.05 -0.19*** -0.78*** 0.54 0.09*** 0.06 -0.07 
DE 2.30*** -0.35*** -0.58*** -0.80*** 3.36*** 0.03 -0.21*** -0.37*** 
GR 13.97*** -0.12 1.11*** 0.80*** 8.63*** -0.13 0.65*** -0.83*** 
HU - - - - - - - - 
IE 7.02*** 0.46*** 0.01 -1.49*** 1.84*** 0.30*** 0.34*** -0.54*** 
IT 2.43*** 0.52*** -0.92*** -0.85*** -2.81*** 0.45*** 0.37*** 0.32*** 
LV 9.94*** -0.23 -1.06*** -2.10*** 1.75*** -0.02 -1.15*** -2.36*** 
LT 8.47*** -0.32*** -0.66*** -1.71*** 7.89*** -0.05 -0.47*** -1.65*** 
LU 0.84 0.15 0.16 -0.39*** -0.51 -0.02 0.01 -0.12 
MT 12.41*** 0.86*** 2.31*** 2.51*** 20.31*** 1.29*** 2.28*** 1.37*** 
NL 10.83*** -0.27 -0.42*** -1.25*** 9.16*** 0.00 -0.01 -0.26*** 
PL 9.81*** -0.18 -0.40*** -0.61*** 6.52*** -0.23 -0.51*** -0.77*** 
PT 11.08*** -0.13 -0.16*** -0.04 7.26*** -0.13 -0.19*** 0.05 
RO 32.47*** 0.49*** -0.38*** -1.40*** 23.02*** 0.33 0.00 -0.91*** 
SK -5.13*** -0.54*** -0.95*** -1.37*** -6.40*** -0.56*** -1.03*** -1.50*** 
SI -14.64*** 0.23 -0.31*** -1.15*** -10.11*** 0.31*** -0.04 -0.61*** 
ES -20.73*** 1.22*** 0.04 -0.56*** -7.33*** 0.29*** -0.41*** -0.61*** 
SE -6.40*** 0.02 -0.04 -0.14*** -4.79*** 0.08*** 0.03 -0.14*** 
GB -19.47*** -0.09 -0.48*** -1.25*** -12.06*** 0.11 -0.04 -0.74*** 
EA 3.97*** 0.18*** -0.18*** -0.75*** 3.60*** 0.11*** -0.01 -0.28*** 
EU 5.21*** 0.19*** -0.10*** -0.70*** 3.71*** 0.20*** 0.07*** -0.36*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A13: Estimated regression coefficients for the socioeconomic variable ‘WORK REGIME’. Extends 
the results from the regressions presented in Table A9, Table A10 and Table A11. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 WORK REGIME WORK REGIME 
COUNTRY UNEMPLOYED PART TIME FULL TIME UNEMPLOYED PART TIME FULL TIME 
AT 0.58*** 0.25*** 0.08 0.23*** 0.17*** 0.03 
BE 0.22 0.04 0.05 -0.06 0.07 0.16*** 
BG 4.50*** 5.63*** 4.85*** 4.39*** 5.42*** 5.12*** 
HR 1.52*** -0.48 0.97*** 1.57*** 0.04 0.95*** 
CY 2.28*** 1.74*** 1.65*** -0.08 0.17 0.94*** 
CZ 0.50*** 1.07*** 0.35*** 0.72*** 1.16*** 0.78*** 
DK 1.42*** 0.42*** 0.39*** 1.12*** 0.38*** 0.27*** 
EE 1.71*** -0.28 0.17 0.84*** -0.23 0.13 
FI 0.01 0.02 0.11*** 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
FR 0.36*** 0.19 0.19*** 0.13 0.05 0.16*** 
DE 0.72*** -0.13 -0.09 0.45*** 0.03 0.00 
GR 1.45*** 0.11 -0.09 1.16*** 0.75*** -0.24 
HU - - - - - - 
IE 0.37*** 0.78*** 0.57*** 0.49*** 0.49*** 0.50*** 
IT 1.07*** 1.75*** 0.91*** 0.51*** 0.34*** 0.06 
LV 0.53*** 0.17 0.62*** 0.42*** -0.57*** 0.50*** 
LT 1.30*** -0.16 1.13*** 1.66*** 0.34 1.31*** 
LU -1.05*** -0.79*** -0.80*** -0.38*** -0.05 0.03 
MT 1.20*** 0.53*** -0.28*** 0.96*** 0.55*** -1.06*** 
NL 0.60 -0.16 0.08 0.24 -0.20 -0.15 
PL -0.90*** -0.94*** -0.48*** -1.46*** -1.06*** -0.61*** 
PT 1.13*** 0.77*** 0.42*** 0.90*** 0.18 0.26 
RO -0.27 -0.13 -0.24 -1.37*** -0.94 -1.33*** 
SK 1.15*** 0.62*** 0.28*** 0.97*** 0.59*** 0.25*** 
SI 0.32 0.92*** 0.67*** 0.82*** 1.19*** 0.77*** 
ES 0.74*** -0.28 -0.37*** 0.36*** -0.28 -0.11 
SE -0.08 0.01 -0.07*** 0.07 0.06 0.02 
GB 0.49*** -0.23*** -0.37*** 0.31*** -0.16*** -0.31*** 
EA 0.79*** 0.26*** 0.16*** 0.45*** 0.01 0.03 
EU 0.71*** -0.06 0.00 0.61*** -0.11*** 0.01 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A14: Estimated regression coefficients for the socioeconomic variables ‘EDUCATION’ and ‘SEX’. 
Extends the results from the regressions presented in Table A9, Table A10 and Table A11. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 EDUCATION SEX EDUCATION SEX 
COUNTRY SECONDARY FURTHER FEMALE SECONDARY FURTHER FEMALE 
AT -0.78*** -1.63*** 1.49*** -0.20*** -0.49*** 0.62*** 
BE -0.13 -0.93*** 1.60*** 0.14*** 0.13*** -0.01 
BG -0.74*** -2.12*** 0.16 -0.97*** -2.29*** 0.30*** 
HR -0.63*** -3.16*** 0.74*** -0.39*** -2.43*** 0.47*** 
CY 0.21 -0.21 0.84*** -0.09 -0.94*** 0.95*** 
CZ -0.10 -0.53*** 1.04*** 0.25*** -0.74*** 1.35*** 
DK -0.97*** -1.20*** 0.36*** -0.61*** -0.60*** 0.14*** 
EE -0.18 -0.95*** 0.53*** 0.57*** 0.11 0.54*** 
FI 0.04 -0.21*** 0.19*** 0.02 -0.07*** 0.02 
FR 0.26*** -0.04 0.26*** 0.38*** 0.44*** -0.15*** 
DE -0.18*** -0.71*** 0.27*** 0.05 -0.13*** 0.07*** 
GR -1.05*** -1.49*** 1.59*** -1.00*** -1.24*** 1.18*** 
HU - - - - - - 
IE -0.45*** -1.65*** 1.39*** -0.43*** -0.90*** 0.73*** 
IT -2.55*** -4.53*** 2.77*** -0.07 0.03 -0.11*** 
LV 0.11 -0.23 0.93*** 0.29*** -0.33 0.78*** 
LT 1.67*** 0.94*** 0.20*** 1.03*** 0.40*** 0.34*** 
LU 0.24*** -0.69*** 1.15*** 0.31*** -0.07 0.43*** 
MT -1.45*** -2.56*** 0.15*** -2.15*** -3.57*** 0.29*** 
NL -0.50*** -1.60*** 1.51*** 0.19*** 0.13 0.00 
PL -0.26*** -1.48*** 0.80*** -0.39*** -1.65*** 0.53*** 
PT -0.43*** -1.07*** 0.71*** -0.19*** -0.53*** 0.40*** 
RO -0.61*** -2.11*** 0.77*** 0.07 -1.07*** 0.96*** 
SK -0.28*** -0.89*** 0.29*** -0.14 -0.55*** 0.35*** 
SI 0.35*** -0.46*** 1.49*** 0.29*** -0.24 1.05*** 
ES -1.09*** -2.35*** 1.45*** -0.26*** -0.69*** 0.37*** 
SE 0.00 -0.24*** 0.10*** -0.02 -0.24*** 0.07*** 
GB 0.17 -0.38*** 1.81*** -0.12 -0.62*** 1.04*** 
EA -0.53*** -1.23*** 1.00*** -0.06*** -0.32*** 0.37*** 
EU -0.40*** -0.93*** 0.92*** -0.06*** -0.46*** 0.45*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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Table A15: Estimated regression coefficients for the socioeconomic variable ‘AGE’. Extends the results 
from the regressions presented in Table A9, Table A10 and Table A11. 
 PERCEIVED INFLATION EXPECTED INFLATION 
 AGE AGE 
COUNTRY 30-49 50-64 65+ 30-49 50-64 65+ 
AT -0.17*** -0.15*** -0.75*** 0.25*** 0.35*** -0.16*** 
BE 0.30*** 0.49*** -0.07 -0.16 0.18 -0.38*** 
BG 1.55*** 2.27*** 2.46*** 1.13*** 1.77*** 2.08*** 
HR 1.97*** 2.26*** 1.77*** 1.67*** 2.02*** 1.59*** 
CY 1.89*** 1.51*** 1.91*** 0.79*** 0.28 0.25 
CZ 0.35*** 0.58*** 0.87*** 0.69*** 1.02*** 0.88*** 
DK 0.06 0.13*** 0.13 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.15*** 
EE 0.62*** -0.06 -0.17 0.54*** 0.57*** -0.76*** 
FI 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.33*** 0.26*** 0.28*** 0.12*** 
FR 0.43*** 0.28*** -0.44*** 0.25*** 0.35*** -0.30*** 
DE 0.16*** 0.02 -0.15 0.14*** 0.19*** 0.26*** 
GR 0.13 -0.34*** -0.30*** 0.53*** 0.34*** -0.05 
HU - - - - - - 
IE -0.34*** -0.85*** -1.40*** -0.05 -0.17*** -0.66*** 
IT -2.04*** -3.65*** -4.95*** -0.16 -0.23*** -0.44*** 
LV 1.08*** 1.30*** 1.16*** 1.19*** 1.41*** 1.32*** 
LT 0.63*** 1.88*** 3.40*** 0.78*** 2.00*** 2.88*** 
LU 0.34*** 0.26*** -0.23*** 0.07 0.36*** 0.01 
MT 0.01 -0.10 -0.71*** 0.04 -0.50*** -1.37*** 
NL 0.64*** 0.34 0.53 0.26*** 0.37*** -0.04 
PL 1.02*** 1.52*** 0.91*** 0.94*** 1.22*** 0.41*** 
PT 0.01 -0.60*** -0.73*** 0.06 -0.48*** -0.52*** 
RO 1.99*** 2.96*** 2.77*** 1.56*** 2.61*** 2.29*** 
SK 0.63*** 1.21*** 1.99*** 0.64*** 1.27*** 1.88*** 
SI 0.55*** 0.17 -0.73*** 0.01 -0.15 -1.07*** 
ES -0.28*** -1.54*** -2.22*** -0.06 -0.69*** -1.26*** 
SE 0.15*** 0.36*** 0.58*** 0.11*** 0.43*** 0.41*** 
GB -0.03 -0.05 -0.51*** -0.18*** -0.13*** -0.44*** 
EA 0.26*** -0.09*** -0.58*** 0.36*** 0.34*** -0.02 
EU 0.61*** 0.46*** 0.04 0.56*** 0.66*** 0.34*** 
Note: Asterisks represent a significance level of: *** = 1%, ** = 5% and * = 10% 
For country names and abbreviations see Table A1. 
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4 The price and risk effects of 
option introductions on the 
Nordic markets 
4.1 Introduction 
4.1.1 Background 
With the opening of the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) in 1973 a 
new era of derivative trading started. CBOE revolutionised the option trading 
by creating standardised, listed stock options. In the same year Black and 
Scholes (1973) published their work on option pricing. They assumed that 
options are redundant assets and could thereby derive a pricing rule for 
derivative securities. This was done by applying a no-arbitrage argument and 
by constructing a dynamic hedge portfolio. Since then academics have 
questioned the assumption of redundancy. Researchers recognise that financial 
markets are not complete. Therefore, introducing derivative securities could 
increase the opportunity set of investors, which in turn could make markets 
more efficient, lead to welfare effects, and make the derivatives market interact 
with the underlying securities market (see, e.g., Ross 1976; Hakansson 1982; 
and Detemple and Selden 1991). 
This study empirically investigates the effects of option introduction on the 
prices and risk of the underlying securities. The data used come from the stock 
markets in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden as well as from the option 
market in Sweden. The study is motivated fourfold: 
(i) One reason is to check the results and implications of theories regarding 
option introduction presented in the academic literature. 
(ii) So far most studies concerning the impact of option listing on the 
underlying stock has been based on data from the United States. To 
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confirm the results from these studies evidence from other data sets are 
needed. 
(iii) Recent studies based on US data have found time-varying price and risk 
effects. These, from most other findings divergent, results will be 
compared with those based on data from the Nordic markets. 
(iv) Policy questions arise, because there is a fear that derivative trading adds 
to the instability of the underlying assets market. Not rarely such trading 
gets the blame for increased uncertainty. The proposed solutions to the 
presumed problem include introducing frictions into the market, such as 
turnover taxes on short-term positions, to reduce the speed of transactions. 
Although no explicit conclusions can be drawn, it is worthwhile checking 
if the allegation of adding instability has any empirical support. 
There are several arguments suggesting that there exist effects on the 
underlying stock returns related to the listing of options. The structure, 
magnitude or even the directions of these effects are debatable, but they are 
potentially of great interest, not only to academics, but also to practitioners and 
market regulators. However, a better understanding of the effects involved can 
only be determined empirically. 
The disposition of this chapter is as follows. The final part of the introduction 
provides some theoretical arguments leading to the hypothesis tested in the 
paper, and also gives a review of the empirical literature. Section two discusses 
the methodology. The following section describes the data. Section four 
presents the results, and in the final section the conclusions are summarised. 
Appendix A and B put forward derivations of parts of the methodology. In 
Appendix C all the shares of the companies used in this study are listed, 
together with their announcement and listing dates. 
4.1.2 Theory and tested hypothesis 
The aim of this study is to contribute to a better understanding of the effects of 
option introduction by examining evidence from the Nordic stock markets. 
There are several variables to be examined and there are several mechanisms 
by which the variables may be affected. More exhaustive reviews, both 
regarding the theoretical and empirical literature, can be found in the surveys 
of Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992) and Gjerde and Sættem (1994).14 
                                                     
14  The last survey of the two is written in Norwegian. 
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Price effects 
Derivative securities are efficient and flexible instruments for controlling 
financial risks. These instruments enable different risk positions and opinions 
about risks to be expressed through trading, and thereby contribute to the 
reallocation of the risks among different market participants. Among other 
things, the access to a developed option market allows investors to unload their 
risks without having to change their positions in the underlying stock. This 
implies reduced transaction costs and makes it possible to manage better the 
investors’ risk exposure in the underlying market, which should be beneficial 
both privately and to the society. 
In a complete market all assets are perfect substitutes, and contingent cash flow 
claims can be duplicated by combining already existing assets (see Black and 
Scholes 1973). In a complete market, options are therefore redundant assets. 
An important economic theorem states that a complete market is always 
pareto-efficient, while an incomplete market may be pareto-inefficient 
(see Cox and Rubinstein 1985, p 435). Practical circumstances prevent the 
construction of such a complete market. Among other things, simple contracts 
may be difficult to write and carry out, e.g. contracts on future labour income. 
Further, transaction costs and regulations could make it difficult to construct 
new derivative securities for all possible outcomes. Options could therefore in 
practice contribute to making the capital markets more complete. To the degree 
that investors are better off by their increased opportunity set when options are 
introduced, it can be claimed that the additional trading possibilities reduce the 
investors’ cost of capital and increase the price of the underlying stock. 
A negative external effect of trading options could be that this trading diverts 
capital from the equity market to the derivative market. This could lead to a 
higher liquidity premium, and therefore a higher required return and more 
expensive equity. Cox and Rubinstein (1985) recognise a problem connected 
with this line of argument, which is in conflict with a fundamental economic 
principle. Call and put options are contracts between individuals or financial 
intermediaries, and are not issued by non-financial firms. At a national level, 
aggregated real asset value corresponds to the sum of aggregated equity, 
convertible instruments, and debt. Like any form of debt between individuals 
or financial intermediaries, options are not included in this balance. A holder 
of an option contract has claims corresponding to the other party’s obligations. 
A buyer of a call option is a potential buyer of the stock, but has not yet bought 
it. Similarly, a seller of a call option is a potential seller of the underlying stock. 
Therefore, it is not correct to say that buying an option represents a reduction 
in the total net demand of the stock. A more nuanced argument would be that 
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the availability of an option market leads to a new equilibrium, whereby the 
total investment level could be either higher or lower. 
Few papers have theoretically dealt with the implications from non-redundant 
option markets for the underlying price. Detemple and Selden (1987) provides 
one line of argument. They construct a general equilibrium model of an 
economy consisting of a risky asset and an option, where the asset market is 
assumed to be incomplete. The economy is populated by two types of 
investors, with homogenous utility functions, but with different beliefs about 
the risk connected with stock prices. They assume that there are two classes of 
investors who disagree on the probability of a fall of the stock price, i.e. there 
is a ‘high-risk’ group and a ‘low-risk’ group of investors. The option increases 
the number of attainable returns. In this incomplete market the derivative and 
the underlying assets will interact, i.e. their valuation becomes a simultaneous 
pricing problem. 
Individuals with high-risk assessments have preferences for payoffs for high 
values of the stock, and therefore want to buy and hold call options to hedge 
the downside potential. For the high-risk investors the option serves as a 
substitute: they buy the call option while selling some of their shares in the 
endowed stock. The low-risk investors do the opposite; they demand the stock 
and supply the call option, and thus treat the derivative security as a 
complement to the stock. The net effect is that the demand for the stock 
increases. The stock is regarded to be more valuable when options are 
introduced, and the price increases. Further, the return volatility of the stock 
decreases. 
The price effect occurs initially at the time of the introduction of the call 
contract, but could be anticipated. This could give rise to an arbitrage 
opportunity. By buying the stock before the actual introduction of the option 
one could secure an additional profit. Therefore, it is likely that a price effect 
should occur at the announcement date. 
The model has nothing to say about any welfare effects that could arise when 
an option is introduced. But through an enhanced opportunity set, and given 
the investors’ different risk assessments, consumption can be more easily 
smoothed, which should be beneficial to the economy as a whole. The positive 
price effect can be expected to be permanent, as the required yield on 
investments can be reduced. 
Conrad (1989) suggests that another explanation for a price effect is the market 
makers’ higher demand for stocks for hedging purposes when new stock 
options are introduced. In the case market makers anticipate writing calls, they 
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might demand the underlying stock for inventory and hedging purposes. This 
should lead to a temporary price increase, likely to occur at the introduction 
day or a few days before the actual listing of new derivatives. Vice versa, if the 
market makers anticipate writing puts, they may short the stock for the same 
reasons. This should lead to a temporary price pressure in the stock at the 
introduction date, or a few days before. Other examples can also be 
constructed, giving rise to both price increases and price decreases. 
In an efficient market, price changes can be expected to occur at the 
announcement date and not at the date of the option introduction. If regulatory 
or institutional constraints exist, it is possible to have a price effect on the 
introduction date. In Haddad and Voorheis (1991) it is argued that the most 
interesting time to analyse is the introduction date. Most option-traders want 
to issue covered options, but this strategy is not possible to implement before 
the options are actually traded. 
Risk effects 
Concerning the risk effects of option introductions, Grossman (1988) states 
that trading in standardised derivative contracts reveals information about the 
demand for financial insurance to the counterpart, who supplies this insurance. 
He argues that the price variance in the underlying security will decline when 
trade in standardised contracts is introduced, as opposed to the case when this 
demand for financial insurance is generated through dynamic trading 
strategies, i.e. re-balancing the portfolio between risky assets and risk-free 
lending/borrowing. 
A purpose of his study is to show how market frictions and incomplete 
information regarding the fraction of portfolio managers that implement a 
dynamic hedging strategy can leave liquidity providers unprepared to meet the 
increased supply induced by the portfolio hedgers. This causes the stock price 
to be more volatile than it would have been if put options had been traded. 
It is crucial that liquidity providers know the fraction of portfolio managers 
who decide to use dynamic hedging strategies to be able to make a correct 
capital allocation decision. In the absence of perfect information about the 
fraction of portfolio insurers, the liquidity providers will choose to provide an 
amount of capital that is optimal for some average level of volatility. This leads 
to situations in which the allocated capital is less than demanded in times of 
high volatility, and is in excess in times of low volatility. Therefore, the 
stabilising role of the liquidity providers will be undermined by imperfect 
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information about the fraction of investors implementing dynamic hedging 
strategies. 
In this situation a tradable put option may have an important role to fill. 
Suppose there exists a put option, and that the portfolio insurers implement 
their strategies via the derivative contract. The price of the put will then reveal 
the fraction of investors committed to dynamic hedging strategies. In the 
presence of real traded derivative contracts, the liquidity providers are 
informed about the fraction of portfolio insurers and thus can allocate their 
capital in an optimal and market-stabilising way. 
Therefore, it is rational to assume that the introduction of options is likely to 
reduce the total risk. 
Focusing on two aspects of speculative behaviour, risk-sharing and 
information transmission, Stein (1987) analyses the risk effect connected with 
the introduction of derivatives. In his model the opening of a derivative market 
produces new investment choices, and enables more and new agents to 
participate in the economy, which improves the risk-sharing. The new agents 
are also differently informed, which can alter the informational content of 
prices. His model illustrates that the opening of a derivative market can be 
destabilising. 
Two mechanisms will determine the effects on price volatility and welfare. 
First, the opening of a derivative market will introduce more agents into the 
economy, and make it possible to transfer the risk of holding inventories to the 
new pool of investors. When inventories are more easily carried forward from 
one period to another, prices become more stable, which leads to a smoother 
allocation of consumption. It is assumed that consumers have concave utility 
functions. Thence it follows that consumption smoothing over time is welfare-
improving. 
The second mechanism affecting the prices has to do with the inference, which 
can be drawn from the observed asset price. If the derivative market is in place, 
and the new traders have imperfect information, their speculative trading can 
reduce the informational content of the asset’s price. This muddling of the 
traders’ information has two effects. It raises their conditional variance of the 
future price. Since traders are risk averse, they will be more reluctant to hold 
an inventory, which prevents consumption smoothing. This gives a 
destabilising effect. Traders also make mistakes in their storage decisions, 
because they have to statistically predict the future price. Again, this is 
destabilising. These two effects are of course reduced by the risk-sharing 
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benefit provided by new traders. Still, the net effect may be destabilising and 
welfare-reducing. 
Thus, the introduction of derivative instruments may also have a destabilising 
effect on the underlying market, which tends to increase volatility and thereby 
the total risk. 
Option trading could also open up opportunities for a manipulation of prices, 
and this could lead to destabilisation. Examples of such a manipulation are 
strategies called ‘pooling’ and ‘capping’. When implementing a ‘pooling’ 
strategy, a holder of a call option uses the fact that options are highly leveraged 
instruments, i.e. the value of an option changes relatively more than that of the 
underlying stock. Thus, by trying to raise the stock price, it is possible to gain 
an additional return on a long position in a call option written on that particular 
stock. This strategy can be implemented at any time of an option’s life as soon 
as it is introduced. 
‘Capping’ is a strategy where an issuer of a call option tries to push down the 
price of the underlying stock during the time of maturity. Selling off stocks at 
this particular period of time can lead to a lower price, which reduces the value 
of the options, and in the extreme case makes them worthless. The opposite 
tactics, called ‘pegging’, can be used to avoid such a reduction of the 
underlying stock price. Both ‘capping’ and ‘pegging’ can contribute to non-
normal fluctuations in the stock price around the maturity of the option. 
Another manipulation opportunity is connected with the front running of block 
holders, which involves taking advantage of information about a coming block 
trade by earning a profit through buying or selling options on the underlying 
stock. This type of action is closer to insider trading, and is easier to regulate 
and supervise than the type of manipulations mentioned above. 
According to Damodaran and Subrahmanyam (1992), arguments about the 
destabilising effect of option trading can be found in the popular press. In 
general, these arguments are not presented within the framework of a model, 
but are based on two factors, according to Damodaran and Subrahmanyam. 
First, in a market with frictions in the trading process, the actions of 
uninformed speculators can generate price bubbles, i.e. prices are determined 
by other factors than fundamental values. Second, actions like programmed 
trading by some market participants, such as index arbitrageurs and suppliers 
of portfolio insurance, tend to increase the speed of response to changes in 
market situations, which can accelerate market declines or increases, and thus 
add to volatility. 
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4.1.3 Review of empirical literature 
The empirical findings concerning the effects of option introductions on the 
underlying stock prices can be divided into at least four areas, namely (i) the 
price level, (ii) the volatility, (iii) the information and price adjustment process, 
and (iv) the microstructure effects (i.e. spreads and volume). This study deals 
mainly with the first two issues. The following review of the empirical 
literature should by no means be seen as a complete review.15 It is summarised 
in Table 1 below. Further, since this study does not deal with issues concerning 
variations in the underlying stock around the time of maturity of the options, 
such literature will be omitted in this review. 
Price effects 
Starting with the price effect, empirical findings employing data from US 
markets suggest that option introduction causes a permanent price increase in 
the underlying stock, beginning a few days before the introduction. Using a 
sample of 300 option introductions between 1973 and 1986, Detemple and 
Jorion (1990) report positive abnormal returns averaging 0.6% on the listing 
day, and 2.9% in the two weeks around the listing date. They also show that 
the effects are stronger in the earlier part of their sampling period than in the 
later years. 
The price effect also seems to be more associated with the time of introduction, 
rather than the time of announcement. Conrad (1989) distinguishes between 
the announcement of a new listing and the actual listing. The sample used 
consists of 96 option introductions made between 1974 and 1980 at 
30 different dates. She finds a positive abnormal return of 2.5% during the 
period from 3 days before to 1 day after the option listing. She could find no 
price effect around the announcement date.16 
The absence of an announcement effect is somewhat puzzling since investors 
should progressively realise that the prices of newly optioned stocks usually 
increase. Hence, an announcement effect should appear. 
In a more recent study the price effect is reconsidered. Sorescu (2000) shows 
that the effect of option introductions on the underlying stocks is best described 
                                                     
15  There are some master theses from Stockholm School of Economics (using Swedish data) 
that are dealing with the issues discussed in this study. These papers will not be taken into 
consideration in the review that follows. 
16  Other students of the return effect of option introductions include Branch and Finnerty 
(1981), Rao and Ma (1987), and Haddad and Voorheis (1991). 
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by a two-regime switching means model. He finds a positive return effect of 
2.37 percent over an 11-day window around the listing date of the options 
introduced from 1973 to 1980. In the period after 1980 he finds a negative 
effect of -1.52 percent. The sample consists of 1924 listings made on 877 
separate dates. 
An attempt was made to explain the causes of the switch in the price effect by 
observable characteristics of the optioned firms, instead of by the underlying 
economics of option introduction. Two such variables were age and size, which 
showed to be negatively related to the time of introduction. In the sample of 
the optioned stocks after 1980, the firms are relatively smaller and younger. 
For this group of stocks, the costs of establishing short positions may be high 
before the option listing, such that investors with negative information who do 
not own the stock are unable to borrow it. These short sale restrictions are 
effectively removed when options are listed. Thus, negative information can 
be incorporated in prices and lead to a negative price effect. Other 
characteristics, also used, were the type of contracts listed, and the trading 
place of the options and their underlying stock. 
The results show that the switch around 1980, from positive to negative 
abnormal returns, is not related to the type or trading place of the option 
contract, nor to the age, size or trading place of the underlying stock. The cross-
sectional characteristics in the underlying firms merely serve as proxies for the 
regime switch. 
Recognising that option listing is an endogenous decision made by exchanges, 
Mayhew and Mihov (1999) investigate the factors affecting the exchanges’ 
listing decisions. They find that firm size, volume, and volatility are positively 
related to the probability of listing. Using these results, they construct matched 
samples of stocks that were eligible, but not selected, for option listing, and re-
examine some of the option listing effects using a control sample methodology, 
in order to correct for an eventual selection bias problem. 
They use a sample consisting of 1953 stocks with options introduced between 
1973 and 1996. The results show that there is a positive price effect prior to 
1980 and a negative one after 1980. But in the years after 1980 the control 
samples also show negative excess returns. Thus, the negative return effect in 
the later period is less pronounced than that reported by Sorescu, and in some 
cases it even disappears. 
So far, most studies concerning the impact of option listing on the underlying 
stock have been based on data from the United States. There is, however, some 
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evidence regarding the effects of option introductions based on data sets 
outside the US. 
Watt, Yadav, and Draper (1992) used 39 option listings (over 34 independent 
dates) made in the UK over the period 1978 to 1989, and report a temporary 
price increase of 1.3% immediately prior to the listing. Stucki and Wasserfallen 
(1994) investigate the effect on stocks traded in Switzerland. Their sample 
consists of 11 option introductions made at one single date in 1988. They find 
that the introduction of traded options leads to a permanent and significant 
increase in the prices of 2%. Gjerde and Sættem (1995) have a sample of 7 
option introductions, listed at 4 individual dates in Norway. They report a 
temporary price increase, giving a positive excess return of 1% on the 
introduction day. Finally, findings from the Netherlands, as reported by Kabir 
(1998), indicate a decline in the stock prices. The magnitude of the decline was 
–2.3% over the 20 days before the listing and –0.46% on the day after the 
listing. The sample used consists of 53 option listings made at 27 individual 
dates during the period 1978 to 1993. 
There is one study based on stocks traded in Sweden by Alkebäck and Hagelin 
(1998). Mainly they study the impact of warrant introduction on the underlying 
stocks, and for comparison they also study the effects of option introductions 
made in Sweden. Alkebäck and Hagelin report that the return is unchanged at 
the introduction of the options. The differences between this study and theirs 
are that in this study the sample of option introductions include all Nordic 
markets, and that the question of an announcement effect is addressed. Further, 
the risk analysis is extended to include both the effects on the systematic risk 
and those on the unsystematic risk. 
All the studies mentioned above, using data from European markets, have the 
weakness of not considering what happens at the announcement date. Another 
shortfall is that the studies using data from Norway and Switzerland contain 
very few independent observations. 
Risk effects 
To date, most studies on the aspect of the impact of option markets are 
concerned with the effects on volatility. The consensus among studies using 
samples up to the mid-eighties is strong regarding the effects, and the findings 
show that volatility is reduced as a consequence of the introduction of options. 
Applying variance measures of excess returns, Conrad (1989) finds that the 
average variance, measured over the 200 days preceding the option 
introduction compared to the value measured over the following 200 days, 
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shows a decline from 2.29% to 1.79%. At the individual firm level, 86 of the 
96 firms introduced during the period between 1974 and 1980 showed a 
reduction in variance. Skinner (1989) proves a decline in variance of 17%-25% 
after the listing of options depending on the time interval used. The sample 
consists of raw returns from 304 stocks with options introduced during the 
period 1973-1986. When the actual returns are adjusted day by day with due 
allowance for the overall market returns, the decline is in the order of 10%. In 
a sample consisting of 300 stocks with options introduced during the years 
between 1973 and 1986, DeTemple and Jorion (1990) find that the total risk 
declines on an average by 7%. Damodoran and Lim (1991) document a 
significant decline in the return variance of 21%. Their sample consists of 200 
stocks with options introduced between 1973 and 1983. Nabar and Park (1994) 
develop a market model approach to investigate the effects of options on the 
underlying assets, as opposed to the earlier studies directed to tests of variance 
ratios. In a sample of 390 optioned stocks introduced at 153 different dates, 
they find that the variance corrected for market risk is reduced on the average 
by 4-8%.17 Mayhew and Mihov (1999) find diverging results depending on the 
time period studied. Between 1973 and 1980 they find decreasing volatility 
compared to the control samples of stocks, but in the period following 1980 
they find mixed results. They even report a significant increase in volatility 
during the period 1991 to 1996. They interpret this as if exchanges listed 
options in response to the stocks’ permanent characteristics, but as these listing 
candidates became fewer over time, the exchanges gradually began listing the 
options in response to changes in market conditions. Thus, this reflects a 
change in the listing criteria, the exchanges become forward-looking, and list 
options in anticipation of high volatility. 
Another risk examined is the non-diversifiable risk, measured by the beta of 
the underlying stock. An early study by Trennepohl and Dukes (1979) uses a 
sample of weekly returns from 32 optioned stocks, which were listed between 
1970 and 1976. The average weekly-return beta in their sample declines from 
1.22 before the listing to 0.87 after the listing. Klemkosky and Maness (1980) 
also come to a similar conclusion comparing monthly-return betas before and 
after the listing of options, but their results are statistically weaker. The sample 
consists of monthly returns on 39 optioned stocks during the period 1972-1978. 
More recent studies with an improved methodology and larger data sets have 
not been able to find any significant change in betas after the option listing. 
                                                     
17  Other scholars have come to the same conclusion regarding reduced risk. Among these are 
Ma and Rao (1988), and Bansal, Pruit, and Wei (1989). 
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Examples of such studies are Whiteside, Dukes and Dunne (1983), Skinner 
(1989), and Damodoran and Lim (1991). 
The results reported by researchers using data sets from non-US markets are 
as follows. Regarding the total risk the results are mixed. Watt, Yadav, and 
Draper (1992) report that the total risk and the unsystematic risk decreased in 
the UK. Stucki and Wasserfallen (1994) investigate the effect on stocks traded 
in Switzerland. They find a reduction in the volatility of the stock returns of 
31%. Sahlström (1998) using a sample of 13 option introductions made in 
Finland, finds that the total volatility is reduced by 31%. The study based on 
stocks traded in Sweden by Alkebäck and Hagelin (1998) report that the 
variance declines by 14%. With a sample of 37 option introductions made over 
the period 1979 to 1987 in Canada, Chamberlain, Cheung, and Kwan (1993) 
fail to find any significant effects on risk, volume, and bid-ask spreads. Gjerde 
and Sættem (1995) find no evidence of a change in the total risk of the stocks 
in Norway. Finally, findings from the Netherlands, as reported by Kabir 
(1998), indicate no significant change in volatility. The evidence on systematic 
risk measured by beta is more conclusive. No effect is found in the studies 
from Canada, Norway, the Netherlands, Switzerland, or the UK. The only 
exception is the study based on Swedish option introductions, which reports a 
decline in beta. 
In summary, the empirical evidence on different risk measures indicates that 
stock return variance declines after option listing. This is true for both total risk 
and unsystematic risk. Only a weak or, more recently, no statistically 
significant change is found in the systematic risk measured by the beta of the 
underlying stock. 
Information and price adjustment process effects 
Several studies have documented the speed at which new information is 
incorporated in equity prices, both those with and those without options. At 
least three issues in this connection are examined in the academic literature. 
The first one is concerned with the effect option listing can have on the quantity 
and quality of the information produced. The second deals with the speed at 
which the prices of optioned stocks respond to new information relative to non-
optioned stocks. A third issue is to what extent option prices lead or lag the 
prices of the underlying stocks. 
Damodoran and Lim (1991) study the issue concerning the quantity and quality 
of the information produced. They look at the number of analysts following a 
stock and the frequency of Wall Street Journal articles about the company 
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before and after the option listing. They conduct a test of whether the 
information structure is affected by option listing, and find a significant 
increase in the number of analysts concerned with stocks with options as well 
as a higher frequency of Wall Street Journal articles. 
The speed of price adjustment to new information has been studied by Jennings 
and Stark (1986), among others. In a sample of 180 stocks having options 
introduced during 1981 and 1982, they find that the price of the optioned stocks 
adjusts more quickly to earning reports than to the non-optioned stocks of a 
matched sample. Skinner (1990), also studying the effect of earnings 
announcements on optioned stocks relative to non-optioned stocks, reports 
smaller abnormal returns of unexpected news after the listing of options. 
Further, he concludes that the overall reaction to earnings reports is smaller 
after the listing of options. The sample in Skinner’s study consists of 214 stocks 
having options introduced during the period 1973 to 1986, at 82 listing dates. 
Using the variance in different return intervals, Damodoran and Lim (1991) 
estimate price adjustment coefficients. Using a sample of 200 firms covering 
the period of 1973-1983 they find that prices adjust quicker to new information 
after the listing of options. 
The last issue, dealing with which market responds to new information most 
quickly, the option market or the stock market, has been addressed by Manaster 
and Rendleman (1982), among others. They use a sample of 172 stocks with 
options listed between 1973 and 1976. They find that the option prices lead the 
stock prices by as much as 24 hours. In addition, they calculate the differences 
between implied and actual stock prices. On the basis of these differences they 
construct portfolios, which make excess returns. This result, however, has been 
challenged in other studies. For example, Stephan and Whaley (1990), using 
intraday price changes in 364 stocks with options traded during 1986, find that 
option prices lag stock prices by 15-20 minutes. They also document a modest 
feedback from the option markets. 
In summary, there is evidence that option listings enhance the information set 
and increase the speed with which new information is incorporated in prices. 
However, the answer to the question whether it is the option market or the 
stock market that leads the information revelation remains open. 
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Market microstructure effects 
Theory suggests that options trading may have market microstructure effects. 
In the empirical literature it is hypothesised that bid-ask spreads and trading 
volume are affected. Damodoran and Lim (1991) estimate the serial correlation 
measure for the bid-ask spread proposed by Roll (1984), using a sample of 200 
firms with options introduced during the period 1973-1986. They reached the 
conclusion that the bid-ask spreads declined after the listing of options. The 
decline is partially attributed to an increase in competition among market 
makers on the option market, and is partially due to an increased institutional 
trading activity in the stock.18 
Studies dealing with the effects of option listing on trading volume have come 
to diverged conclusions. Skinner (1989) reports how the stock market trading 
volume changes around the listing time of options. The sample consists of 297 
firms with options introduced between 1973 and 1986. The result indicates that 
the median trading volume in the stock increases after the listing by 17%.19 
Likewise, Damodoran and Lim (1991) report an increase in the raw trading 
volume of the same magnitude, but when controlling for general market 
changes the effect is insignificant.20 
In summary, it seems like the bid-ask spread decreases after the listing of 
options, and there is no or little effect on the market-adjusted trading volume 
of the underlying stock. 
4.1.4 Hypothesis 
Based on the arguments above, four explicit hypotheses regarding a return 
effect are tested in this study. Since the return effect is a priori indeterminate, 
both regarding the time and the direction of a shift, the tests are designed to 
allow for either an increase or a decrease in the returns. Further, an effect is 
allowed to take place at both the announcement date and the introduction date. 
If a shift in the return-generating process is found, it is also tested if it is 
18  Others have also studied the effects on the bid-ask spread. Among them are Neal (1987) and 
Fedenia and Grammatikos (1992), and they draw similar conclusions as Damodoran and Lim 
(1991). 
19  Jennings and Stark (1986) also find a positive volume effect of option introduction. 
20  Whiteside, Dukes and Dunne (1983) and Bansal, Pruit, and Wei (1989) draw similar 
conclusions as Damodoran and Lim (1991), i.e. there is no change in volume when options 
are introduced. 
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reversed at a later date following either the announcement or the introduction. 
The hypotheses are: 
H1 Option introductions do not lead to a change in the price of the underlying 
assets at the announcement date. 
H2 In the case of a price effect at the announcement, the effect is not reversed. 
H3 Option introductions do not lead to a change in the price of the underlying 
asset at the introduction date. 
H4 In the case of a price effect at the introduction, the effect is not reversed. 
As regards a risk effect, theory is not conclusive about in what direction the 
risk might shift. Thus, also in this case, the tests must allow for either an 
increase or a decrease in risk. Moreover, the theoretical analyses referred to 
above are not comprehensive enough to disentangle which risks are affected 
and how, i.e. the effect on the systematic and/or idiosyncratic risks. According 
to the theories it is clear that the total risk is affected, but it is hard to say what 
happens in a setting with more than one asset and how this affects the relation 
with other assets. This raises the questions of which risks are affected, and 
how. Three explicit hypotheses are tested in this study concerning a risk effect 
caused by the introduction of options: 
H5 Option introductions do not change the total risk of the investments in the 
underlying assets, measured by the variance in returns. 
H6 Option introductions do not change the idiosyncratic risk. 
H7 Option introductions do not change the systematic risk, measured by beta. 
4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Return effect 
To investigate the price effect of an option introduction, an event study is 
undertaken based on introduction of options on the Nordic exchanges. The 
event is defined in two distinct ways. The first way is to use the announcement 
date of an option introduction as it appears in a newsletter from Options 
Mäklarna (OM) and Oslo Stock exchange (OSE), or in the newspaper Dagens 
Industri. The second way is to use the first day of trade of the standardised 
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contract, as reported by the respective exchange. Throughout the study, 
continuously compounded returns are calculated in a standard fashion: 
𝑟௧ = 𝑙𝑛(𝑝௧ − 𝑑௧) − ln 𝑝௧ିଵ    (1) 
In the equation above 𝑝௧ denotes the price and 𝑑௧ denotes the dividend at date 𝑡. 
The securities on the Nordic exchanges are infrequently traded in comparison 
with stocks traded on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE). Thus, there will 
be days with no closing prices and therefore missing values in the return series. 
In such cases, a return is calculated for the period of missing prices. For 
example, if closing prices are missing for two days, a three-day return is 
calculated using the third day's price. 
In sample one and two, the event window is defined to be 61 days, that is 30 
days prior to the event day and 30 days after the event day. Calculating 
abnormal returns for a security, the normal return over the event window is 
subtracted from the actual ex-post return. A modified market model 
implementing Fowler and Rorke (1983) betas, which adjusts for non-
synchronous trading, is used to model the normal returns. The parameters in 
the market model are estimated on data in a window of 150 days after the event 
window (see Figure 1). The pre-event period is used for alternative choices of 
estimation periods.21 
Figure 1 Time line for the event study 
T i m e  i n  d a y s
0- 3 0 3 0- 1 8 0 1 8 0
E v e n t
w i n d o w
P r e - e v e n t
p e r i o d
E s t i m a t i o n
p e r i o d
 
When many options in the sample are introduced on the same calendar date, 
cross-sectional correlation in excess returns could give biased results. 
Therefore, equally weighted portfolios are formed out of those stocks, which 
have identical option introductions and announcement dates. These portfolios 
are treated as individual securities. An inference is drawn by calculating z-
                                                     
21  Other specifications of the estimation period are also tried, e.g. 150 days before and 150 days 
after the event window, and just 150 days before the event window. The choice does not 
affect the results. But, as will be seen later, there is a risk of a selection bias in the data set, 
which could have an influence on the estimation of the parameters of the normal return 
models. 
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scores from the standardised excess returns of the securities for each day in the 
event window. The methodology is more exhaustively presented in 
Appendix A. 
4.2.2 Risk effect 
The second part of this analysis deals with the effect of an option introduction 
on the total risk, the idiosyncratic risk and the systematic risk of the underlying 
security. Using a similar event-study approach as in the analysis of the return 
effect, the total risk effect is first investigated. 
Total risk 
Monthly variances are estimated from daily returns for 21 consecutive days. 
Since there are periods of days with no closing prices, there will be days 
without returns. Therefore, some variances will be estimated by using fewer 
returns than 21. This infrequent trading of securities causes the returns to be 
autocorrelated, particular at a one day lag (see Scholes and Williams (1973)). 
Because of this autocorrelation, variances are estimated as: 
𝜎௜௧ଶ = ଵே೔೟ ∑ ൫𝑟௜௧௞ − 𝑟௜௧
௩ ൯ଶே೔೟௞ୀଵ + ଵே೔೟ ∑ ൫𝑟௜௧௞ − 𝑟௜௧
௖ ൯൫𝑟௜௧,௞ିଵ − 𝑟௜௧௖ ൯ே೔೟ିଵ௞ୀଵ  (2)22
𝜎௜௧ଶ  Stock or market variance 
𝑁௜௧ Number of trading days in a month 
𝑟௜௧௞ Daily return in day k within month t 
?̅?௜௧௩ Mean return in month t excluding missing returns 
?̅?௜௧௖  Mean return of the returns used when calculating the one-period lagged 
cross product23 
22  It should be noted that the covariance term in equation (2) does not enter by a factor two as 
it usually does. This is due to a Newey-West correction in order to make the variance-
covariance matrix positive semidefinite in small samples (see Hamilton 1994, p 281). If the 
covariance matrix is not positive semidefinite, it is not asserted that all variances are non-
negative. 
23  The two mean returns 𝑟௜௧௩  and 𝑟௜௧௖  are essentially the same, but since cross products are 
calculated, resulting in more missing values, they could differ. The reason for 𝑟௜௧௖  to differ 
from 𝑟௜௧௩  could be that the time series of 21 consecutive days, used to estimate a monthly 
variance, include missing values. When the time series is lagged one day, and multiplied 
with the original (not lagged) time series to calculate cross products, the days following a 
missing value will become cross products of missing values. The number of cross products, 
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A market model for monthly stock variance is used to describe the normal 
variance, i.e. the individual stock variance is expected to fluctuate around its 
mean and the variance is adjusted for shifts in the overall market variance. 
Three different market models for variances are considered: 
𝜎௜௧ଶ = 𝑎௜ + 𝑏௜𝜎௠௧ଶ + 𝑒௜௧  
𝜎௜௧ = 𝑎௜ + 𝑏௜𝜎௠௧ + 𝑒௜௧    (3) 
ln 𝜎௜௧ = 𝑎௜ + 𝑏௜ ln 𝜎௠௧ + 𝑒௜௧  
Nabar and Park (1994) specify these market models for volatility ad hoc. They 
use these models to answer similar questions as asked in this study, and they 
show that the methodology is statistically more powerful than comparing 
variance ratios adjusted for market volatility, as in Skinner (1989). The 
advantage of this specification of normal variances is that it adjusts to a 
potential market shift in volatility. It also makes it possible to follow the 
development of the excess volatility over time. Empirical results found by 
Schwert and Seguin (1990) support such a statistical model. The modelled 
normal variances are compared with realised monthly return variances, and the 
differences are considered to be the abnormal variances, as follows: 
?̂?௜∗ = 𝜎௜∗ − 𝑎ො௜𝑙 − 𝑏෠௜𝜎௠∗     (4) 
In equation (4) the star superscript indicates that the vectors of standard 
deviations come from the event window, while 𝑎ො௜ and 𝑏෠௜ are estimated with 
data from the estimation period (see Figure 2). The abnormal variance can then 
be aggregated across stocks, and thereafter tested if it is significantly different 
from zero. Test statistics and hypotheses are developed in the same way as for 
the test concerning significant abnormal returns. As in the return study, a cross-
sectional correlation in excess variances could bias the results. Therefore, 
equally weighted portfolios are formed out of the stocks having identical 
option introduction dates. Portfolios are formed before variances are 
calculated, and they are treated as individual securities. 
The timing of the events of the risk effect is presented in Figure 2. The first 
sub-period is the 44 months’ estimation period, while the second period is the 
                                                     
therefore, become fewer than the number of days in the original time series. For example, if 
there is one day missing out of the original 21 days, the resulting number of cross products 
is 18. One is lost due to the lagging of the series, and two more are lost due to the missing 
day. The mean return 𝑟௜௧௖  is calculated by only using those returns which result in a cross 
product that does not result in additional missing values, i.e. in the example the 18 returns 
resulting in an existing cross product are used. 
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event window with 10 months prior to the listing and 10 months after the 
listing. The first day in month 1 is the listing day of any stock option. The pre-
listing period in the event window is used to verify the predictability of the 
model. The post-listing period in the event window is used to test for excess 
volatility in returns. 
Figure 2 Time line for the event study 
T i m e  i n
m o n t h s- 1 0- 5 4 1 0
E v e n t
w i n d o w
E s t i m a t i o n
p e r i o d
0
Table 2 shows summary statistics from the three specified volatility models in 
equation (3). It can be seen from the table that all estimated parameters are 
significant with one exception: the slope coefficient in the variance model. All 
models produce similar results. The ordinary least squares (OLS) estimation 
of the models in (3) shows that the residuals exhibit a significant serial 
correlation for many stocks. Therefore, the OLS estimates of the model 
coefficients will be biased. Instead, the methodology developed by Nabar and 
Park (1994) will be used, i.e. implementing generalised least squares (GLS) 
estimates of the parameters in the models, and adjusting for first order 
autocorrelation. The methodology is explicitly presented in Appendix B. 
Table 2 Summary statistics for volatility market model regressions 
The table shows summary statistics from the regression models in equation (3). Separate regressions are 
conducted using variances from portfolio returns. Each portfolio consists of securities having the same 
introduction date. In each column the mean of each coefficient is displayed. Columns 2-5 show the parameter 
estimates with their respective standard deviations. A first order autocorrelation from OLS residuals is presented 
in column 6, the coefficient of determination in column 7, and in the last column the average skewness in the 
residuals. 
MODELS 𝜶 𝝈𝒂 𝒃 𝝈𝒃 𝝆 𝑹𝟐 SKEWNESS 
𝜎ଶ 0.079 0.030 1.60 0.854 0.202 0.20 2.10 
𝜎 0.212 0.048 0.61 0.288 0.268 0.18 1.14 
ln 𝜎 -0.799 0.271 0.26 0.132 0.288 0.14 0.04 
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To facilitate the interpretation, and due to a higher 𝑅ଶ, the model using market 
standard deviation as explanatory variable is chosen. The results are essentially 
the same regardless of the choice of model specification.24 
Idiosyncratic risk 
Variance ratios are used in testing for a change in the idiosyncratic risk. The 
same methodology is also used for the test of changes in the total risk in such 
a way that a comparison can be made between the two risks. 
When calculating the variance ratios for the idiosyncratic risk, the variances of 
residuals from a market model for each stock are computed for a ten-month 
period on either side of the option introduction date. To get the total risk effect, 
the variances of the stock returns are calculated. The variances of the 
corresponding market returns are also calculated on either side of the stock’s 
listing date. This is done for each stock separately, using the same ten-month 
period. Dividing the post-listing period variance by the pre-listing period 
variance forms variance ratios (VR). Presented in equation (5) and (6) are the 
variance ratios for the idiosyncratic and total risks. The superscripts I and T 
indicate which risk is considered, the idiosyncratic or total risk. 
𝑉𝑅௜ூ =
ఙഄ೔ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ
ఙഄ೔ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ     (5) 
𝑉𝑅௜் =
ఙ೔ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మ
ఙ೔ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మ
    (6) 
To control for coexisting shifts in the market risk, the stock variances in each 
period is divided by the corresponding market variance. The quotient between 
the stock variances and the market variance is the market-adjusted or 
standardised variances. Dividing the standardised variances after the listing by 
the standardised variances before the listing forms the standardised variance 
ratio (SVR). Presented in equation (7) and (8) are the variance ratios of the 
idiosyncratic and total risks. 
𝑆𝑉𝑅௜ூ =
ఙഄ೔ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ ఙಾ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మൗ
ఙഄ೔ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ ఙಾ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మൗ
   (7) 
                                                     
24  The parameters in Table 2 appear to differ considerably depending on the choice of model, 
and could potentially lead to a question of robustness in the results. This difference is due to 
the transformation of the monthly time series, and has no effect on the results whatsoever. 
All models were tested, and the conclusions drawn are the same regardless of the model 
used. 
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𝑆𝑉𝑅௜் =
ఙ೔೔ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ ఙಾ ,೛೚ೞ೟ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మൗ
ఙ೔೔ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒
మ ఙಾ ,೛ೝ೐ష೗೔ೞ೟೔೙೒మൗ
(8) 
A VR or a SVR greater than one indicates an increase in the overall risk in 
each stock. A ratio less than one indicates a reduction in volatility. An F-test is 
performed on each security’s variance ratio to test for significant deviations 
from one. The median variance ratio is also tested for a significant deviation 
from one by a Wilcoxson-signed rank test. 
Systematic risk 
To test if option introduction has any impact on the systematic risk of the 
underlying securities, a market model regression is estimated over 360 days. 
Half of the data set occurs before the option listing, and the other half after the 
option listing. To adjust for the bias in the coefficient estimates arising from 
thinly traded securities, the approach of Fowler and Rorke (1983) is followed. 
A dummy variable is included in the model that takes the value one in the 
periods following the option listing and zero otherwise. More specifically, the 
following model is estimated: 
𝑅௜ = 𝛼௜ + 𝛽௜ି ି𝛽௠ିି + 𝛽௜ି 𝑅௠ି + 𝛽௜଴𝑅௠଴ + 𝛽௜ା𝑅௠ା + 𝛽௜ାା𝑅௠ାା +
 +𝛾௜𝐷௜൫𝛽௜ି ି𝛽௠ିି + 𝛽௜ି 𝑅௠ି + 𝛽௜଴𝑅௠଴ + 𝛽௜ା𝑅௠ା + 𝛽௜ାା𝑅௠ାା൯ + 𝜀௜ (9) 
In the regression model 𝑅௜ and 𝑅௠ represent vectors of stock returns and 
market returns, respectively. The superscripts ++, +, 0, -, and -- indicate that 
each time series is shifted to lead or lag two days, one day, or no day. 
A 𝛾௜-coefficient significantly different from zero indicates that the option 
listing may have affected the beta values. The null hypothesis tested is 
∑ 𝛾௜௜ = 0. 𝐷௜ represents the dummy vector. 
4.3 Data 
This study is based on all stocks on which options were listed in the four Nordic 
countries Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden between the years 1985 and 
1998. During this period there were a total of 90 listings at 62 individual dates. 
The option introduction dates are the dates reported by the respective exchange 
in each country. The announcement dates were collected from newsletters from 
Options Mäklarna (OM) and Oslo Stock Exchange (OSE). For the first two 
years the sample announcement dates were gathered from Dagens Industri, a 
major Swedish business newspaper. 
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Three samples are collected and used in this study. Sample one and two consist 
of daily stock return data aligned at the announcement date and at the 
introduction date respectively. Sample three consists of 64 months of daily 
stock returns aligned at the introduction date. It is used to calculate 64 monthly 
variances. Sample one is used to test hypothesis (i) and (ii). Sample two is used 
to test hypothesis (iii), (iv), (vi), and (vii). Sample three is used to test 
hypothesis (v). 
All observations in all three samples included in the study must meet the 
following criteria. When options are introduced on several types of stocks of a 
company, only the first introduction is considered. This means that if the 
options on Volvo B-shares were introduced before those on Volvo A-shares, 
only the Volvo B option introduction date will be considered in the study.25 
After this has been taken into account, 85 stocks remain. In sample one and 
two, the individual shares must have been publicly traded 180 days prior to and 
180 days after the considered date. The 361-day interval is chosen to match the 
estimation period. This reason for the rejection of data excludes 27 stocks. The 
selection criterion results in a remaining sample of 58 stock option 
introductions, and the number of different introduction dates is 37. 
Announcement dates could only be received on introductions made in Sweden 
and partly in Norway. This shortfall reduces the number of announcements to 
39, at 27 individual dates.26 
Table 3 shows the number of option introductions that have occurred in the 
Nordic countries, and the number of stocks that had to be excluded because of 
the selection criteria. Out of the 58 listings in the final sample the majority are 
Swedish. In sample three, which is used in the study of the risk effect, the 
individual shares must have been publicly traded 54 months prior to and  
 
 
                                                     
25  The sample includes companies, which have as many as four types of stocks. Two of these, 
A-shares and B-shares, refer to voting rights. Both types can also be classified as restricted 
or unrestricted, referring to whether domestic or foreign ownership is allowed. This last 
classification does no longer exist. 
26  For comparison, Conrad (1989), the most widely cited paper in the area, used 96 stock 
options in her study. After the forming of portfolios there were 30 portfolios at the 
introduction date and 15 at the announcement date. 
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10 months after the introduction date.27 Due to the longer return horizon 
required when calculating variances, fewer stock option introductions can be 
considered. The selection criterion results in 48 stock option introductions at 
31 individual dates. Only introduction dates are considered when the risk effect 
is studied. Since monthly variances are used, and introduction dates and 
announcement dates are close together in time, the results are not affected. 
The price and dividend data are drawn from SIX Trust and Datastream.28 The 
market index is Datastream's Scandinavia-DS Market index (SDSM), which is 
a value-weighted total return index.29 
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of return series for the total sample period, and before and after option 
introduction 
The sample of 361 trading days is divided into three time periods, signed Total, Before, and After, The last two 
consist of the first and last 150 trading days, excluding the middle 61 trading days. Separate regressions of the 
type 𝑅௜௧ = 𝛼௜௧ + 𝛽௜௧𝑅𝑚௜௧ + 𝜀௜௧ are run for each stock and period individually. The values presented in the table 
are the averages of the estimated parameters and standard deviations. Columns 2 to 5 contain the sample 
average of the parameter values from the regressions with the corresponding average standard deviation. 
Columns 6 and 7 contain the standard deviation for the return series. The last column contains market-adjusted 
standard deviations. 
PERIOD 𝜶 𝝈𝜶 𝜷a 𝝈𝜷 𝝈𝒊 𝝈𝒎 𝝈𝒊 𝝈𝒎⁄  
Total 0.0006 0.0010 0.4927 0.1105 0.3392 0.1560 2.12 
Before 0.0010 0.0017 0.3786 0.1829 0.3571 0.1527 2.23 
After 0.0002 0.0016 0.4472 0.1632 0.3346 0.1647 1.99 
𝜎஺௅ 𝜎஻௅⁄ b     0.94 1.08  
Note: a) In the ‘Total’ period 49 out of the 58 estimated betas are significantly different from zero at a five percent 
significance level. In the ‘Before’ period 33 betas are significant, and in the ‘After’ period 37 betas are 
significant. 
b) Quotient between the standard deviation after listing and the standard deviation before listing. 
Table 4 shows descriptive statistics of the return series concerning the sample 
of stocks. Each stock in the sample is studied during a total interval of 361 
consecutive trading days around the listing, 150 days ‘Before’, 61 days around 
and 150 ‘After’ the listing. Two observations can be made from Table 4. The 
average beta increases after the option introduction, and rises from 0.3786 to 
                                                     
27  Outside of this time interval too many shares would have to be excluded. Some options have 
been introduced recently, which means that not enough time has elapsed between the 
introduction and today’s date, to generate relevant return data. Also, some stocks were not 
publicly traded prior to the considered introduction and announcement dates. The 
introduction of the stock and the option occurred close together in time, which prohibits a 
satisfactory estimation of model parameters. 
28  Trust is a financial database, which is administered by Scandinavian Information Exchange 
(SIX). 
29  Included in the index are 220 stocks, out of which the Danish, Finnish, and Norwegian 
markets contribute with 50 stocks each, and the Swedish with the residual 70. 
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0.4472. This shift in beta is not significant at any conventional significance 
level. After the option introduction the standard deviation is reduced on 
average by 6% in the underlying stocks, while the total market volatility 
increases by 8% on an average over the corresponding period. This means that 
the optioned stocks show a decreasing volatility during a period whereas the 
rest of the market shows an increase in volatility. This could potentially be an 
indication of a selection bias in the sample. It is possible that the options are 
introduced in the beginning of a period of rising volatility. The exchanges have 
a selection procedure to be able to see which securities have the necessary 
prerequisites for listing, where market conditions and circumstances in general 
are taken into account. Variables affecting the decision are likely to be, among 
others, volume, size, and liquidity. A consequence could be to that the sample 
of optioned stocks differs from that of non-optioned stocks. 
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Return effect 
The main results of the study are presented in Table 5 and Table 6. Note that 
in Table 5 the announcement day data are used, which only include stock 
returns from Norway and Sweden. In Table 6 returns from all Nordic markets 
are included. 
Announcement effect 
As a point of departure, abnormal returns around the announcement date are 
examined. It can be seen from column three in Table 530, showing the t-statistic 
for the excess return at each day, that there is essentially no evidence of excess 
returns on the announcement day. There is a small increase on day 0 of 0.15 
percent, with a t-statistic of 0.37. However, on the day after the announcement 
there is a substantial excess return of one percent, strongly significant with a t-
statistic of 2.67. Since the market participants in some cases do not have the 
possibility to immediately absorb and analyse the information on option 
introductions, or if the announcements reach them late in the afternoon, they 
may react either on day 0 or day 1. To check if traders do respond to the 
30  In Table 5 results from 21 days in the event window are presented. During the excluded 40 
days there are 5 days showing significant excess returns, out of which four occur in the pre-
listing period. 
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information on either the day of the announcement or the day after that, the 
cumulative effect over day 0 and 1 is tested. Over the two days the return effect 
is positive and amounts to 1.17 percent, which is significant with a t-statistic 
of 2.14. It is also worth noting that 67 percent of the securities on day 1 show 
positive excess returns. Thus, hypothesis (i) is rejected, as the outcome shows 
that there is a positive price effect of an option introduction in connection with 
the announcement. 
Table 5 Average and cumulative return residuals, and test statistics, around option introduction 
announcement 
The table shows 21 out of 61 daily excess returns and cumulative excess returns in the event window, defined 
to be 30 days before and after the announcement day of an option introduction. To calculate excess returns, a 
one-factor market model is used to describe normal returns, which are then subtracted from realised returns. 
The estimated parameters in the market model are adjusted for asynchronous trading using the Fowler-Rorke 
[1983] methodology to calculate betas. Thirty-nine stocks from Norway and Sweden are used and are grouped 
into 27 separate portfolios, one for each event date. In the first column the days are numbered according to the 
event time where day zero is the day of announcement. Columns two and three show the average excess return 
of the portfolios day by day with their respective t-statistic. Columns four and five show the cumulative average 
excess return, starting cumulating at date 0, with respective t-statistic. Returns are expressed in percentage 
terms. All t-statistics are asymptotically normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
DAY 
AVERAGE 
EXCESS RETURN T-STATISTIC 
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS RETURN T-STATISTIC 
-10 0.4098 1.0585 - - 
-9 0.4725 1.1979 - - 
-8 0.3339 0.8562 - - 
-7 0.1899 0.4385 - - 
-6 0.5019 1.2881 - - 
-5 0.3915 0.9981 - - 
-4 0.1861 0.4496 - - 
-3 -0.1924 -0.6729 - - 
-2 0.3460 0.8646 - - 
-1 0.0843 0.1791 - - 
0 0.1532 0.3665 0.1532 0.3665 
1 1.0203 2.6689 1.1734 2.1393 
2 -0.0835 -0.2916 1.0899 1.5730 
3 -0.3323 -0.9450 0.7576 0.8896 
4 0.1236 0.2631 0.8813 0.9095 
5 0.2398 0.5815 1.1211 1.0624 
6 0.0568 0.0745 1.1779 1.0086 
7 -0.5156 -1.4202 0.6622 0.4524 
8 0.0108 -0.0075 0.6730 0.4229 
9 0.2355 0.5959 0.9085 0.5826 
10 -0.6070 -1.6738 0.3015 0.0666 
 
Table 5, column four, presents cumulative excess returns from day 0 and 
onwards. Corresponding t-statistics are presented in column five. There is no 
evidence of a price reversal during the eleven-day period included in the table. 
This is also true for the rest of the event period following the announcement 
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date, even though this is not shown in the table. Therefore, hypothesis (ii), 
stating that there is no reversed price effect, cannot be rejected at a 
conventional significance level. 
Introduction effect 
The study of the introduction effect is based on data from all Nordic markets. 
The results from the analysis of the return effect around the introduction date  
Table 6 Average and cumulative return residuals, and test statistics, around option introduction 
The table shows 21 out of 61 daily excess returns and cumulative excess returns in the event window, defined 
to be 30 days before and after the listing day of an option. To calculate excess returns, a one-factor market 
model is used to describe normal returns, which are then subtracted from realised the returns. The estimated 
parameters in the market model are adjusted for asynchronous trading using the Fowler-Rorke [1983] 
methodology to calculate betas. Fifty-eight stocks from all Nordic markets (Denmark, Finland, Norway, and 
Sweden) are used and are grouped into 37 separate portfolios, one for each event date. In the first column the 
days are numbered according to the event time where day zero is the day of announcement. Columns two and 
three show the average excess returns of the portfolios day by day with their respective t-statistic. Columns four 
and five show the cumulative average excess returns, starting cumulating at date –4, with their respective t-
statistic. Columns six and seven show the cumulative average excess returns, starting cumulating at date –7, 
with their respective t-statistic. The returns are expressed in percentage terms. All t-statistics are asymptotically 
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
DAY 
AVERAGE 
EXCESS 
RETURN T-STATISTIC
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS 
RETURN T-STATISTIC
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS 
RETURN T-STATISTIC
-10 0.5123 1.5148 - - - - 
-9 0.0863 0.2181 - - - - 
-8 -0.2727 -1.0146 - - - - 
-7 0.5315 1.4455 - - 0.5315 1.4455 
-6 0.6547 1.9284 - - 1.1862 2.3775 
-5 0.3553 1.0210 - - 1.5415 2.5198 
-4 0.8909 2.6051 0.8909 2.6051 2.4324 3.4644 
-3 -0.2850 -0.9998 0.6059 1.1311 2.1474 2.6483 
-2 0.2950 0.8078 0.9009 1.3841 2.4424 2.7338 
-1 0.2637 0.7238 1.1646 1.5526 2.7061 2.7893 
0 -0.2750 -0.8722 0.8896 0.9991 2.4311 2.2986 
1 -0.1236 -0.4013 0.7660 0.7411 2.3075 2.0212 
2 0.1802 0.4731 0.9462 0.8595 2.4877 2.0579 
3 0.4809 1.4102 1.4270 1.2877 2.9686 2.3669 
4 -0.2738 -0.8850 1.1533 0.9236 2.6948 2.0134 
5 -0.0681 -0.2308 1.0852 0.8028 2.6267 1.8670 
6 0.1862 0.5244 1.2714 0.9158 2.8129 1.9278 
7 -0.2517 -0.8059 1.0196 0.6503 2.5612 1.6585 
8 0.3243 0.9369 1.3440 0.8723 2.8855 1.8239 
9 -0.3090 -0.9613 1.0350 0.5919 2.5765 1.5428 
10 -0.0712 -0.2475 0.9638 0.5089 2.5053 1.4392 
141 
are presented in Table 6.31 No immediate effect on the stock returns at the 
introduction date is found: the excess return cannot be distinguished from zero. 
This is true even if the returns from day 0 and +1 are cumulated and jointly 
tested. Therefore, hypothesis (iii) cannot be rejected. As a consequence, 
hypothesis (iv) is not of current interest. 
A reason for an effect around the introduction day could be the inventory build-
up by market makers for hedging purposes. More detailed information about 
the introduction date is provided in Table 7. This is done in order to see if the 
market participants are building inventories up to one week before the 
introduction. It is tested whether the cumulated excess returns over the trading 
days 0 to 1, -1 to 1, -2 to 1, and so on up to -5 to 1, differ significantly from 
zero.32 At no interval can any effect be found. 
Table 7 Tests of cumulative excess returns five days before option listing to one day after option 
listing 
CUMULATING DAYS CUMULATIVE EXCESS RETURN T-STATISTIC 
-5 – +1 1.1214 1.0611 
-4 – +1 0.7660 0.7411 
-3 – +1 -0.1248 -0.3301 
-2 – +1 0.1601 0.1224 
-1 – +1 -0.1349 -0.3179 
0 – +1 -0.3986 -0.8931 
 
In spite of the statement above, there is a significant price effect at date -4 
amounting to 0.9 percent. This could indicate the existence of a positive price 
effect caused by market makers building inventories of the share to hedge their 
future option positions. In that case the price effect should be temporary. But 
the effect is permanent; there are no price reversals, as can be seen from 
column five in Table 6. This statement holds for the whole 30-day period 
following the introduction. Considering that about 50 percent of the 
announcements occur seven to four days before the introduction date, it is 
possible that the announcement effect shows up as a positive excess return over 
the days -7 to -4. This argument is in line with the finding that there is no price 
reversal after the introduction date, and the significant cumulative effect during 
the days -7 to -4, found in column 6 and 7. 
                                                     
31  In Table 6 the results from 21 days in the event window are presented. During the 40 days 
not displayed in the table, there is only one significant excess return. 
32  Other intervals were also tested, with no interesting results. 
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Additional tests are made to disclose any possible patterns in the excess 
returns. Cumulative abnormal returns over days -10 to +2 are plotted against 
the calendar time, to see if there exists a learning process among the market 
participants. The hypothesis is that CARs could decrease over time as traders 
learn about the positive return effect. However, no results are found to support 
this idea. Further, both the total risk and the systematic risk prior to the 
introduction are plotted against, and regressed on the excess returns. This is 
done in order to test if there is a difference in the abnormal returns depending 
on whether the stocks are of a high-risk or low-risk type prior to the 
introduction. Again, no statistically significant results were obtained. 
Even though this study spans over a fairly long period of time, and the sample 
contains firms of variable size and age, the results cannot verify those of 
Sorescu (2000) and Mayhew and Mihov (1999). The reason could be that there 
is no time effect in the Nordic data, or that the short selling restrictions are not 
as severe in the Nordic markets. 
In summary, the combined results from Table 5 and Table 6 indicate that there 
is a positive price effect on the underlying securities of the option introduction 
associated with the announcement date, but not with the introduction date. The 
cumulative excess return over the announcement day and the day after that is 
significantly positive, amounting to about one percent. The figures in column 
five, Table 5, also show that the price effect is permanent. The Nordic stock 
markets, therefore, behave fairly efficiently, without anomalies or delayed 
effects. 
Selection bias or large firm effect 
Figure 3 shows a distressing effect. There is a persistent price increase 
continuing during the entire first half of the event window. This finding can 
have three explanations. 
Information could leak to the market participants prior to the actual 
announcement made by the respective stock exchange. This would lead to 
increasing prices if the information is considered as good news, and the 
information would be incorporated in the prices prior to the announcement day. 
Furthermore, the significant price increase prior to the event date could be a 
result of the fact that mainly large enterprises are selected for option trading. 
These large firms have for a long time done relatively well compared to the 
rest of the stock market. In an attempt to control for such a large firm effect, a 
large firm return-index was used instead of the market index. This did not alter 
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any of the results presented above. If anything, the results were confirmed on 
a higher level of significance. 
Figure 3 Cumulative return residuals around option introduction announcement 
 
The early price increase could also be due to the special selection criteria used 
by the exchange when deciding which stocks to base new option listings on 
(see also the discussion after Table 4). To be able to set prices on derivative 
products, the underlying securities must be fairly liquid. This means that large, 
profitable growth firms, which are heavily traded, will be of greatest interest 
to use as an underlying security. New listings will therefore follow only if the 
stock has reached a certain level of volume, size, and liquidity.33 Before a 
security reaches this threshold for being listed, it is probable that the stock is a 
‘winner’ in relation to the rest of the market. Just subtracting each stock return 
series by the market return for a few years prior to the listing shows that in 
general the stocks in the sample outperform the market. This speaks in favour 
of a strong increase in the cumulative excess returns that can be seen prior to 
                                                     
33  Mayhew and Mihov (1999) show that a firm’s size, volume, and volatility are positively 
related to the probability of having options on its stock listed. Thereby a potential selection 
bias is introduced. Forming control samples of stocks that were eligible, but not selected for 
an option introduction, they re-examine some of the option listing effects in the literature. 
The effects still persist after this selection bias has been taken into consideration. 
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the event dates. Therefore, the outcome could be explained as a selection bias 
phenomenon. 
4.4.2 Risk effect 
Total risk 
The results presented in this section originate from the examination of 
volatility in the underlying stocks at the introduction date only. The returns 
used to estimate portfolio variances are largely the same as for volatility 
measures around the announcement date and the introduction date. Twenty-
one consecutive trading days are used in measuring volatility, and the median 
number of the trading days between announcement and introduction is five. 
Therefore, the results are virtually the same, independently of which of the two 
possible event dates are used. Even though the previous section indicates that 
the return effect is more associated with the announcement day, the listing day 
has been used as the defined event. It enables the use of option introductions 
from all Nordic markets, i.e. to enlarge the sample from 22 to 31 portfolios. 
In Table 8, column two, twenty months of average excess standard deviations 
are presented. Excess standard deviations are expressed on a yearly basis. 
Cumulative excess standard deviations are calculated by adding the monthly 
deviations over time, and these values are used in the tests displayed in column 
five and seven. However, the cumulative excess standard deviations have no 
economical interpretation, but give some guidance to where the results are 
heading. The event occurs the first day in month one. The outcome of the ten 
months prior to the event month indicates how well the model works. As long 
as the model has some predictive power, there should be no significant excess 
standard deviation during the ten months prior to the introduction. As seen in 
Table 8, column three, none of the first ten months exhibit any significant 
excess volatility at a five-percent significance level. Neither shows the 
cumulated excess standard deviation over the ten-month period prior to the 
announcement any significant abnormal volatility. The t-statistics are 
presented in column five. During the following ten-month period after the 
introduction, six months (month 1 through 5, and 10) exhibit significant 
abnormal volatility. However, during the months with a significant decrease in 
standard deviation, the reduction in standard deviation lies between six and 
seven percent in the respective months. The figures from the whole period of 
ten consecutive months show a reduction in volatility. This makes it interesting 
to test whether the cumulative effect is significant. In column six and seven, 
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the cumulative excess standard deviations and their respective t-statistics for 
the ten months after the introduction date are presented. The cumulative effect 
shows a significant reduction in volatility after the introduction. 
It is hard to give the numbers in column four and six a sound economic 
interpretation, since the standard deviations do not sum up to a meaningful 
number. In spite of the problems with interpreting the numbers, the tests are 
still valid since the residuals are normally distributed by assumption. The 
results attained when implementing the model that utilises the variances 
 
Table 8 Average and cumulative volatility residuals, and test statistics, around option listing 
The table shows excess standard deviations and cumulative excess standard deviations in the event window, 
defined to be ten months before and ten after the announcement day of an option introduction. The day of listing 
is included as the first day in the first month in event time following the introduction. To calculate excess volatility, 
a one-factor market model is used to describe normal volatility, which is then subtracted from the realised 
volatility. Monthly standard deviations, estimated over 21 consecutive trading days, are used as a volatility 
measure. Forty-eight stocks from all Nordic markets are used and are grouped into 31 separate portfolios, one 
for each event date. In the first column the months are numbered in event time where month one is the month 
including the listing day. Columns two and three show the average excess standard deviations of the portfolios 
month by month with their respective t-statistic. The standard deviations are expressed on a yearly basis. 
Columns four and five show the cumulative average excess standard deviations starting cumulating at month –
9, with their respective t-statistic. Columns six and seven show the cumulative average excess standard 
deviations starting cumulating at month 1, with their respective t-statistic. All t-statistics are asymptotically 
normally distributed with mean zero and standard deviation one. 
MONTH 
AVERAGE 
EXCESS STD T-STATISTIC 
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS STD 
T-STATISTIC 
FROM MONTH 
–9 TO 10 
CUMULATIVE 
EXCESS STD 
T-STATISTIC 
FROM MONTH 
1 TO 10 
-9 -0.0049 -0.2122 -0.0049 -0.2122 - - 
-8 0.0240 0.9778 0.0191 0.5094 - - 
-7 0.0269 1.0608 0.0460 0.9250 - - 
-6 0.0350 1.4116 0.0809 1.3460 - - 
-5 -0.0017 -0.0666 0.0793 1.1331 - - 
-4 -0.0263 -1.0613 0.0529 0.6706 - - 
-3 -0.0455 -1.8358 0.0075 0.0856 - - 
-2 -0.0417 -1.6833 -0.0342 -0.3593 - - 
-1 -0.0220 -0.8839 -0.0562 -0.5459 - - 
0 -0.0193 -0.7780 -0.0755 -0.6850 - - 
1 -0.0587 -2.3684 -0.1342 -1.1430 -0.0587 -2.3684 
2 -0.0655 -2.6321 -0.1997 -1.6075 -0.1242 -3.1387 
3 -0.0589 -2.3738 -0.2586 -1.9737 -0.1830 -3.5423 
4 -0.0664 -2.6738 -0.3249 -2.3567 -0.2494 -3.9999 
5 -0.0663 -2.6370 -0.3913 -2.7079 -0.3157 -4.3874 
6 -0.0406 -1.6052 -0.4318 -2.8575 -0.3563 -4.3893 
7 -0.0349 -1.3886 -0.4668 -2.9603 -0.3912 -4.3612 
8 -0.0476 -1.9227 -0.5144 -3.1364 -0.4389 -4.4947 
9 -0.0309 -1.2409 -0.5453 -3.2063 -0.4698 -4.4663 
10 -0.0663 -2.6473 -0.6116 -3.4831 -0.5361 -4.7790 
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instead of the standard deviation in equation (3), it is possible to get an idea of 
what an interpretable number could be for the reduction in standard deviation 
over the ten-month period after the introduction. By assumption there are no 
autocorrelations in the residual variances. Therefore, it is possible to cumulate 
the monthly residual variances over the period. Cumulating and taking the 
square root of the excess variance over the total ten-month period results in a 
number that can be interpreted as the cumulative reduction in standard 
deviation over the ten-month period. The result is a reduction of the standard 
deviation by 21.9 percent on a yearly basis, i.e. if the standard deviation were 
40 percent before the announcement, it would be 31 percent one year later. 
Thus, as total risk has changed, hypothesis (v) is rejected. 
To see if the volatility effect has changed over time, the time of introduction is 
regressed upon the cumulative excess volatility for each stock. No significant 
time pattern is found, so the results of Mayhew and Mihov (1999) cannot be 
verified. An explanation might be that the Nordic exchanges have not yet 
exhausted the obvious candidates for listing, and are therefore still listing 
options in response to the permanent characteristics of the stocks, rather than 
to changes in market conditions, such as anticipated high volatility. 
Idiosyncratic Risk 
Variance ratios are used to test for a change in the idiosyncratic risk in 
connection with an option introduction. The total risk is also studied at the 
same time, using the same methodology, enabling a comparison between the 
different types of risks. The results are therefore presented together in this 
section. 
As can be seen from Table 9, the two average SVRs are less than one (0.983 
and 0.976), indicating that both the measured residual risk and the return 
volatility decline after the options have been introduced. Because the 
expectation of a ratio in general is greater than the ratio of expectations due to 
Jensen’s inequality, it is likely that the median ratio is more informative. For 
the ten-month period considered, the median ratio is 0.909 and 0.843 
respectively, indicating that the total volatility is reduced by almost 16%, while 
the firm specific volatility is reduced by 9 %. Testing the median to be different 
from one results in p-values in the order of 11%. 
Due to the high p-value, the hypothesis (vi) cannot be rejected using variance 
ratios as measurement. The lack of significance when using variance ratios 
could, however, be explained by the low-powered test methodology. Support 
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Table 9 Variance ratios and standardised variance ratios for idiosyncratic and total risk around option 
introduction 
The table shows variance ratios (VR) and standardised variance ratios (SVR) for 58 firms with optioned stocks. 
Market model residuals estimated with ten months of daily returns before and after the listing date are used to 
estimate the idiosyncratic risk. The residuals are used to calculate variances before and after the listing. Ten 
months of daily returns are used to estimate the stock return variance before and after the listing date. 
Standardised variance ratios are calculated by dividing each period’s variance by its corresponding market 
variance. The standardisation adjusts for contemporaneous shifts in market volatility. 
 IDIOSYNCRATIC RISK TOTAL RISK 
 VR SVR VR SVR 
Mean 1.188 0.9835 1.193 0.976 
Median 1.008 0.909 1.007 0.843 
     
Proportion of firms with declining volatility 0.50 0.55 0.50 0.57 
     
No. of VR significantly greater than one 20 12 20 12 
No. of VR significantly less than one 17 26 17 26 
     
Wilcoxon Test p-value for H0: Median  = 1 0.423 0.113 0.394 0.112 
 
for this statement can be found when comparing the results from the previous 
section studying the effect on the total risk. As is shown there, the effect is 
strongly significant, but when using variance ratios, the total risk effect is 
insignificant. Nabar and Park (1994) also point out the lack of power when 
using variance ratios. Even though the results are not statistically significant at 
conventional significance levels, it seems that more than half of the reduction 
of the total risk can be explained by a decline in the firm specific risk. 
Systematic Risk 
In the light of the significant decrease in the total risk, and considering that 
only half of it is explained by a reduction in the idiosyncratic risk, it could be 
expected that also the systematic risk would be influenced by the introduction 
of options. The analysis of the data has not supported this expectation. 
Estimating equation (9), 30 stocks out of 58 showed a reduction in beta. Six of 
these stocks showed significant shifts. Twenty-eight stocks showed an increase 
in beta after the option listing. Four of these were significant shifts. The shift 
coefficients were also plotted against calendar time. The coefficients were 
evenly distributed around zero with no time trend to be detected. Thus, the 
hypothesis (vii), presuming no change in the systematic risk, cannot be 
rejected. 
This result differs from that of Alkebäck and Hagelin (1998), who find a 
significant decline in beta in their sample of Swedish optioned stocks. This 
148 
difference may be explained by a difference in the methodology used, and by 
the fact that they use average bid-ask spreads instead of transaction prices. 
To conclude from the results in this section, the total risk in the underlying 
stocks are reduced on an average by 21.9 percent during the ten-month period 
after the introduction of options. Six out of ten individual months show a 
significant reduction in volatility, and the downward trend over the whole ten-
month period is clear and significant. Although not significant, part of the 
reduction of the total risk can be attributed to the reduction in the idiosyncratic 
risk. No evidence could be found in support of the possibility that option listing 
effects the systematic risk of the underlying stocks. These findings are in 
accordance with findings in other studies. The results support the idea that 
introducing options enhance people’s investment opportunities in a risk-
reducing and market-stabilising way. 
Table 10 Stability of beta around option introduction 
The table shows the results from running 58 separate regressions for each firm of optioned stocks. The 
regression model used is the one described in equation (11). 361 days of returns are used in the estimation. The 
dummy variable in the model takes the value one in the periods following the option listing and zero otherwise. 
The table shows the shift coefficient 𝛾௜ and the number of shifts in beta, with their respective shift direction. 
Average 𝛾௜-value 0.0175 t-Statistic 0.22 
No. of negative shifts 30 No. of sign. Neg. shifts 6 
No. of positive shifts 28 No. of sign. Pos. shifts 4 
4.5 Conclusions 
In the Nordic countries, the introduction of standardised options with stocks as 
underlying securities has reached a volume, and has covered a time span long 
enough to generate data for a statistical analysis of the effects of option trading. 
The results of this investigation are mostly in accordance with the outcome of 
studies based on data from other countries, mainly the USA. 
The introduction of options has proved to render the underlying stocks a 
significant price increase, and a persistent excess return compared to an index 
indicating normal return. The positive effect is strong and similar in magnitude 
to those in studies based on data from other countries. Contrary to the 
experiences from other studies, however, the observed increase in return seems 
to be associated with the date of announcement of the option program, rather 
than the date of introduction. Further, there is no evidence of a trend in the size 
of the price effect, as found in recent work based on option introductions made 
in the US. The findings in this study are therefore in harmony with the market 
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efficiency hypothesis and the expectations that prices should be promptly 
adjusted when additional information reaches the market participants. 
The positive price effect could be explained by a change in the risk of the 
underlying stock. An increased systematic risk or an increased idiosyncratic 
risk can lead to a price increase, assuming that the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM) holds. As the results show, no statistically significant support can be 
found for this argument. It can also be argued that options expand the 
opportunity set of investors and promote risk reallocation, which can be 
beneficial to market participants. To the degree that the investors experience a 
better control of the financial risk when options are introduced, the required 
yield can be reduced. 
The impact on the total risk is also favourable, and in line with findings in other 
studies. No influence on the systematic risk could be verified. The volatility in 
the underlying stocks is found to decrease continuously for ten months after 
the introduction of the option program. Further, there is no evidence of a trend 
in the size of the volatility effect, as found in recent US studies. These results 
support the notions that derivatives widen the investment choices of the market 
participants, decrease risks, and provide improved hedging opportunities. 
The reduced total risk could be explained by a reduction in the systematic 
and/or idiosyncratic risk. However, the last mentioned two types of risks have 
not significantly changed. One reason may be the power of the methodology 
used, and given the amount of data. It is also possible that the total risk will 
shift without a change in the systematic risk, since an introduction of options 
should not affect the balance sheet of a company. In this case the different risk 
levels can be attributed to a change in the idiosyncratic risk, although this has 
not been possible to verify at conventional significance levels. 
In all, this study supports the idea that option introductions make markets more 
efficient. Nothing in the analysis gives any indication that derivative trading 
should contribute to financial unrest. On the contrary, option programs seem 
to add increased stability to the market. 
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4.7 Appendix A 
To investigate the price effect of an option introduction, an event study is 
undertaken. When calculating the abnormal returns of a security, the normal 
return over the event window is subtracted from the actual ex-post return. A 
modified market model implementing Fowler-Rorke (1983) betas, which 
adjusts for non-synchronous trading, is used to model the normal returns.34 It 
is assumed that the error term in the market model is normally distributed. 
𝜀௜̂∗ = 𝑅௜∗ − 𝛼ො௜𝜄 − 𝛽መ௜𝑅௠∗  (A1) 
𝜀௜̂∗ Abnormal return 
𝑅௜∗ Vector of daily stock returns in the event window 
𝑅௠∗  Vector of daily market returns in the event window 
𝜄 Vector of ones 
𝛼ො௜∗ Intercept coefficient estimated in the estimation window 
𝛽መ௜∗ Regression coefficient estimated in the estimation window 
The parameters in the market model are estimated on data in a period of 150 
days after the event window (see Figure 1). To test for significant abnormal 
returns on individual stocks when options are introduced, the abnormal returns 
are averaged across stocks: 
𝜀∗ = ଵே ∑ 𝜀௜̂∗ே௜ୀଵ . (A2) 
Because of the uncertainty about the event date, it is sometimes interesting to 
test the abnormal return earned over a period of time. For this exercise the 
abnormal return is added over the considered time period. Define 𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) 
to denote the cumulative average abnormal return from 𝜏ଵ to 𝜏ଶ, where 𝜏ଵ and 
                                                     
34  Fowler-Rorke betas are calculated by running the regression below: 
𝑅௧ = 𝛼 + 𝛽ିି𝑅𝑚௧ିଶ + 𝛽ି𝑅𝑚௧ିଵ + 𝛽଴𝑅𝑚௧ + 𝛽ା𝑅𝑚௧ାଵ + 𝛽ାା𝑅𝑚௧ାଶ  
The stock’s beta is then a weighted sum of the estimated regression parameters, as follows: 
𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑚𝛽መ = ଵାఘభାఘమଵାଶఘభାଶఘమ 𝛽
ିି + ଵାଶఘభାఘమଵାଶఘభାଶఘమ 𝛽
ି + 𝛽଴ + ଵାଶఘభାఘమଵାଶఘభାଶఘమ 𝛽
ା + ଵାఘభାఘమଵାଶఘభାଶఘమ 𝛽
ାା  
The superscripts ++, +, 0, -, and -- indicate that each time series is shifted two days’ lead, 
one day’s lead, no lag, one day’s lag, and two days’ lag. 𝜌ଵ and 𝜌ଶ are the first and second 
order autocorrelation coefficients. This way of estimating beta is consistent with the 
methodology proposed by Scholes-Williams (1977). 
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𝜏ଶ are two dates within the event window. For the cumulative average 
abnormal return we have: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) = ∑ 𝜀௧∗ఛమ௧ୀఛభ . (A3) 
The average cumulative abnormal returns are normally distributed with an 
expected abnormal return of zero. This can be used to draw an inference about 
the abnormal returns. To derive a test statistic that can be used to test for the 
significance of the average cumulative abnormal return, the variance of the 
average cumulative abnormal return in equation (A3) is needed. Denote the 
covariance matrix of the estimated abnormal return by 𝑉௜ = 𝐸ൣ𝜀௜̂∗𝜀௜∗ᇱ|𝑋௜∗൧. Let 
𝛾 be a (61 x 1) vector with ones in the position of the days corresponding to 
the interval 𝜏ଵ to 𝜏ଶ and zeros elsewhere. Aggregating the covariance matrices 
𝑉௜ across stocks results in a covariance matrix for the average abnormal return 
vector 𝜀∗, i.e. 
𝑉𝑎𝑟൫𝜀∗൯ = 𝑉 = ଵேమ ∑ 𝑉௜ே௜ୀଵ . (A4) 
By using the gamma vector to aggregate over time the variance of the average 
cumulative abnormal return can be calculated as 
𝑉𝑎𝑟ൣ𝐶𝐴𝑅(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ)൧ = 𝜎ଶ(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) = 𝛾′𝑉𝛾.  (A5) 
The hypothesis that the abnormal return is equal to zero can be tested by using 
the test statistic 
𝐽 = ஼஺ோ(ఛభ,ఛమ)
ටఙ෡మ(ఛభ,ఛమ)
௔
~ 𝑁(0,1) (A6)
where a sample estimate of 𝜎ଶ(𝜏ଵ, 𝜏ଶ) is used. 
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4.8 Appendix B 
The following is the derivation of the estimation procedure for the different 
volatility models proposed in section two, equation (3). The standard deviation   
will be used throughout the derivation, but the derivation is the same 
independently of the volatility measure. Just change 𝜎 to any of the other two 
measures. The notation used in the derivation follows Nabar and Park (1994), 
and Judge et al. (1980). The derivation is carried out for one single security. 
Let 
𝑌 = ൥
𝜎௜,ଵ
⋮
𝜎௜,்
൩  
be the vector of independent values during the estimation period, and  
𝑋 = ቎
1 𝜎௠,ଵ
⋮ ⋮
1 𝜎௠,்
቏  
be the matrix of dependent variables in the estimation window. 𝜎௜௧ is the 
standard deviation of stock 𝑖 in month 𝑡 and 𝜎௠௧ is the standard deviation of 
the market index in month 𝑡. Also, let 
𝜀 = ൥
𝜀ଵ
⋮
𝜀்
൩ (B1) 
be the disturbance vector, which is assumed to be normally distributed. Recall 
that the market model for standard deviations is 
𝜎௜௧ = 𝑎௜ + 𝑏௜𝜎௠௧ + 𝑒௜௧. (B2) 
This can be expressed as a regression system on the form 
𝑌 = 𝑋𝛽 + 𝜀, (B3) 
where 𝛽 = ሾ𝑎 𝑏ሿᇱ is the vector of parameters. In this case assume that the 
residuals follow an AR(1) process, i.e. 
𝜖ఛ𝜌𝜀ఛିଵ + 𝜈ఛ ⟹ 𝜎ఌଶ = ఌഌ
మ
ଵିఘమ . (B4) 
Let 𝜀̂ be the OLS residual and estimate 𝜌 = 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝜀௧̂, 𝜀௧̂ିଵ) by 
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𝜌ො = ∑ ఌො೟ఌො೟షభ೅೟సమ∑ ఌො೟మ೅೟సభ . (B5) 
Estimate the variance of the residual in the AR(1) process by 
𝜎ොఔଶ = (௒ି௑ఉ)
ᇲ௉෠ᇲ௉෠(௒ି௑ఉ)
்ି௄ , (B6) 
where 𝑃෠ is the estimated transformation matrix. The estimation is done by 
using 𝜌ො. The transformation matrix is described next. If 
𝐸(𝜀𝜀ᇱ) = 𝜎ఌଶΩ = ఙഌ
మ
ଵିఘమ Ω = 𝜎ఔଶΨ (B7)
let 
𝑃ᇱ𝑃 = Ψିଵ (B8)
where 𝑃 is a transformation matrix. Using 𝜌 it looks like 






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−
=
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01000
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0001
00001
ρ
ρ
ρ
ρ


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


P . (B9) 
From the definition of P, it follows that 






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(B10) 
and 
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









−
−+
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−
=Ψ −
100
1
00
1
001
2
2
1
ρ
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ρ





. (B11) 
Transform the data 
𝑃𝑌 = 𝑃𝑋𝛽 + 𝑃𝜀  
     ⟹ 𝑌∗ = 𝑋∗𝛽 + 𝑃𝜀  
     ⟹ 𝛽መ = (𝑋ᇱΩିଵ𝑋)ିଵ(𝑋ᇱΩିଵ𝑌) (B12) 
     ⟹ 𝜀̂ = 𝑌 − 𝑋𝛽መ   
Post estimation period residuals become 
𝜀்̂ ାଵ∗ = 𝑦்ାଵ∗ − 𝛽መᇱ𝑥்ାଵ∗ − 𝜌𝜀்̂   
𝜀்̂ ା௡∗ = 𝑦்ା௡∗ − 𝛽መᇱ𝑥்ା௡∗ − 𝜌௡𝜀்̂  (B13) 
and result in a 1 by n vector 
𝜀∗ = 𝑌∗ − 𝑋∗𝛽መ − 𝑉ᇱΨିଵ൫𝑌 − 𝑋𝛽መ൯ = 𝑌∗ − 𝑋∗𝛽መ𝑉ᇱΨିଵ𝜀̂, (B14) 
where n is the number of months in the event window. 𝑌∗ and 𝑋∗ are the 
dependent and independent variables in the event window, see Figure 2. The 
matrix V is described in what follows. To be able to draw an inference about 
the abnormal variances 𝜀∗, the covariance matrix has to be derived. Let 
𝐸 ቂቀ 𝜀𝜀∗ቁ (𝜀ᇱ 𝜀∗ᇱ)ቃ = 𝜎ఔଶ ቂ
Ψ 𝑉
𝑉 Ψ∗ቃ = 𝐸 ൤
𝜀𝜀ᇱ 𝜀𝜀∗ᇱ
𝜀∗𝜀ᇱ 𝜀∗𝜀∗ᇱ൨ (B15) 
then 
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 (B16) 
and 
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The variance covariance matrix becomes 
Σ = 𝐸ൣ𝜀̂∗𝜀̂∗ᇱ|𝑿∗, Ψିଵ, 𝑽൧ = 
= 𝜎ఔଶൣ𝑿∗𝑪𝑿∗ᇱ + Ψ∗ − 𝑽ᇱ(Ψିଵ − Ψିଵ𝑿𝑪𝑿ᇱΨିଵ)𝑽 −
−𝑿∗𝑪𝑿ᇱΨିଵ𝑽 − 𝑽ᇱΨିଵ𝑿𝑪𝑿∗ᇱ൧   (B18) 
where 
𝐶 = ሾ𝑋ᇱΨିଵ𝑋ሿିଵ. (B19) 
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